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Realist approaches to the study of ideology have treated ideologies as static ideas that 
mediate between presumed social realities and political powers. In this research the 
researcher views ideology as discursive practice that constitutes social realities through 
producing its subjects. A series of formal narrative models are established to tackle the 
fundamental discursive structures of ideological texts. Temporal narrative analysis is used to 
reconstruct grand narrative in terms of causality and social categorization. Models of 
narrative modes, genres, and modalities are established to examine the processes of self-
identity formation. Furthermore, a semantic analytical approach is devised to examine the 
associations among social identities, action modalization, and emotional displays and 
transformations. 
Using the theoretical and analytical models established, the researcher conducted a 
case study on the Chinese communist ideology. Three types of texts (i.e. government 
pronouncements, personal stories, and editorials) are sampled from People's Daily. Analysis 
of government pronouncements shows that the Chinese communist ideological system 
typically opposes traditional Chinese culture as its antithesis. Different from traditional 
Chinese historical discourse, the communist ideology imposes a single teleological material 
cause on the organization of historical events. This ideological system contains two distinct 
sets of social categories: "we" and "they." Certain elements in the two sets are rendered 
ambiguous at initial stages of mass movements to provide targets. In contrast to traditional 
Chinese culture in which social identities change in degree, social identities in the communist 
ideological system change in kind. 
V 
Analysis of personal narratives shows that one's actantial role in a story is determined 
by one's social identity. Narrative conflicts are typically resolved through communications 
that are initiated by an in-group person. The ideology's typical narrative modality is the 
"right" modality, which is often opposed to the traditional "obligation" modality. A semantic 
analysis conducted on editorials shows that proposed in-group actions are of primary 
importance in this ideology and only negative emotions are discursively transformable as 
potentials for action. 
This research offers an alternative to traditional discourses on totalitarian ideology. 
Findings of this research challenge the assumption that modern totalitarian system emerges in 




TOTALITARIANISM, CULTURE, AND IDEOLOGY 
The term totalitarianism has been used to describe a new type of social political 
organization that emerged in the 20th century, a social political system that is an 
amalgamation of three hierarchical elements: power, money/property, and knowledge 
(Korchak 1994). Although totalitarian ideologies have been consistently identified as a 
distinctive feature of such social and political systems, studies on totalitarian systems have 
treated ideologies as secondary, doctrines that legitimate political powers. In this research I 
view ideology as discursive practice that opposes preexisting cultural traditions as its "other" 
and constitutes its own subjects. My goal is threefold. First, by providing an alternative 
epistemological foundation to ontological realism, I intend to establish a perspective from 
which ideology is seen as an autonomous space, within which discursive instances occur. 
Second, in order to examine various genres of ideological texts, I establish a set of narrative 
models that allows me to reconstruct the fundamental discursive structures of such texts and 
social and political processes that are of the production of the texts. Third, employing these 
theoretical and analytical models in a case study, I intend to reveal some aspects of the 
Chinese communist system that have been concealed by conventional totalitarianism 
discourse without basing my analysis on other metaphorical prototypes such as the German 
Nazi or Soviet Union. My focus is on one component of the Chinese communist system, 
ideology, which is consensually recognized as a distinctive feature of modern and 
contemporary totalitarian systems. This choice of subject matter makes it possible for me to 
bring in traditional Chinese culture as a basis for comparison. The discursive structure and 
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strategies of the communist ideological system are examined against its social cultural 
"other," namely traditional Chinese culture. 
Totalitarianism Discourses 
Until very recently modernization and liberalist discourses have dominated the study 
of modern totalitarianism and totalitarian politics (Halberstam 1998). On one hand, 
modernization discourse on totalitarianism has resulted from efforts to understand the 
political and social oddities in the West such as Nazism. On the other, this discourse is a 
product of research on the Western economic and political expansion. Liberalist discourse 
can be understood as a self-understanding of the democratic Western societies that posit 
totalitarianism as its antithesis or its "political other." 
Modernization discourse focuses on the question, "How are totalitarian systems 
possible?" Studies along this tradition have brought social and political transformations into 
its perspective and examined the conditions that sufficed for the establishment of totalitarian 
systems (Arendt 1951, Moore 1966, Skocpol 1994 [1979], Dumont 1994). In general, 
scholars in this camp locate the emergence of totalitarian systems within a grander process of 
modernization, and view totalitarian systems as perversions of or departures from the goal of 
human emancipation; occasioned by the Enlightenment and facilitated by a focus on 
rationalization and instrumentalization (Halberstam 1999). In Origins of Totalitarianism 
(1951), Arendt argues that a necessary condition for the emergence of a totalitarian system is 
a historical moment when a society appears to be classless. According to Arendt, class 
always exists in an organized manner and is represented by a party or parties. If a majority of 
a society is not represented, it can be mobilized by some elite cliques through propaganda 
and terror, whereby other political competitors are destroyed. Thus the emergence of a 
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totalitarian system requires the absence of representative political parties, the availability of 
mobilizable masses, and manipulation of an elite. This argument follows Pareto's theory 
(1979 [1901]) on the circulation of elites and Borkenau's theory (1940) on totalitarianism. 
Arendt's theory differs from Pareto's in that it embeds the emergence of totalitarianism in 
specific historical backgrounds of capitalist development and the rise of modern nationalism. 
Dumont (1994) examines specifically the formation of German totalitarian ideology. 
According to Dumont, the German intellectual elite had to deal with the contradiction 
between the universalist discourse of human emancipation and the need for a German 
national identity. Through a series of historical transformations, this elite managed to capture 
a German identity within an emancipation discourse lodged in a discourse that posits the 
German state as the highest form of the spirit of life. Like Arendt's theory, Dumont's is 
similar to Pareto's in its emphasis on the elite. 
Sociologists such as Moore (1966) and Skocpol (1991 [1979]) do not explicitly 
address the emergence of totalitarianism. However, as part of modernization discourse, their 
studies on social revolutions shed light on the emergence of totalitarianism. Their works 
follow the trajectory of modernization. Different from Arendt, both Moore and Skocpol 
assume class as their basic unit of analysis and treat various classes as agents in revolutions. 
Thus, the breakdown of the old bureaucratic functionalities, the degree of resource 
mobilization of various classes, the allies they formed, and the conflicts among the classes 
are factors that eventually lead to the victory of one class, oftentimes giving rise to 
totalitarian systems. 
Modernization sociologists, such as Rostow (1964), Smelser (1964), and Lipset 
(1963), prescribe stages of economic development and couple these stages with 
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corresponding political systems. In their theoretical scheme, political systems are outcomes 
of economic development. The inability of this type of theorization to explain the Soviet 
Union's level of economic development and its nonexistent level of democracy highlights the 
peculiarity or perverseness of such totalitarian systems relative to other more "normal" social 
forms. 
In contrast to modernization discourse, liberalist discourse on totalitarianism focuses 
on what constitutes the "normal" operation of totalitarian systems. The question at the center 
of this discourse is, "How does a totalitarian system work?" Theories and studies along this 
tradition ground their definitions in Western democratic liberal ideals and treat totalitarian 
systems as anything that a democracy is not (Halberstam 1999). Although recognizing the 
rational components of a totalitarian system such as its routinized bureaucratic operation, 
Brzezinski (1956) characterizes totalitarian systems such as Nazi Germany and Soviet Union 
of fanatic, irrational, and brutal. He further argues that rationalization, bureaucratization, and 
economic development will not change the nature of the totalitarian system. Such 
developments would only enhance and improve the method of control through terror. 
In his insightful book Totalitarianism and the Modern Conception of Politics, 
Halberstam (1999) summarizes this discourse as having four main components. First, a 
totalitarian system rules by force, not consent. It "eradicates political freedom, democratic 
process, and legality as such, by setting up the daily pronouncements of the ruler and of the 
party as an omnipotent force with unchecked powers to exercise control over the institutions 
of the state as well as all other social institutions" (1999, p. 5). Second, totalitarianism 
violates freedom of conscience by forcibly disseminating an ideology that is supposed to 
dominate all aspects of one's consciousness. Third, totalitarianism violates the boundaries 
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between public and private spheres by politicizing all domains of one's life. Fourth, the 
totalitarian system is both irrational and over-rational. It is irrational in that it appeals to 
"quasi-religious sentiments" to win support for policies that are neither in the interest of the 
individual nor in the interest of the community as a whole. It is over-rational in its 
technologies of control over the population and of maintaining power. Research guided by 
such definitions tends to reveal characteristics in opposition to those of democratic societies. 
Examples include Hollander's study of Soviet literature (1966), Inkles's report on daily life 
in the Soviet Union (1959), and Whyte's research on Chinese small groups and "political 
study" sessions (1974). 
Most of the perspectives, models, and theories on totalitarian systems have severe 
limitations, partly due to their having been established by outsiders of totalitarian systems. 
Modernization discourse's difficulty lies in its own totalizing tendency both in its claim of 
historical continuity and in its claim of a single trajectory of development. Liberalist 
discourse highlights differences between democratic and totalitarian societies but fails to 
reveal either similarities between the two, or complexities of both. After China's Open 
Policy, especially after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the fall of the Berlin Wall, 
insiders within China, East Europe, and Russia have conducted many studies. Although these 
scholars have provided tremendous new information on experiences from inside those 
totalitarian systems, most of them have unreflectively embraced the two traditions just 
discussed. 
There is always a risk of misinterpreting a passage of modern Chinese history when 
either of these traditions is applied. The risk is threefold. First, totalitarianism discourse has 
often been embedded in a modernization discourse. In this light, totalitarianism is understood 
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as a perverted and sometimes deformed artifact of the ideals of the Enlightenment with 
implications counter to emancipation (Arendt 1951, Halberstam, 1998). From these traditions 
questions arise about the Chinese case. In what sense are Chinese communist experiences the 
consequences of a modernizing process? In what sense did the Chinese communist regime 
"pervert" the Western ideal type of modernization and emancipation? Why and how did this 
perversion occur? 
As a second limitation, the totalitarianism thesis embedded in modernization 
discourse is itself totalizing in that it attempts to unify the very different experiences of 
peoples under very different regimes by resorting to a presumption of historical continuity, 
coherence, and prescribed trajectory. For example, one might argue that the Chinese 
experience of modernization is characteristic of interruption, disruption, and incoherence. 
Then, one might ask, does the modernization perspective offer any meaningful interpretation 
of such Chinese experience? 
The third limitation lies in the "Chinese characteristics" of the Chinese communist 
regime. For instance, Korchak (1994) points out that totalitarianism is not new in China. This 
leads one to question whether Chinese experience of totalitarianism might best be understood 
without a liberalist tradition as its antithesis. In other words, it becomes difficult to 
characterize the Chinese communist regime as a perverted version of "old-fashioned" 
Chinese totalitarianism. 
Halberstam (1998) suggests that Westerner's understanding of the Soviet Union was 
mostly achieved through equating the Soviet with the Nazi regime. In other words, the Nazi 
regime was used as a prototype (or a metaphor) in historical, social, and political studies to 
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render Soviet communist society comprehensible. Later, images of each regime were 
metaphorically and reciprocally used to understand the other. 
My challenge is to develop a perspective without the shortcomings of the two existing 
metaphors of totalitarianism but that allows the uniqueness of the Chinese communist 
experiences to be understood. However, the above-mentioned limitations should not be 
understood as a rejection either of the two totalitarianism theses or of the research 
accomplishments associated with them. Pointing out these limitations functions as a reminder 
of problems this analysis is intended to overcome. 
Culture and Cultural Frames 
Culture as a theoretical concept was popularized by anthropologists and sociologists 
in the middle of the last century. Traditionally, culture was defined as the totality of the 
beliefs, values, customs, art, and laws of a society. Until the 1960s the sociological study of 
culture remained focused on moral values, beliefs, and customs supposedly held by 
consensual members of a society. During this period sociological studies of culture presumed 
an unquestioned expertise of the social scientist and an understanding of culture as ideas. 
Ethnomethodologists such Harold Garfinkel emerged in the 1960s with their unique research 
strategies and the theoretical backdrop of Schutz's phenomenology. Together with its 
epistemological foundation, this methodology is characterized by an emphatic focus on the 
practice of culture and a clear distinction between the researcher's theoretical structure and 
the practical theoretical structure of the researched. However, culture has not achieved a 
central place in sociological studies, mostly due to the conceptualization of culture as 
epiphenomenal, as secondary to social relations and structures (Hays 1994). 
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The early 1990s saw a renewed interest in the concept of culture and serious efforts at 
theorization (Kane 1991, Hays 1994. Emirbayer and Goodwin 1994). It appears that 
Giddens's (1984) structuration theory was one of the main sources of inspiration. 
Traditionally the notion of social structure relied on an "architecture" metaphor that is 
resilient to change. As a result, social structure is understood as a powerful and immovable 
force that dictates social practice. Giddens's re-conceptualization of structure as generative 
rules and resources available to the social agent enables the sociologist to conceive culture as 
rules and hence a game metaphor replaces the architecture metaphor. However, the dualism 
of the cultural versus the social remained, though culture was granted more explanatory 
power and autonomy as a logic or frame for structuring social relations. As Hays (1994) 
points out, this wave of theorization adheres to the opposition between the cultural and the 
social, the material and the ideal, the objective and subjective, the external and the internal, 
the malleable and the non-malleable, the necessary and the contingent. In a sense, culture, as 
a theoretical concept, acquires its meaning through an opposition to its theoretical antithesis, 
namely the social. Hays seems to be one most acutely aware of the problems resulted from 
these binary oppositions. Therefore, she argues, "Culture is, in fact, both external and 
internal, objective and subjective, material and ideal. Not reducible to systems of social 
relations, culture has a logic of its own" (p. 70). However, this argument seems to be more an 
assertion of the binary oppositions than a theoretical strategy for overcoming the dualism 
predominant in conceptualizing culture. 
Another feature of this wave of theorization is its assertion of "the analytic autonomy 
of culture" (Kane 1991, p. 56). The theoretical strategy of this assertion is to emphasize the 
internal logic of culture understood as a symbolic domain that organizes experiences and 
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structures social relations. To locate a source of dynamics of possible change, Kane (1991) 
resorts to Durkheim's concept of ritual. It is through rituals that culture is reproduced, 
renewed, and transformed, though Kane recognizes that based on her model, cultural 
transformation only happens within the boundary of a specific culture. This recognition is 
significant since until the perspective of culture acquires autonomy and the dualism, though 
avoided in Kane (1991), overcome, it does not seem possible to address changes between and 
among cultural boundaries. 
Clifford Geertz, instead of treating culture as a subject matter, established the concept 
of culture as a distinctive theoretical perspective. For Geertz (1973), the concept of culture is 
essentially a semiotic one, suggesting a clear departure from the tendency in the traditional 
sociological enterprise for theoretical concepts to be depicted as referring reified entities that 
form causal chains. This departure was noticed by sociologists such as Schneider (1987) who 
translated this semiotic perspective into a textual one. Similar to Geertz, Schneider also 
argues that this profound switch of perspective entails a search for meaning instead of social 
laws (p. 810). 
Syntheses of the two apparently distinctive perspectives was later achieved by 
systems theorists like Niklas Luhmann through the concepts of system and communication, 
and by cultural sociologists such as Zygmunt Bauman through the concept of practice. From 
the former perspective (Luhmann 1995, Fuchs 2001), the distinction between the social and 
the cultural disappears because social systems are conceived as communication proper, 
which could refer to any form of exchange. Here the concept of system is shed of its static 
link to the concept of structure, and is conceived as a self-sustaining, or autopoietic 
organism. Meaning in this model becomes a surplus of communication that refers back to 
itself. Thus meaning is self-referential, the form in which the system understands itself. The 
possibility of cross-cultural-boundary changes is ensured as the system accommodates its 
environment and interpenetrates with other systems. 
Bauman (1999, 1991) overcomes dualism by subsuming the symbolic (or the cultural) 
and the actual (or the social) under the concept of practice. Practice fuses the virtuality of 
discourse with the practicality of its production and reproduction. Bauman's study on the 
different experiences of the European Jews in Nazi Germany and Soviet Union shows that, 
on one hand, political policies and social forms are governed by a fundamental semantic 
structure of the "Jewish problem." On the other hand, his study shows that specific 
ideological discourses lead to different social and political practices. The Nazi and Soviet 
systems were similar in their intolerance of ambivalence, specifically, the ambivalence of the 
stranger (a concept originally proposed by Simmel (1908 [1971]). Both systems needed to 
classify the Jews, strangers in both societies, as either enemies or friends. In Nazi Germany 
Jews were classified as enemies while in the Soviet Union they were friends or at least, allies. 
This difference in the practice of policies regarding Jews was determined by specific 
ideological discourses: an essentially evolutionary view of races in Germany and a 
universalist emancipation discourse in the Soviet Union. 
As part of an effort to reformulate his field of political science, Almond (1956) 
introduced a set of concepts commonly used by sociologists and anthropologists. He first 
proposed that a political system should be understood as a Parsonian action system that 
consisted of various political roles. According to Almond, "every political system is 
embedded in a set of meanings and purposes" (p. 396) according to which political actions 
are oriented. The patterns of a particular orientation to political actions are then defined as a 
11 
political culture. Almond stressed two points concerning the concept of political culture. 
First, he noted that a political culture does not necessarily coincide with a particular political 
system, but may extend beyond the boundaries of any particular political entity. Second, he 
asserted that political culture is not the same as general culture. Political culture is that part of 
a general culture that enjoys some autonomy. 
Although Almond's framework (1956, 1989) received much positive attention, the 
result of it was, as critics such as Tucker (1973) have pointed out, fifteen years of political 
science treating politics and polity as an autonomous cultural system that functions in 
relation to other systems. Instead of treating political culture as a more or less autonomous 
system, Tucker proposes to view political systems from a cultural perspective. Basing his 
argument on Geertz's (1966) and Dumont's (1970) treatments of politics and polity as 
cultural practice, Tucker argues that the concept of culture should be treated as a perspective 
instead of as a Parsonian system. 
Of theoretical importance to my effort of establishing a perspective of culture is 
Tucker's application of this perspective to the study of the communist system. He suggests 
that, instead of viewing communism as a political system imposed on the culture, communist 
societies can be understood as having undergone a cultural transformation from traditional 
societies. He states, "Every successful communist revolution has been attended by a 
sustained and strenuous effort of the newly established regime to transform the way of life of 
the population; and where the revolutionary takeover process has been protracted - as in 
China, Yugoslavia, and Vietnam - the transformation of culture has begun in the course of 
the revolution" (1973, p. 185). Moreover, he maintains that the cultural approach is not only 
pertinent to studying the formation of communist systems but is also pertinent to the study of 
its sustenance, for which he uses the then ongoing Cultural Revolution in China as evidence 
of support. 
Despite this perspective shift, the lack of models of culture seems to have hindered 
more fruitful research. What this perspective shift has accomplished is limited to a 
redirection to traditional cultural orientations in the society being studied in order to support 
a general hypothesis that the emergence of a totalitarian system in a certain society is 
compatible with its traditional political culture. Therefore, many researchers start their work 
with the assumption that the reason why totalitarian systems occurred in countries like 
Germany, Russia, and China, is because those societies had traditional authoritarian or 
totalitarian cultures (Korchak 1994, Schwartz 1965, Tucker 1987). 
This assumption has been indirectly questioned by Chinese scholars. Although there 
were authoritarian (not necessarily totalitarian) elements in traditional Chinese societies, they 
were mostly restricted to certain domains. The order of traditional Chinese communities was 
maintained primarily by people of higher social status such as members of the literati and the 
gentry, scholars, and retired officials. Their authority was derived from their status rather 
than their formal affiliation with ruling governance. Official governance at the lowest level, 
the county, was very small, and its scope of authority covered mostly legal affairs. Therefore, 
it is safe to say that the power of the communist regime was the first to have successfully 
penetrated into the community level, and to have established party branches within villages. 
In fact larger villages were segmented into smaller units called production brigades, each of 
which had its own party branch. Although I shall not delve further into specific institutional 
changes, one may well ask: Is such a political arrangement really compatible with traditional 
Chinese culture? What kind of cultural transformation has occurred to render such an alien 
social structure normal? To at least partly answer such questions, models of culture are 
needed to distinguish an imposed ideological system from a pre-existing culture. 
Such models are not rare in sociological theories. However, seldom are such models 
constructed in a systematically formal way. Most of these models are inductively (intuitively) 
established for heuristic reasons. Nearly a hundred years ago, Simmel (1909) proposed that 
sociology be a science of "forms of sociation," the primary forms of which were religion, 
science, art, and reality. Each of these forms of sociation contained ways of viewing oneself, 
other people, and the world, plus rules that govern the unfolding of interactions. Robert E. 
Park (1939) posited two ways of interaction: competition and communication. In his model, 
conflict was subsumed under competition as an unregulated form, while communication 
assumed two modes: adaptation and accommodation. Goffman (1974, 1982) used terms such 
as frame and interaction order to refer to such structures of perception and patterns of 
behavior. Intuitively one can observe that sociological theories seem to have been 
constructed following certain underlying frames or structures. For instance, culture has been 
conceived as quite different "things" such as resources (repertoire) (Swidler 1986), rules 
(Giddens 1984), performance (Goffman 1959), and power relations (Collins 1990, Smith 
1992). Such hunches lead some sociologists to propose models of culture in a deductive and 
more formal manner. 
Starting with the basic unit of interaction where only two persons are involved, Fiske 
(1991) relies on transitivity (intransitivity) and ranking of the outcomes as two dimensions of 
his model, arguing that there are four and only four basic models of social structure: 
communal sharing, authority ranking, equality matching, and market pricing. In this 
approach, transitivity is understood as the reach of the effect of an action. For instance, in the 
communitarian sharing structure an inappropriate treatment of a person is perceived as an 
insult to a whole group. Such an action is transitive, in that an action directed at an individual 
is perceived as having effects on the whole community. Ranking refers to the way in which 
the outcome of an action is evaluated. For instance, in the authority ranking structure the 
outcome of one's action is ranked in term of an enhanced or undermined authority. Important 
for this research is the implication that each model implies a way of perceiving one's self and 
others and each model is a mode of interaction. For example, in the communal sharing mode 
one's individuality is merged with the identity of the community, whereas in the market-
pricing mode one's position is ranked according to a unified and supposedly fair system, the 
market. 
Roberts (2003) uses the term cultural frame to refer to the fundamental ways in which 
one perceives one's self and others, and the interactional patterns that result. Since my 
research heavily depends on Roberts's model of cultural frames, it deserves a detailed 
discussion. I would also like to note that my rendering of this model is more heuristic than 
formal because the formalized model requires much more space and theoretical preparation 
than the scope and scale of this research allow. Furthermore, such models can be constructed 
on various bases. As Roberts himself would agree, this is not "the" model but one possible 
alternative of many. The key is that once the foundation is laid out, one has to follow 
consistently the internal logic determined by one's assumptions and elementary relations 
among concepts. This point is partly supported by the fact that my reconstruction of his 
model is conducted in a different manner than Roberts', though I would be more than glad to 
acknowledge that the fundamental ideas are all available in Roberts's works. 
Roberts notes that for any event and its outcome to be meaningful, one needs to ask 
either why- or how-questions (or both). An answer to a why-question traces a logical 
sequence back to a set of initial assumptions. For instance, in answering the question "why is 
it the case that C," one needs to make clear that B implies C and A implies B. Thus the 
explanatory strategy is to infer from C to B and from B to A in a way that ensures whenever 
A is the case, C follows logically and (if supported by one's experiences) empirically. An 
answer to a how-question starts with a set of definitions of A that operationally implies B. C 
then results in the event of B. In sum, the answer to a why-question requires a inductive 
discursive operation that locates experiences within a conceptual scheme while the answer to 
a how-question needs a deductive one that locates experiences within a process. The other 
dimension of the strategies has to do with how one recognizes something, for instance, "C is 
the case." Again, there are two possible strategies. One can recognize that "C is the case" by 
either identification or distinction. Identification requires that one assert that "C is the case" 
by arguing that C\ the empirical C, is the same as (or similar to) a previously established 
concept. Note that when communicating this strategy, a concept is held constant and a 
discursive operation is carried out to assert an identity. Or, one can distinguish C from a 
previously established concept as its contrary or opposite. Thus "C is the case" is recognized 
through its distinction from another set of concept, for instance, D that is not the case. To 
combine the two dimensions of discursive operation we obtain a scheme shown in Table 1.1. 
With the "identification through process" strategy, a set of concepts and their 
operational relations are established which guarantees the appearance of C. Here C is 
understood as a set of C\ or empirical Cs. Then a C is discursively evaluated against the 
sufficient set of operations. If all the operations occur, then C as a case of C, occurs. The 
"distinction through process" strategy only differs from the first in that it aims at establishing 
at least one distinction through at least two operational sets. For instance, C is C because it 
satisfies all the conditions of C and lacks at least one condition for D. Here the empirical case 
evaluated could be either C or D. 
Table 1.1: Types of Discursive Operation 
Answer 
Question Same Different 
How is C the case? Identification through process Distinction through process 
Why is C the case? Identification through schema Distinction through schema 
With the third strategy, identification through schema, one attempts to offer a 
description of a schema in which C is implied by B which is in turn implied by A. "C is the 
case" is then established as the result of an inferential logical move. The "distinction through 
schema" strategy differs from the third only in its inclusion of at least one other concept (or 
concept set), for instance D, that is semantically opposed to C. Thus the logical steps lead to 
a conclusion that C is the case because it lacks at least one condition for D. 
Each cell in table 1.1 refers to one way of perceiving and understanding. If one 
considers the perceptions referred to in each of the table cells as perceptions people have of 
each other, the following forms of personhood emerge. In the upper left cell, the individual is 
perceived by default as being in a process of making something (C) appear and she/he is 
understood as the sum of her/his resources or abilities (evidenced by her/his past 
accomplishment) to make the "thing" appear. The "thing" that the individual is committed to 
making appear is defined as a goal, a culturally valued concept. 
In the upper right cell, an individual is also perceived as being in a process. However, 
what is highlighted in the perceiving is the distinctive set D instead of C. Because if one 
condition for C is absent, Dx is perceived. That is, if D" is perceived, one condition for C is 
absent and thus "C is not the case." Suppose C is a culturally valued set, and then if D is 
perceived, a problem occurs. Thus an individual is by default perceived as in a process of 
preventing something (the culturally unvalued set D) from appearing by following the 
regulation of the culturally valued set C. Set C can then be understood as a set of 
requirements. 
With the lower left cell, an individual is perceived as being a category whose 
relations to other categories in the schema determine the nature of the category of which 
she/he is. What one is doing is understood as part of her/his being. On one hand, one's 
actions are regulated by the category of which she/he is. On the other hand, one's actions are 
perceived as manifestations of the nature of the category. Because it is usually defined in 
relations to other categories in the schema, the nature or essence of the category, can be 
understood as obligations. 
Again, with the last cell, the distinctive set D is crucial since the discursive operation 
ends with distinction instead of identification. In this cell an individual is either perceived as 
belonging to the set C or its distinctive set D, which is semantically defined in opposition to 
C. If we bring in a cultural dimension and posit that C is a valued set and D is an unvalued 
set, then empirically, one can be read as either one of "us" or one of "them", or, either an 
enemy or a friend. Thus the acts associated with the valued set can be understood as rights 
while acts associated with the unvalued set can be understood as non-rights or violations of 
rights (Wang and Roberts 2002). 
It should be noted that in the first two strategies the conception of the end (that C is 
the case) is held constant. The key to the strategies consists in "manipulation" of the process 
that supposedly leads to the end. Whereas, in the third and fourth strategies, the conceptual 
schemata are held constant, a discursive operation (i.e. one of the four discursive processes) 
is carried out to show the consistency or inconsistency between the ideal and the empirical. 
Roberts (2003) has named these four cultural frames individualistic, mutualist, 
essentialist, and reformist respectively. It should be noted that a cultural frame does not 
necessarily correspond perfectly to a specific culture. To identify a certain culture as 
individualistic or essentialist is an empirical issue not a theoretical one. Hence, a culture 
identified as primarily individualistic may develop forms of interaction in accordance with 
other frames. For instance, even if we identify traditional Chinese culture as primarily 
essentialist, we would be remiss not to recognize its reformist elements, especially in the 
sphere of official governance and interactions among the governing elite. 
In this dissertation the Chinese Communist regime is examined in terms of its culture, 
that is to say, the regime is viewed as a semiotic system that reproduces itself through 
discursive practice. The first hypothesis, derived from Roberts' model of cultural frames, is 
that the Chinese communist ideological system is consistent with a reformist frame. 
In summary, one of the advantages of the cultural approach is its avoidance of the 
dualism that characterizes many sociological studies discussed above. Another vantage point 
is the relocation of the ontology of the regime from a presupposed reality domain to a 
discursive domain. This is, of course, not a rejection of the concept of reality but an assertion 
that realities are the products of discursive practice. This fundamental theoretical assumption 
has been suggested, if not explicitly expressed, by sociologists like Mead, (1934) and 
Goffman (1959), and especially by contemporary theorists like Bulter (1990), Bruner (1990), 
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Gergen (1994, 1999), Harré (1993 1983), and Somers (1994, 1995). This "discursive turn," 
or "interpretive turn" Geertz (1983, p. 233), will be discussed in detail in chapter 2. 
Ideology 
Ideology has been consistently identified as an important component of totalitarian 
system (Arendt 1951, Brzezinski 1956, Cassinelli 1962, Gleason 1995, Shlapentokh 2001, 
Piekalkiewicz and Penn 1995). Totalitarian ideology may very well be the defining feature 
that distinguishes modern totalitarian systems from historical dictatorships and tyrannies 
(Arendt 1951, Piekalkiewicz and Penn 1995). However, most theories and research on 
totalitarian systems either identify ideology as instrumental to the workings of the system or 
as a doctrine that serves as the basis for party and state formation. In other words, ideology is 
secondary to social and political structural processes. Cassinelli (1962, 1960) came closer to 
arguing that the distinctive feature of modern totalitarian system is ideology. Primarily due to 
the lack of a perspective that could avoid the divorce between language and action and the 
lack of a methodology that could tackle the textual data, he dismissed any theory that was 
centered on ideology. 
Later scholars of totalitarian systems paid more attention to ideology, especially the 
different ideological strategies employed by different totalitarian regimes. Gleason (1995) 
noticed that the Soviet regime aimed to extract confessions so that the author could be 
removed from society. In contrast, the Chinese communist regime attempted to "cure the 
disease and save the man. (1995, p. 95)" In a sense, Chinese communists took a more 
proactive approach to indoctrination and conversion instead of destroying the dissident 
physically. Of course one can still be skeptical about the accuracy of the evaluation, 
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especially if one takes into consideration differences in practice of ideological policies at 
different phases of both regimes. It appears that with both regimes, the early stage of 
consolidation of power was characterized by violent means in dealing with the regimes' 
enemies. Once power was consolidated to certain degree, both regimes took more proactive 
measures in indoctrinating an ideology. 
Despite the many studies on totalitarian ideology, the concept of ideology remains 
insufficiently clearly defined. Historical and contemporary debates on ideology along the 
divisions of various discursive traditions add much to the complexity of conception of 
ideology. For instance, Kinloch (1981) divides sociological writings on ideology into three 
categories: the conservative, the radical, and the liberal. The conservative discourse, for 
instance, conservative sociological writings locate ideology in a system within which 
ideology is understood as functional (thus necessary) for the system's survival (Parsons 
1971). Radical writings highlight the separation of individual rationality and political 
irrationality in modern capitalist and communist societies, arguing that ideological systems 
are components of dominant powers that operate to restrict certain segments of the 
population from accessing political resources. Instances of this discourse include C. Wright 
Mills' work on culture and power (1959), most of the works of the Frankfurt School, and 
Althusser's (1984) influential chapter on state ideological apparatus (SIA). 
Liberal writings on ideology take the individual as the origin of ideology. According 
to this school (Garfinkel, 1996, Homans 1958), ideology arises from interpersonal exchanges 
assuming rationality as an individual disposition. Therefore, ideology is the result of 
rationalization taking the form of common sense, entailed by interpersonal and inter-group 
processes. 
However, this categorization is not without its problems. For instance, the usage of 
terms such as conservative and radical, with their strong political connotations, suggests that 
this categorization might be "ideological" itself. The question then becomes, "How can a 
discursive field be defined as ideology?" The key seems to rely on the answer to the question 
"What is then a non-ideology?" Differently put, in opposition to what antithesis or "other" is 
the concept ideology, meaningful? 
The first discursive strategy is to assert a "real" reality. Ideology is then conceived as 
a symbolic representation that distorts reality. Ideology is the "false consciousness" produced 
as effect of a dominant system (Marx and Engels, 1845-46, Adomo 1991). However, 
variations exist in this camp. Arguing that German ideology creates an upside-down 
consciousness about reality ("from heaven to earth"), Marx and Engels (1845-46, p??) 
strongly claims a starting point, namely the reality of man ("from earth to heaven"), from 
which a consciousness about the "real" reality can be reestablished. Modern Marxists such as 
Gramsci (1926[1988]) and Lukacs (1971 [1923]) emphasize ideology as a transformative 
force. Although the claim of a "real" reality" is not as strong, they both start with a concept 
of ideology that is conditioned by material processes, the "real" reality. Theorists of the 
Frankfurt School view ideology as an encompassing system that legitimates one reality, 
namely the capitalist system, but conceals other possible "better" realities. Here the claim of 
a real reality is the weakest due to their awareness of the difficulty in arguing for such a 
reality while defining ideology as all encompassing. However, their assertion of such a 
reality is suggested in their claim that they could conceive "better" realities that are 
fundamentally different from the status quo. Althusser's theory (1984) defines ideology as 
"imaginary relations" to one's real conditions of existence. This definition suffices to place 
Althusser in this camp. 
A second discursive strategy opposes ideology to science. Mannheim's (1968[1936]) 
distinction between particular conception of ideology and total conception of ideology and 
his proposal of the scientist's position strongly suggest such an opposition. For Mannheim, 
the particular conception of ideology views ideology as false ideas, essentially "lies", 
consciously or unwittingly offered by an opponent for his/her interest. In contrast, a total 
conception of ideology conceives ideology as the "characteristics and composition of the 
total structure of the mind of this [an] epoch or of this [a] group." (p.50) Mannheim 
recognizes that the grasp of this total structure is not easy to break. He demonstrates that his 
contemporary scholarly efforts such as positivist (for Mannheim also relativist) approach to 
ideology is nothing but part of the Weltanschuuang of his times, a world outlook of his 
epoch. For Manheim, the only way to achieve a scientific understanding of an ideology or in 
general, Weltanschuuang of any epoch, is to adopt a hermeneutic approach. The first step is 
to recognize the boundedness of any social and political discourse. "[T]hat political-historical 
knowledge is always bound up with a mode of existence and a social position. (1968[1936], 
p. 166)" He also points out that this is often the basis on which the possibility of truth and 
understanding is denied. The second step requires that the sociology of knowledge 
disentangle "every concretely existing bit of 'knowledge' from the evaluative and interest-
bound element, and eliminating it as source of error with a view to arriving at a 'non-
evaluative,' 'supra-social,' 'supra-historical' realm of 'objectively' valid truth. (1968[1936], 
p. 166)" However, one cannot be sure how far this separation can go Thus the third step 
leads one to a moment of reflection instead of a conclusive solution. According to 
Mannheim, the third step is to arrive at the awareness that our own intellectual mediation is 
"bound up with a mode of existence" and with "one's social position, (p. 166)" Thus if we 
are willing to "retreat from decisions" (p. 169) we would benefit from an "expansion of our 
horizon (p. 169)" and a "greater intellectual mastery of our world, (p. 169)" Mannheim's 
argument implied in his approach is that knowledge is a historical process, an open discourse. 
This argument departs from the Marxian perspective that claims a knowable and known 
reality independent from any ideology. However, Mannheim is a realist in that he does 
assume a knowable reality. But this reality of Mannheim's is not easily known. In a sense we 
can always get closer to the truth if we adhere to the scientist's position which enables us to 
disentangle our knowing process from the grasp of preexisting ideological (i.e., historical, 
positional, and interested) knowledge. 
Of contemporary theorists, Habermas (1970) is probably one of the most akin to 
Mannheim. Habermas' primary concern is communication whose ideal conditions are 
distorted by power — the colonization of the life-world by the systems. In other words, the 
ideal conditions for communication are distorted by political and capitalist economic 
systems. For communication to occur in an undistorted way, the scientist (or philosopher) 
needs to establish theories that could help restore the "original scene" through their inquiry. 
This theories bridge the gap between the pre-signified scene (what really happened) and the 
signified world of meaning (the distorted or suppressed communicative act). Although 
Habermas asserts the pre-signified "original scene", he does suggest that this scene is not 
accessible until a sign system, such as theories, is established to tap into it. This approach 
bears strong similarity to Mannheim's approximation to truth. 
The third discursive strategy rejects the notion of a reality that is independent from 
any representation. For this school of scholars, reality is always a representation (Gergen 
1999, 1994; Edwards, Shotter, and Potter 1995). In discussing the "discursive turn" and 
constructionism, Gergen (1999) suggests that this fundamental perspective switch relocates 
the ontology of reality in discourse. In other words, a reality is understood as effects whose 
causal roots reside in discursive practice. According to this argument, science, the last 
stronghold of realism, is founded on ideological basis such as objectivity and an autonomous 
knowing subject. Discursive activity is fundamentally ideological in that all discourses 
contain assumptions and beliefs that cannot be empirically tested. Foucault's (1995[1977]) 
fusion of the term power/knowledge suggests that knowledge has to exercise a certain type of 
power and power is always based on a specific knowledge system. More relevant to this 
research is Foucault's objection to a presumed Cartesian subject. For Foucault, subject and 
subjectivity are always produced by a power. Thus the operation of power, structured by 
discourse or knowledge, produces its constituents, i.e. subjects. The notion of subject is only 
meaningful in relation to a specific type of power. Some contemporary theorists such as 
Judith Butler (1990) and Jagose (1996) criticize Foucault for his presumption of a 
generalized body since in Foucault's works the body is only thing left as pre-power. Butler 
suggests that the pre-subjected body is an empty concept — a residue of Foucault's implied 
realism. For the Butler the body is inconceivable without discourse. The body is always the 
body of a subject — an effect of a power and knowledge system. 
Despite his definition of ideology as imaginary relations, Althusser (1971) deviates 
from his starting point in his elaboration of a theory of ideology. He argues that we, as 
subjects, are always subjects of an ideology. Note the two connotations of the concept of 
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subject: subject of subjectivity and subject to a dominant power. According to Althusser 
(1984), the defining "function" of ideology is that all ideologies constitute concrete 
individuals as subjects. It can be recognized that Althusser starts with a realist definition of 
ideology but concludes with a constructionist understanding. 
In this research I take the constructionist perspective viewing the Chinese communist 
ideology as a living and lived discursive system. It is living as the totality of a system and is 
lived by its subjects, its constituents. Subjects are integrated into the system through a 
process of identification (or recognition to use Althusser's term) or discursive practice such 
as telling personal stories and expressing personal opinions. Such story-telling and opinion-
expressing are, on the one hand, the ways in which the system sustains itself, and on the other 
hand, the ways the system produces its constituents. Therefore, examining the products of 
such practice will help understand how the ideological system works and also shed light on 
the antinomy between the traditional Chinese cultural system, which the communist system 
has never completely eradicated, and the communist ideological system itself. 
Mechanisms of Ideological Systems 
The challenge then is to establish a model that would treat ideology as discursive 
practice rather than a static set of ideas. The inspiration comes from a few sources. First, 
Lyotard (1991 [1979]) consistently uses the term of pragmatics to refer to the 
operationalization of a grand narrative (to be discussed in the next chapter) into governance 
and to people's taken-for-granted perception of the governance and other forms of 
institutions. In Lyotard's discussion, a semantic field, a static set of ideas and their relations, 
constitutes a pragmatic field to the extent that it structures the operations that lead to concrete 
forms of governance, perception, and meaning. Moreover, Lyotard characterizes the post-
modem condition as a loss of the center, the loss of the credibility and validity of the basic 
assumptions of a grand narrative. This center implies not only discursive elements that are 
the most fundamental but also a foundation for power. A similar approach is present in 
Dumont's comparative study of German and French ideologies (Dumont 1970). According to 
Dumont, the French ideology is an operation to settle the tension between a primary 
universal individualist discourse and a secondary communitarian discourse, whereas German 
ideology is one that resolves the tension between a primary communitarianism and a 
secondary individualism. Individualist and communitarian positions exist in both ideology 
systems. The tension or contradiction of these two elements requires an operation to, on the 
one hand, sustain the contradiction so that both be meaningful and, on the other hand, resolve 
the tension in practice so that a member can make sense of his/her experiences consistently in 
accord with that ideology. For instance, the French typically perceives a legitimate 
government as a means with which the welfare of each individual is guaranteed. The 
government is then represented in an ideology as a resolution of the contradiction between 
individualism and communitarianism. In contrast, the German tends to see the government as 
representative of the German nation. Welfare of each individual is ensured within the 
boundaries of the German identity. 
Althusser's (1984) distinction between "the Subject" and "subjects" suggests a 
similar notion. The Subject cannot be identified with any concrete subject. It only exists in a 
discourse, as its center. Thus in this research, I identify this center, or Subject, as a grand 
narrative that is sustained through ongoing interpretations of specific events. 
To establish a model of subjects I resort to the theories of Althusser, Geertz, Butler, 
and social psychologists like Gergen and Harré. Both Althusser (1984) and Butler (1990) try 
to establish a concept to describe how the Subject (i.e. discourse) produces its subjects. For 
Althusser, this mechanism is called interpellation or hailing. Here the Subject is the hailer 
who calls the individual until she/he recognizes (or mis-recognizes) her/himself as the one 
who is called upon. This mechanism implies a "name" offered by the Subject and a 
consciousness-producing process of identification. The individual becomes a subject to the 
Subject through acknowledging her/himself as identified by the name. This process is 
realized through the operation of Ideological State Apparatus (ISA) that includes the 
education system, the family, church, the media and other institutions. 
The difficulty in Althusser's model lies in its presupposition of the pre-subjection 
individual. Like Foucault's "generalized body," the concept of the pre-subjection or pre-
signified individual is an empty concept — a Cartesian residue (Hirst 1979) or a theoretical 
convenience that only introduces contradictions. Butler (1990) replaces this notion with the 
conception of the body as a social discursive boundary. It is through a mechanism of 
inscription — an operation of the discourse — that the boundary is established, and a subject 
is embodied and produced. This model relocates the process of power and subjection 
completely into a discursive space where the lack of any "real" foundation is the very reason 
why the discursive boundaries are unstable. Another of Butler's key concepts is 
"performativity," which is an inherent feature of discourse. In brief, inscription is realized 
through iterative performances. Therefore, despite superficial similarities, the fundamental 
difference between Althusser's model and Butler's model lies in their different ways of 
conceiving the subject either as a unified continuous entity or as instances of discursive 
performativity. Althusser's starting point is the subject-to-be. Interpellation and recognition 
produce a relatively stable subject. Butler conceives subject as fleeting performativity. If 
certain consistent patterns are discerned in "individuals", they are testimonies to the power of 
discourse rather than evidence of a unified and consistent subject. 
The differences between Althusser's and Butler's models mean that adopting one 
model entails rejection of the other. Geertz (1973) proposes a middle ground — a strategy 
that suspends the difference that is not relevant to analytical formulation. In discussing two 
sociological theories on ideology, strain theory and the theory of interest, Geertz indicates 
that sociologists tend to jump directly from the determinants of ideology to its effects, 
ignoring the mediation of a semiotic and semantic domain. The lack of theoretical and 
analytical approaches to tackle the "connecting element — the autonomous process of 
symbolic formulation" (1973, p. 207) is the very reason why research done from either 
perspective is often based on misinterpretations of social phenomena. 
The middle ground Geertz established is essentially analytic. Similar to some political 
scientists discussed in the first section of this chapter, Geertz emphasizes the importance of 
an autonomous semiotic and semantic space. In a critique of content analysis, Geertz clarifies 
this emphasis by noting the analyst's strategy. "Themes are outlined, of course, among the 
content analysis, they are even counted. But they are referred for elucidation, not to other 
themes nor to any sort of semantic theory, but either backward to the effect they presumably 
mirror, or forward to the social reality they presumably distort." (1973, p. 207) The 
implication of Geertz's critique for such research is twofold. First, if we do not grant 
discursive space its deserved autonomy, not only will this not be a resolution of the 
contradiction between Althusser's ontological realism and Butler's primacy of discourse, but 
it will also distract us from any valid understanding of ideological systems. Second, instead 
of trying to resolve the philosophical dispute inherent in these models, we can benefit from 
bracketing the controversy and focusing on the indisputable. What is bracketed is the 
assumption of the pre-subjection subjectivity. What is indisputable is a discursive space — 
the ideological system as an autonomous object to be studied. 
Components of Ideological Systems 
In addition to its grand narrative (i.e. its core or center), another important component 
of an ideological system is the subject or its practical constituents. Before postmodernist 
writings, "the subject" was usually understood as a personality, a set of individual cognitive, 
emotional, and interactional dispositions. This tradition is probably best exemplified in 
Fromm's work (1941) on German Fascist psychology and Adorno's work on the 
authoritarian personality. 
Fromm's wrote before the Third Reich had collapsed. Although a psychologist, his 
focus was on the social conditions that gave rise to an ideology such as German Fascism and 
the reason why it appealed to so many people, particularly the lower middle class. Fromm 
argued that the bleak socioeconomic conditions after World War I and the newly emerging 
democracy in Germany placed the lower middle class in a very insecure situation. It was 
freedom itself that scared these Germans into embracing Fascism and communism as 
authorities. He described this embrace as escape from freedom. However, a more profound 
explanation was to be found in the German culture. Fromm argued that the German 
individual had a disposition to identify with an authority — a disposition produced by the 
German style family life, where the father was an authority figure. As a nation Germans had 
previously acquired such a self-identity through the monarch, whose authority was seriously 
undermined by Germany's defeat in World War I. Under such socioeconomic circumstance, 
ideology started to appeal to more and more of the German people. Not long after Hitler 
became the Prime Minister, the Nazi regime became identified with the German nation as a 
consequence of the Nazi ideology. 
The focus of Adorno's work (1950) was on what he called the authoritarian 
personality. Adomo agreed with Fromm on Germans' tendency to embrace an authority. 
Moreover, Adomo argued that this was only one side of such a personality. This side was 
manifested as obedience to authority, rigid adherence to ideas of right and wrong, conformity 
and submission to authoritarian figures such as parent, teacher, boss, and leader. The other 
side of the authoritarian personality was a tendency to redirect one's frustration and anger to 
an outsider, someone who was different. Moreover, this personality tended to project their 
frustrated desires (e.g., for sex and violence) to the outsider. Thus, an authoritarian 
personality would always feel that he was surrounded by oversexed, immoral, dishonest, and 
violent people. 
Both Fromm and Adomo suggested that a certain type of personality is susceptible to 
authoritarian ideology. This personality uses polarized categorization for the people around 
them, applies differential attitudes and behaviors toward people within different categories, 
and expresses emotional propensities such as anger and hatred—all dispositions and 
tendencies considered as individual psychological traits. 
Later empirical studies on communist regimes such the Soviet Union and China 
depict these features as components of the ideological systems. For instance, Hollander's 
study on Soviet literature (1966) examines the cognitive, behavioral, and emotional traits of 
the heroes and anti-heroes in Soviet novels. The cognitive feature of the hero shows a close 
identification with the party and the nation, which Hollander labels as party-mindedness and 
patriotism. Hero's behavioral traits are a readiness of uncovering subversive acts of the 
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enemies, a willingness to work hard, a lack of spontaneity, and a drive to improve oneself. 
Hero's emotional traits include a propensity to hate and feel shame, selective emotionalism, 
and instant enthusiasm. It is worth noting that Hollander does not treat these features as 
individual propensities, but as part of an ideological discourse. 
Hollander's work is rare in its focus on the subjectivity a totalitarian ideology tries to 
produce. Most studies on totalitarian ideology do not grant ideology an autonomous status. 
Instead ideologies are treated as institutions that function to legitimate power structure and 
other institutions. Hence, components of an ideology are usually identified with discrete 
social institutions as sets of ideas — nationalism with the government, socialism with the 
economy, and revolutionary discourse with the military and police. Of the few studies that 
touch upon the issue of personality or subjectivity produced under totalitarian systems, such 
personality or subjectivity is treated as a deformed psyche, or at least as an abnormal psychic 
entity (Kelman and Hamilton 1989, Korchak 1994). 
In this research I follow the lead of Hollander and use a conventional social 
psychological scheme to identify three components of the subject: cognition, behavior, and 
emotion. Relocating the three components in ideological discursive processes, I examine the 
cognitive component through the process of identification (telling personal stories), the 
behavioral component through action orientation (expressing possible action during situated 
events), and emotions through emotional display (immediate reactions to events). 
Structure of Ideological Systems 
The structure of an ideology can be analytically defined as the set of binary 
oppositional relations of the semantic elements that hold ideological discourse together and 
structure its production. Therbom (1980) proposes a scheme that generates four types of 
ideological discourses. This scheme has two semantic dimensions that address two questions 
that an ideology has to answer: "Who am I?" and "Where am I?" Each question can be 
answered in two possible ways. To the who-question, an answer can be composed by either 
claiming a fixed existential status or locating the individual in a history. The answer to the 
second question can be established by either including the individual in a category such as 
humankind, a group, or a community, or locating the individual in a social position in 
relation to others. 
Although in his elaboration Therbom tends to blur distinctions among the types of 
discourses, his scheme does suggest four fundamental ideological perspectives. The 
inclusive-existential ideology locates the individual in a community and her/his existence is 
asserted as a member of the community (e.g. humanity). The inclusive-historical ideology 
positions the individual in a group that has a history. The individual understands her/himself 
as being a member of the group and his position as justified by the historical discourse of the 
group. The positional-existential ideology asserts the individual as a being of certain form 
that is her/his relations to other people and her/his environment. The form of existence is the 
essence of her/his being in the sense that "who she/he is" is manifest through her/his form. 
Thus, her/his actions are evaluated according to whether they are of certain form. Finally the 
positional-historical ideology distinguishes itself from the positional-existential ideology 
through the notion that one's position in relations to other members of the society is 
historical. The individual understands who s/he is through a personal history. She/he is what 
she/he does and achieves. 
Different from Dumont (1994), Therbom does not distinguish between primary and 
secondary discourse. It is the interplay of two answers that constitutes an ideological 
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discourse. Furthermore, like Roberts (2002, 2003) Therbom does not posit a one-to-one 
correspondence between an ideology type and an empirically identified ideology. Instead, 
these types are understood as fundamental semantic fields that practically structure 
ideologies. As illustrated in Table 1.2, Therbom's ideology types and Roberts's cultural 
frames have a close correspondence. In combination with the above discussion on Roberts's 
cultural frames, a synthesis of both their ideas is obtained. 
Each cell in the Table 1.2 is a combination of answers to the two fundamental 
questions. The terms in the cells are borrowed from Roberts's cultural frames. Therbom's 
existential-inclusive ideology corresponds to Roberts's mutual!st frame. In this frame an 
individual obtains her/his identity through inclusion in an asserted community. The inclusive-
historical ideology corresponds to reformist frame in which an individual obtains her/his 
identity through a historical discourse about a group. It should be noted that the historical 
discourse is sustained through interpretation and reinterpretation of ongoing events and thus 
personal identities are subjected to redrawing of group boundaries. 
Table 1.2: Type of Ideological Discourse and Cultural Frames 
Subjectivities of "In-the-World" Subjectivities of "Being" 
(Fixed) (In a process) 
Existential Historical 
Inclusive in a group or community Mutualist Reformist 
In a Social Positional Essentialist Individualistic 
Therbom's positional-existential ideology corresponds to Roberts's essentialist frame 
in which an individual is understood as a fixed category. The individual's actions are 
perceived as exhibiting the essence of the category. One's social position is determined in 
accord with the position of one's category in a social structure. Finally, the positional-
historical ideology corresponds to the individualistic frame. In this frame, an individual 
obtains self-identity through what she/he has done and is doing. Self-identity is not stable in 
this frame because it depends on the unfolding of a personal history. 
The above discussion has sketched out four fundamental semantic fields that can be 
mapped onto empirical fields, i.e. the actual ideological discourses that Ricoeur (1975), calls 
instances of discourse. According to Ricoeur, a linguistic system exists only virtually until it 
is produced as an instance of discourse. However, it should be noted that these types of 
ideology and cultural frames discussed thus far only address the discursive strategies with 
which a person obtains her/his identity. One more question needs to be answered, "In which 
frame(s) is grand narrative possible?" 
At this point it suffices to define a grand narrative as a historical discourse about a 
group, community, society, nation, civilization, or humanity. It appears that the 
individualistic (positional-historical) ideology uses a strategy that involves a discursive 
presentation of a process or "history." However, this history is a personal history, which does 
not qualify for a grand narrative. One can also argue that because the positional-existential 
ideology naturalizes social identities by resorting to a timeless cosmos, grand narrative does 
not exists in the essentialist frame either. Therbom's scheme suggests that historical 
discourses about whole groups or communities only exist in the two inclusive types of 
ideology, which correspond to mutualist and reformist frames. The differences between the 
two types of grand narrative will be discussed in chapter 2 in terms of their different modes 
of causality. 
In this chapter I have discussed briefly two discourses on totalitarianism and three 
orientations in the study of ideology. My discussion on components of ideological systems 
identifies the subject matter of this research as the grand narrative of the Chinese communist 
ideology and the identification strategies, action-orientation, and emotional patterns of the 
subject constituted by the ideology. The elaboration on Roberts's model of cultural frames 
and Therbom's model of ideology types delineates the semantic fields of all possible 
structures of ideology. This delineation provides not only a theoretical foundation but also an 
analytic scheme whose importance will become clear in later chapters. 
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CHAPTER 2 
DISCOURSE, NARRATIVE, AND MEANING 
In the previous chapter I discussed an alternative approach to the study of the Chinese 
communist ideological system, an approach that views totalitarianism as a cultural system 
that operates in the form of discursive practice. In this chapter I locate elements of such an 
ideological system within a concrete domain, namely, texts. This location should not be 
understood as an identification of material processes within texts, but as a relocation of the 
texts into a discourse and its discursive practice. Moreover, this fundamental shift in 
perspective provides new theoretical and analytic approaches to many important subjects of 
sociological concern. Once this shift is completed, texts are brought into perspective and 
acquire an autonomous status of a field to be examined. Within this chapter, specific genre of 
text, the narrative, receives special attention here because of its role in structuring 
experiences. Moreover, the structures of action and emotion will be discussed with an 
emphasis on modality and modal semantics. 
Discursive Practice and Text 
As discussed in chapter 1, Geertz has noted that one problem with the sociological 
study of ideology has been the absence of theoretical and analytic means to address the 
symbolic mediation of social processes. Sociologists usually forego such mediation in a leap 
from determinants or conditions to effects. Although he advocates establishing a well-
deserved autonomous domain of meaning, Geertz does not completely reject the realist 
assumption that ideology is determined by material conditions. A fundamental dilemma of 
Geertz's approach is highlighted by the argument that material conditions and effects per se 
are not conceivable unless they are conceived with the mediation of meaning. Resolution of 
this dilemma requires a perspectival switch, a switch that recognizes a symbolic field that is 
not merely a mediating segment of a social process but a process on its own. 
The constructionist "movement" in the 1980s and '90s provides the philosophical, 
theoretical, and analytical foundations for such a perspectival switch. Gergen (1999, 1994) 
summarizes the fundamental assumptions of this movement in a series of works. First, he 
postulates that the terms by which we account for the world come from social practices 
occurring in social relations instead of being dictated by the world we attempt to account for. 
This is a rejection of the Cartesian tradition, according to which the mind is understood 
metaphorically as a mirror that reflects the objective world. For the constructionist, 
objectivity is a rhetorical achievement through discourse based on such metaphors. Once this 
metaphor is examined in parallel with other metaphorical images of the mind, objectivity is 
shown as the effect of discursive practice. Second, our accounts of the world, are not 
sustained by the world's objective validity but by its functions in social processes. Third, 
language derives its significance from its functions within patterns of relationship, and to 
appraise of existing forms of discourse is to evaluate patterns of cultural life. One profound 
implication of the latter two assumptions with respect to the study of ideology is the 
abandonment of any attempt at assessing the ways in which an ideological system "distorts" 
reality. Instead, a new objective is established, i.e. the examination of the ways in which 
ideological systems function in social practice. 
Another implication of this switch is the centering of discourse and, in particular, 
language processes. Here discourse is understood as the totality of semiotic process including 
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operations on various levels such as semantic, syntactic, and textual and in various domains 
such as speaking and writing (Greimas and Courtes 1982). This centering of discourse has 
given rise to studies on many subjects that had excluded or at least marginalized the role of 
discourse. The French philosopher, Paul Ricoeur (1991), brings social action into discourse 
through a series of theoretical operations. First he distinguishes human action from social 
action. Human action is an action specific to the situation in which it occurs. In a sense it is 
pre-signified and opens the possibility for signification. Second, he argues that only those 
human actions that are relevant to situations other than those in which they occur would 
leave marks in history and thereby become social actions through signification. The "mark" 
is made through an operation he terms as fixation, just like writing is a fixation of possible 
speech acts, a human action is fixated through signification. Therefore, he argues that social 
actions can be studied as texts. For Ricoeur (1991, p. 151), "...action as meaningful, may 
become an object of science, without losing its character of meaningfulness, through a kind 
of objectification similar to the fixation that occurs in writing." What is suggested by Ricoeur 
is that social actions, as meaningful, are always signified or discursively fixated actions. 
What physically happens is lost in time. However, through signification we retain the part of 
it that transcends the specific situation in which it occurs. 
One form of signification, writing, and its product, text, are of particular importance 
to my research. According to Ricoeur (1991, 1981), text is, first of all, a specific form of 
discourse. Each text is an instance of discursive production. Second, text differs from other 
forms of discourse such as speech acts in that it is a fixation of a possible speech act. Unlike 
speech acts, which bring interlocutors into one unified situation, text separates the author and 
the reader by its very presence. Following Ricoeur's discussion on the transformation of 
human action into meaningful action through signification, one may argue that text always 
transcends the situation in which it is produced and thus always bears social and cultural 
significance. In reviewing a set of anthropological studies on text and text production, Hanks 
(1989) suggests that textual production is a power process. "... not only does text have 
locutionary, illocutionary, and perlocutionary force potential, but it is also a powerful mode 
of naturalizing social reality and socializing natural reality. (1989, p. 118)." 
Defining text as a fixated signification through writing leads to the question, "What 
are the modes of textual production or signification? This question brings us from a 
theoretical into an analytic mode, though one may note that these modes are oftentimes 
inextricably entangled. 
Returning to the model of ideology established in chapter 1, one finds two primary 
elements: a core or center that is identified as the grand narrative and the subjects or 
constituents of the ideological system. In the following section I discuss central theoretical 
issues concerning narrative, causality, cultural frames, self-narrative, and identification. 
Narrative, Causality, and Cultural Frames 
Definitions of narrative vary according to researchers' perspectives and theoretical 
orientations. However, common elements of narrative can be identified in existing literature. 
Herman (2002) defines narrative as the representation of events in a time sequence. Ricoeur 
(1984) argues that narrative is a condition to and structure of human temporal experiences. 
"[T]ime becomes human to the extent that it is articulated through a narrative mode, and 
narrative attains its full meaning when it becomes a condition of temporal existence. (1984, 
p. 52)" Similarly, Gergen and Gergen (1984) define self-narrative as "the individual's 
accounts of the relationship among self-relevant events across time. (p. 255)" Common to 
these definitions are two distinctive features of narrativity. First, narrative is a form of 
organization of experiences across time, which is marked by events. Second, the marking 
events are structured in a sequence or order and thereby are related to render experiences 
meaningful. 
It should be noted that the above definitions highlight narrativity at a textual level. 
Researchers such as Somers (1992) distinguish two levels of narrativity. At the textual level, 
a master narrative organizes temporal experiences explicitly in terms of past, present, and 
future. In social historical discourse, as Somers points out, a conceptual core such as class, 
society, tradition, and modernity suggest historicity and implicit organization of time and 
space. Thus narrativity is oftentimes implied at the conceptual level. This is of particular 
importance to examining grand narrative because, as Lyotard (1991 [1979]) and Somers 
(1992) suggest, grand narrative usually contains in itself de-narrativizing operations that 
conceals its narrativity so that it appears to be timeless truth. 
A question arises from the above discussion. How are events organized into specific 
narratives, i.e. stories? According to Ricoeur, emplotment is the key to organization of events. 
Time, with past gone, future to come, and present passing, is captured through the 
emplotment of events, i.e. rendering events as beginning, middle, and end in a unified and 
unifying story. Among sociologists, Somers is one of the few that come closest to this point. 
For Somers (1994), narrative is not merely a subject to be explored. Rather, it is the only 
perspective that allows sociologists to bring time into a sociological perspective. Somers 
(1992) further argues that narrativization turns events into episodes and an imposed causal 
plot "gives significance to independent instances, not their chronological or categorical order. 
41 
(p. 600)" Labov (1997) makes a similar argument, which he formulates into a theorem, 
"Narrative construction requires a personal theory of causality, (p. 10)" The significance of 
Somers' argument and Labov's theorem lie in their emphasis on an imposed causal structure 
that holds event-turned-episodes as a unified story. 
It should be noted here that none of the above scholars posits any mode of causality. 
Trying to link narrative to cultural frames, I resort to Aristotle's (1984) four modes of 
causality. These four modes — efficiency, form, material, and purpose — have long been 
recognized as four fundamental modes of answering and understanding "why" and "how" 
questions to be asked about any event. 
The first Aristotelian mode of causality, efficiency, agrees with the individualistic 
culture frame in which an event, normally an appearance of a goal, is fully explained in terms 
of one's ability (efficient agency). The second mode, form, is very well in accord with the 
essentialist frame in which an event, normally the fulfillment or failure to fulfill an obligation 
is explained as indicators of a form understood as a distinctive category. The third and the 
fourth modes, because of their importance to this analysis, need more discussion. 
Material as one mode of causality entails that material is active in the sense that 
material is a kind of force that strives for a form. Note that here it is the form that is to be 
explained as an effect of the material. However, material as force attains its form in two ways. 
First, material can be understood as a negative force, a force that is to be tamed or at least to 
be adapted to. In this case, form results from reacting and accommodating to the material 
force. This kind of causality can be seen in cultures that have struggled long against 
unfavorable natural elements. In this kind of culture or society, social arrangements are 
understood as necessary to prevent natural disasters from happening. Second, the material 
force is ineluctable and the only way to deal with it is to follow its direction that points to a 
purpose. Thus material causality and teleological causality (Aristotle's third and fourth 
modes) are merged in one. In this case, the material force is usually seen as positive, moving 
towards a desired end. Lyotard (1991 [1979]) recognizes a fusion of the two modes of 
causality in Marx's historical materialism. He points out that as a grand narrative, Marxism 
oscillates between the emancipation of humanity (a purpose) and the speculative spirit (a 
force). Furthermore, a distinction between agency and the material force needs to be 
delineated. Agency is a potential, usually associated with an actor (individual, group, 
institution). This potential is only manifest in the process of achieving certain goals. 
Different from purpose, goals are optional, one of a number of possible choices. Thus agency 
is understood as agency for certain goals. Material force is itself, either relentlessly 
destructive and thus purposeless or inevitably marching towards purposeful end. 
Thus it is argued that material causality needs the complementary concept of force 
that is either purposeless or purposeful. Teleological causality also needs a concept of an 
entity that bears purpose (e.g. history). It is here that I modify Aristotle's modes of causality. 
In light of the above discussion, it can be seen that purposeless material force as one mode of 
causality corresponds to the mutualist frame in which the social system is established as a set 
of requirements for its adaptation to hostile forces of a material world. The purposeful 
material force as a mode of causality is one that integrates material and teleological causality, 
which corresponds to the reformist frame. It is the last mode of causality, I hypothesize, that 
dominates the Chinese communist grand narrative. 
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Grand Narrative 
Grand narrative has been used as a heuristic concept and a deconstructionist tool. To 
identify components of grand narrative is usually intertwined with the attempt to de-center a 
grand narrative (Derrida 1976, Lyotard 1991[1979]). With the deconstructionist approaches, 
a grand narrative is usually not associated with any specific historical document. Instead, the 
analysis relies heavily on the author's holistic grasp of an underlying discourse of history 
supposedly present in a culture or society over a long historical period. For instance 
Lyotard's (1991[1979]) discussion on the French emancipation narrative does not refer to 
any specific texts. This, of course, has to do with the assumption that a grand narrative is 
stable over a long period of time and dominates the totality of the discursive practice in a 
society or civilization. Scholars like Foucault (1994[1977]) and Dumont (1994) analyze 
discourses spanning a long period of time, but they never explicitly address how temporality 
is organized in those discourses. 
Sociologists tend to focus on personal stories in order to infer more profound social 
discourses (Strauss 1995, Maynes 1992, Mason-Schrock 1996, Rommon-Kenan 2002). Thus 
direct and explicit studies of grand narrative are rare though not without exceptions such as 
Somers' (1995) study on the discourse of American citizenship and Jacobs' (2001) research 
on racism and politics. Even in the studies done to address certain type of grand narrative, no 
formal model has been established. Thus an analytic model has to be designed to 
systematically tackle texts produced by one regime at certain historical moment. 
In this research grand narrative is defined as a (hi)story of a whole community, 
society, civilization, or even human kind that is unified by one single cause. It can be further 
argued that the mutualist grand narrative provides a history of a community that has 
struggled against "purposeless" and hostile material forces. This type of grand narrative 
stresses the identity of the community and asserts equality and homogeneity within the 
community. In contrast, the reformist grand narrative provides a history of a society that is 
driven by "purposeful" material forces. This type of grand narrative emphasizes the internal 
differentiation of social groups and classes at different phases of history. Thus social events 
oftentimes open possibilities of redefining the historical phase a society is undergoing and 
consequently lead to re-categorization of social groups and classes. Based on the above 
discussion, one expects that the grand narrative of the Chinese communist ideology is 
structured in the reformist frame and its mode of causality is teleological-material. 
Furthermore, the social categories in this grand narrative are usually redefined during large-
scale mass movements and redefining social categories or identities functions to provide 
targets for mass movements. 
Forms of Self-Narrative and Identification 
Many social scientists see narrative as a discursive strategy employed by social agents 
to organize and reorganize their experiences (Strauss 1995, Jacobs 2001, 1996). This group 
of social scientists focuses on one form of narrative, i.e. self-narrative, and its functions in 
self-formation. This orientation has led to reconsideration of theories and research agendas 
on self-identity (Harré 1983, Mancuso and Sarbin 1983, Gergen and Gergen 1984, Sewell 
1992, Strauss 1995, Mason-Schrock 1996, Rimmon-Kenan 2002,). 
According to Harré (1983), self is an effect produced by discursive practice through 
the use of deixis (or indices) such as "I." Identities are positions already existent in discourse 
because discourse itself is a relational process. One's sense of identity is established through 
assuming or being assigned discursive positions in interaction. A similar rendering is at least 
suggested by Mead's work (1934) nearly 50 years before Harrè. Gergen and Gergen (1984) 
argue that individuals construct their self-narratives using existing cultural narrative forms to 
organize events in their lives so that they perceive themselves as stable beings. One's self-
identity is thus produced through such narrative construction. From this perspective, self-
identity is relocated in processes of self-identification in which the individual assumes 
discursive positions that is organized in a coherent story structured by existent narrative 
forms. One can further argue that an ideological discourse provides such narrative forms to 
be utilized by individuals in constructing their self-identities and at the meantime the system 
produces its desired subjects. 
What is needed next are models that can be operationalized to tackle the textual data 
collected for this research. For my research purpose, two models of narrative are needed to 
address grand narrative and personal stories respectively. An integrated model that is capable 
of dealing with both would seem ideal. However, partly due to the nature of the research 
questions and partly because of the available theoretical and analytical resources, this ideal 
does not seem to be possible. The study of a grand narrative is usually concerned with 
causality, the force that holds all historical (past, present, and future) events in a consistent 
temporal organization. Whereas, the study of personal stories is concerned with specific 
social actors, identities, relations, and tension or conflict among them, and the ways these 
conflicts are settled. In the following sections I discuss the theoretical and analytic sources 
that lead to the establishment of narrative models to be used in analyzing the personal stories 
sampled from People's Daily. 
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Actantial Models, Narrative Modes, and Genre 
Actantial models in narrative analysis are originally inspired by Propp's formalist 
story grammar. In an attempt to analyze Russian folktales, Propp (1968 [1928]) proposed 
thirty-one story functions that are performed by seven actants or roles. The functions include 
actions such as violation (of a contract), departure (of a hero), struggle, transfiguration, return, 
and wedding; while the seven roles are the hero, the false hero, the villain, the helper, the 
sought-for person, the dispatcher, and the donor. The functions are essentially syntactical. A 
story thus reconstructed is analogous to a sentence with the functions as its grammatical 
components. 
Structuralists like Levi-Strauss (1984 [1963]) and Greimas (1984[1966]) recognize 
the potential of this approach but indicate that the functions are components of surface 
structures of the stories and they are sometimes intuitive and naïve. Unlike the formalist, they 
argue that syntactic forms do not produce meaning and suggest that structuralist analysis start 
at the semantic level. Based on what is called "the elementary structure of signification", 
Greimas establishes an actantial model of narrative modes inspired by Levi-Strauss's 
narrative matrix. Greimas postulates that the elementary structure of signification is the 








Figure 2.1 Elementary Structure of Signification 
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For instance, if the first cell in figure 2.1 is taken by a "subject", then three logically 
possible relations generate three concepts that are meaningful: the anti-subject, the non-
subject, and the non-anti-subject, each of which takes the contrary, the contradictory, and the 
complementary position in the structure respectively. Greimas's model of narrative modes is 
then obtained by imposing different actantial roles in each of the cells. 
Heroic Agonistic Synecdochical Ironic 
Subject w -x — 1 - z 
y 
Contrary -w — 1 - y z 
x 
Contradictiory — 1 - x y - z 
w 
Complementary 1 - w x - y — 
Figure 2.2 Greimas's Actantial Model of Narrative Modes 
The elements of the matrix are read as different actants or narrative roles (Levi-
Strauss 1984[1963], Greimas 1984 [1966], Schleifer et al 1992). For instance, if w represents 
a hero, than -w stand for the contrary of hero, an opponent or villain, — is the contradiction 
w 
of a hero, usually a character to be saved or sought for by the hero. 1 -w is then the 
complement of a hero, usually the helper or facilitator. Each of the four columns forms a 
narrative mode: a focus or perspective of the story and the relations between the subject and 
other actants. In other words, narrative modes determine whether the center of a story is a 
hero, a villain, a heroine (understood as the "object" to be saved or sought for by the hero), or 
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a helper. In a sense, the subjectivity the author assumes determines the narrative mode of a 
story. The relations between the subject and other actants are then functions of mode. 
Greimas labels the four narrative modes in his scheme as heroic, agonistic, synecdochical, 
and ironic. It should be noted that actual actantial roles are culturally defined. Greimas treats 
the concretization of actantial roles as an empirical issue. 
What a narrative mode establishes is a set of relations among the four actants. 
According to Greimas' scheme, the hero's power declines as the modes changes from the 
heroic to the ironic. For instance, in the agonistic mode, the opponent is almost equally 
powerful to the hero, in the synecdochical mode the helper is usually the most powerful, and 
in the ironic mode the opponent overpowers the hero. Thus to construct a specific actantial 
model for a personal story is to identify the set of social relations perceived by the storyteller, 
particularly the differentially distributed power among the actants. 
Greimas further argues that stories convey cultural values. To address this issue 
Greimas expand the above model of narrative modes into what he calls basic actantial model 





Figure 2.3: Greimas's Basic Actantial Model of Narrative 
There are three pairs of actants in this model: subject/object, helper/opponent, and 
sender/receiver, forming three axes: the project axis, the conflict axis, and the 
communication axis respectively. It should be noted that a character does not necessarily 
embody only one actant. For instance, the hero can also be the receiver of messages, help, 
and reward; the sender can also be a helper. According to Greimas (1984 [1966], 1989), each 
actant in one pair presupposes the other in the same pair. The first two pairs are internal 
elements of a narrative. Their relations and interactions establish the central events of a story. 
The last pair articulates the situation (also see Schleifer et al. 1992) and informs the story of 
its social and cultural values. 
Specifically, Greimas posits that in each narrative mode one internal actant is 
syncretized with one of the two external actants, most likely the receiver. It is through this 
syncretization that cultural values are communicated to the reader or an audience. In heroic 
mode, the hero is usually the receiver of a prize, oftentimes the "object" sought for. The 
cultural message conveyed is that a hero should be rewarded (e.g. with love, money, power, 
acknowledgement, etc). In the agonistic mode, the receiver is fused with the helper who is 
usually a survivor of the struggle between the hero and his opponent. The cultural value 
conveyed in this mode is communication, namely how we should understand the struggle. 
The synecdochical mode conveys the value of harmony with the "sought-for-object" 
syncretized with the receiver. The "object" in classical comedies is usually a heroine (not a 
female hero) who is eventually awarded a husband as a result of the restored harmony. The 
ironic mode conveys a sense of meaninglessness. With the defeat of the "hero" she/he is 
forced to live with his failure, his opponent becomes the receiver of certain prize. Therefore, 
irony poses a doubt, a questioning of taken-for-granted cultural values. In a sense, an irony is 
counter-cultural. 
While the model of narrative modes provides a scheme of constructing power 
relations among the actants, the basic actantial model of narrative offers a scheme for the 
study of types of action and event in stories. Since Greimas argues that the external actantial 
roles and their syncretization with internal roles communicate cultural values, the axis of 
communication deserves special attention. 
According to Greimas (1984[1966]) communication occurs in two forms: marking 
(indicating)-recognition, and inquiry-answering. Note that the sender-receiver is a more 
fundamental form than these two. In the marking-recognition form, the one who marks (or 
indicates) is the sender and the one who recognizes is the receiver. Whereas, in the inquiry-
answering form, the one who answers is the sender and the one who inquires is the receiver. 
These two forms depend on how a communicative action is initiated. However, as Roberts 
(2003) points out, communication does not always occur after initiation. One may refuse to 
engage in a communication. Furthermore, communication may appear to have occurred but 
the result is a misunderstanding instead of understanding. This argument can be generated 
using Greimas' basic signification structure. For instance, if a communication is initiated by 
a marking, we obtain the scheme shown in Figure 2.4. 
In the above scheme, after marking, recognition completes the communicative act; 
refusal ends the communicative act; and mis-recognition leads to misunderstanding; and non-




Recognition Refusal (to recognize) 
Figure 2.4: Communication Initiated by Marking 
A similar scheme can be constructed for communication started with an inquiry. In 
the following scheme, after inquiry, answering completes the communicative act; refusal 
ends the communicative act; and mis-answering leads to misunderstanding; and non-refusal 
may either end the communication or lead to further communication such as clarifying the 
question. 
Inquiry 
Mis-answering Non-refusal (to answer) 
Answering Refusal (to answer) 
Figure 2.5: Communication Initiated by Inquiry 
Moreover, the different manners in which a communication is initiated imply 
different relations between the interlocutors. For instance, Roberts (2003) argues that 
marking is usually initiated by an "expert" or "authority"; and inquiry is usually directed to 
an "expert" or "authority". The distinction between the "expert" and the "authority" lies in 
the types of knowledge they embody. In presenting Roberts' model of cultural frames I 
discussed two ways of identifying and distinguishing: schematic and processual. For Roberts, 
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the schematic way corresponds to relational knowledge that addresses relations among 
concepts. One who embodies such knowledge is an authority. The processual way of 
identifying and distinguishing corresponds to operational knowledge whose embodiment is 
seen as an expert. As discussed in chapter 1, the reformist frame depends on schematic 
(relational) knowledge to make distinctions, we have enough reason to expect that the 
communicative act recounted in the personal stories would be initiated through marking by 
an authority. 
Narrative Genre 
Narrative modes determine the perspectives from which a story is told and to some 
extent they also determine the ways in which the events in stories unfold. Narrative genre is 
the formal embodiment of an "external" cultural field represented by the actantial roles of 
sender and receiver. In other words, narrative genre refers to the form that concretizes the 
semantic content of narrative modes in a way that reflects cultural values and cultural 
conventions of resolving conflicts. For instance, a story ends with the hero defeating her/his 
enemy reflects different cultural values from one that ends with the hero and her/his enemy's 
mutual destruction. Moreover, stories end with the hero receiving love or wealth reflect 
different cultural values. 
Therefore, while identifying actantial modes usually leads to the establishment of 
social relations within which events unfold, identifying narrative genres reveals cultural ways 
to settle certain situations and the values attributed to the settlements. Greimas avoids 
offering a scheme to delineate narrative genres based on his actantial model. In fact he 
cautions the researcher not to over-use the actantial model. He views his narrative model as 
an open discursive domain that should not be rigidly followed. He notes that, "...to define a 
genre only by the number of actants, while setting aside all the contents, is to place the 
definition at too high a level; to present the actants under the form of a simple inventory, 
without questioning the possible relationships between them, it is to renounce analysis too 
early, by leaving the second part of the definition, its specific features, at an insufficient level 
of formalization." (Greimas 1984[1966] p.202). Thus a model of narrative genre remains to 
be established, at a lower level of abstraction and by bring in cultural elements such as 
cultural frames and values. 
Gergen and Gergen's (1983) narrative model, proposed in a study of autobiography 
and self-formation, contains two primary narrative genres — progressive and regressive — 
that generate five secondary narrative genres. A progressive narrative ends with a state that is 
culturally more valued than the initial state; whereas, a regressive narrative ends with a less 
valued state. A romance is usually a progressive narrative that tells the story of a struggling 
hero. However, romance sometimes falls in the category of stability narrative that ends in a 
state the story starts with. Tragedy is essentially a regressive narrative that ends rapidly and 
sometimes abruptly in destruction of the protagonist, whereas, comedy-melodrama is a 
progressive narrative in which happiness is quickly restored. Another issue concerns the 
Gergens is the direction of the narrative. A happily-ever-after narrative is one that transits 
from a progression to stability while romantic saga is a never-ending alteration of 
progression and regression, a constant struggle. One question arises from this relatively 
simplistic and intuitive model. Do all these narrative forms exist in different cultures? If the 
answer is yes, then how are they differentially weighted within different cultures? 
To answer these questions, a more complex model that allows for its integration with 
Robert's model of cultural frames needs to be established. Despite Greimas' warning, 
Schleifer et al. (1992) established an inventory of narrative genres derived from Greimas' 
model of narrative modes and basic actantial model of narratives. In this research Gergens' 
notion of tragedy and comedy and Schleifer et al's model of narrative genres are synthesized. 
Moreover, Roberts' model is used as the basic structure to address narrative genres in 
different cultural frames. 
A melodrama, according to Schleifer et al. (1992) is a signification of a series of 
events that ends with the hero's victory. This genre can only embody one of Greimas' 
narrative modes, the heroic mode. Tragedy is defined as a signification of a series of events 
that leads to destruction of both the hero and his opponent. This genre, however, can embody 
two narrative modes: the heroic and the agonistic. (Note that in the synecdochical mode, 
neither the hero nor his opponent end in destruction and in the ironic mode the opponent 
triumphs.) Therefore, heroic and agonistic tragedies are both tragic stories but told with 
different foci. 
Comedy is a story that starts with certain degree of disorder and ends with a restored 
harmony. It can embody the heroic and the synecdochical modes. Note that the agonistic 
mode focuses on struggle and opposition instead of harmony and the ironic mode may 
contain "funny" elements but they are not comedic. Irony is here understood as a narrative 
genre in which the hero is defeated but not destroyed by her/his opponent. The fact that the 
hero has to live with her/his failure usually subverts cultural norms and values and challenges 
the meaningfulness of the social and cultural system. It should be noted that irony as a 
narrative genre is different from ironic narrative mode, though it only embodies ironic mode 
as concretized narratives. 
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Application of the scheme established above to the study of ideology is possible only 
if the scheme is integrated with the model of cultural frames. Table 3.1 shows such an 
attempt at integration. Note that this table implies a hypothesis that each cultural frame only 
allows for certain narrative genres. To fully support such a hypothesis requires a research of 
much large scale and data of a much broader range. Therefore I only focus on one of the 
frames that are pertinent to the examination of personal stories sampled from People's Daily, 
namely, reformist frame. 
Table 2.1: Cultural Frames and Narrative Genres 
Genres 
Cultural Melodrama Tragedy Comedy Irony 
Frames 
Melodrama Heroic Agonistic Synecdochical Ironic Irony 
Individualist V V V V 
Mutualist V V V V 
Essentialist V V V V 
Reformist V V V V 
The reformist frame only allows for melodrama, heroic tragedy, synecdochical 
comedy, and irony. Each of the genres provides a settlement of one of four possible 
situations regulated by the frame. Because of the clear distinction between "in-group" and 
"out-group," the conflict between the two is of primary importance. Two possible between-
group situations need settlement. The first is the victory of "us" or one of "us" which is of the 
genre of melodrama in which a hero triumphs over her/his opponent. Second, the failure of 
"us" or one of "us" is narrativized by the genre of heroic tragedy. Since the enemy is denied 
of her/his subjectivity, the narrative mode is never agonistic. Tragedies such as Macbeth, 
which are centered on a villain or villain in its becoming, do not exist in this frame. 
The situation among "us" always needs a happy ending, thus synecdochical comedy 
performs the task. Irony is the "natural" enemy of this frame if a story narrates events within 
the system because it is a rejection of the system's legitimacy. However, the reformist irony 
is used to narrate events occurring in the "out-group" or the "other system." In doing so, the 
irrationality or meaninglessness of the "other" system is exposed, usually in contrast to the 
meaningfulness of "our" system. 
The above discussion suggests a more complex scheme of narrative genre, and hence 
more complex social interaction patterns than the scheme proposed by Greimas and Schleifer 
et al. In the analysis of personal stories from People's Daily, one may expect three narrative 
genres, namely, melodrama, synecdochical comedy, and irony. If the narrator is of an in-
group identity, the subject is a hero on his/her way to overcome obstacles and accomplish a 
task that is part of the group cause. The helper in this scenario is a character from the center 
of the group or someone whose identity as a group member can never be questioned, usually 
a powerful figure of the group, who helps strengthen the hero's will and makes sure the hero 
is tenacious enough to accomplish the task. In the reformist synecdochical comedy, the story 
would start with some degree of estrangement of the subject from the in-group. The narrator 
or subject does not assume the actantial role of a hero. Instead she/he is the sought-for-person 
The helper, again from the center of the group and usually a messenger (sender), helps the 
subject understand the causes of the estrangement. The end result is a return of the subject to 
the center of the group. In other words, an ambiguous identity is clarified. 
The meaning of a hero, opponent, sought-for-person or object, and helper are 
culturally defined. Simply put, a hero is someone who represents positive values and 
qualities relative to a culture. A similar rendering applies to the other roles. According to 
Greimas (1984) only in specific actions the functions of these roles appear. Consequently, 
one character may embody different actantial roles in different situations. For instance, the 
helper is oftentimes a sender, and the hero usually becomes a receiver (of the valuable object) 
at the end of a story. 
In summary, the model of narrative genres provides a scheme for identifying ways of 
settling conflicts. Integrating this model with cultural frames allows for distinguishing 
cultural differences in resolving conflict. Reformist frame in particular allows for four of the 
six narrative genres. Since personal stories cannot possibly be tragedies, I expect only three 
genres to be identified. 
Narrative Conflict and Modalities 
A story, structured by a set of relations, needs to be enacted by certain conflict or 
tension. For Greimas (1984), this tension comes from the transfer of the sought-for-object 
from the opponent to the hero or vice versa. However, many stories do not contain such a 
transfer. A preliminary examination of the sampled autobiographies for this research shows 
that a significant number of these personal stories involve some kind of internal change of 
the subject. Thus, Greimas' model, at least based on the available literature by him, appears 
inadequate to address my research questions. 
Ryan (1984) proposes a model that contains various modal worlds to address the 
dynamic feature of narratives. A modal world is a discursive domain that prescribes what one 
"can" "should", "must", "may" "wants to" or "wish to" be or do. For Ryan, all narratives 
contain certain types of conflict or tension that drive the storied events to unfold. She 
conceives narrative conflict as the tension created between and among the modal worlds and 
the actual worlds. For instance, a story may be centered on the tension between one's own 
personal goals (a personal intention world) and the moral value world of a community or it 
may be centered on the conflict between two characters' rights (right-worlds). Ryan's model 
differs from Greimas' in that the former locates narrative conflicts in the differences between 
different cultural and social formations while the latter places the tension in the more abstract 
structure of relations among the a actantial roles. 
Ryan's model leads further to formulating approaches to the issues of subjectivity, 
self-identity, and action-orientation. The modal worlds and tensions among them provide the 
narrator with a cultural repertoire to render her/his experiences intelligible and orient her/him 
to certain types of action to resolve the conflicts. 
In the field of linguistics, modality is understood as "what modifies the predicate" 
(Greimas and Courtes 1982). In other words, modalities are the elements that modify 
"being" and "doing" that links a subject to a state (in being) or an object (in doing). Modal 
verbs (or modal auxiliary verbs) are the primary vehicles to convey such modifications, 
though modal adverbs play similar roles in many languages. These modal auxiliaries are 
consensually conceived as of two types: epistemic and deontic, despite various efforts to 
establish a theory that can unify the two (Groefsema 1995, Sweetser 1986, Greimas 1987). 
Epistemic modalization conveys the degree of certainty of the speaker about a state while 
deontic modalization modifies an action that links a factual to a possible world. 
Organizing one's experiences through a semiotic system such as language not only 
entails a temporal structuring of state and events as in narrative but also requires a mapping 
among modes of realities. One's actions do not acquire meaning within the domain of 
themselves. Rather, the distance between the actual world — what is known or believed to be 
factual — and the possible worlds — what one can or should or must or may do — is the 
foundation of meaning for actions. In an attempt at understanding narratives in terms of a 
factual world and various possible worlds, Ryan (1985) proposes a formal scheme to bring 
modal analysis into narrative studies. 
The term modal structure refers to the organization of the possibility or plausibility of 
the domains of meaning in the stories. Note the difference between Greimas's narrative mode 
and Ryan's modal structure. Ryan (1985) devises a set of rules that generate a formal scheme 
of "worlds" or domains of meaning. The primary distinction she makes is between the 
author's world and the character's world. Ryan's scheme assumes that the reader and the 
author share the same narrative global universe. The global universe is further divided into a 
profane world and a sacred world. The profane world includes a factual domain in which 
everything is unquestionably real and an actualizable domain, which is a plausible extension 
of the factual. In opposition to the profane world is the sacred world that is always actual. 
According to Ryan, the character's world comprises of the following domains. The 
knowledge-world (K-world) includes the aspects of the world that the character knows and 
believes to be true. 
The intention-world (the I-world) is the goal domain a character aspires to achieve by 
following a course of action. The elements of this world come from three model (note, not 
modal) worlds. The first model world is the wish-world (the W-world). This world contains a 
set of wishes of states and actions that the character ranks along a continuum of "good" and 
'bad" in accord with his or her value system. The world of moral values (the M-world) is 
similar to the wish world in that they both have a ranking continuum of "good" and "bad". 
Different from the W-world, the M-world "specifies what characters consider good or bad for 
all the members of a specific group. (1985, p. 729)" The third world, the obligation world 
(the O-world), is similar to the M-world in that it contains a set of ranked states and actions 
along a continuum of good and bad. It differs from the M-world in that the values come from 
the group of which the character is a member. It is "a contract binding him to the group. 
(1985, p. 729)" The reason why the I-world is not included in the model world is unclear. It 
seems that Ryan thinks that the intention world is not an autonomous domain because it has 
to be informed by a value domain. However, excluding the I-world from the model world is 
an operational switch from the character's world to the researcher's world. It can be argued 
that in the individualistic cultural frame, personal intentions are autonomous for the character 
in the sense that they can serve as ultimate justifications for one's action. It is when one shifts 
from the character's position to a researcher's position that one may argue that those 
intentions depend on the worlds of moral values, obligation, or rights. 
One problem arises from asserting the I-world as one of the model worlds. What 
distinguishes the I-world from the W-world? The answer is: nothing significant. Ryan (1985) 
states clearly that the wish world is a private domain since the valuing is in reference to the 
character. The only underlying difference implied by Ryan is the connection between 
intention and action and the disconnection between wish and action. Since a discussion on 
intentionality, causality, and action is beyond the scope of this paper, I would only argue that 
the difference between the I-world and the W-world is semantically in degree not in kind. 
Therefore, in the following analysis, the I-world is conceptually merged with the W-world 
and redefined as a model world, still labeled as the I-world. 
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Another complication in Ryan's modal structure is his conceptualization of the 
obligation world. Ryan's obligations are of two types: obligations and 
permissions/prohibitions. This ambivalence is obvious in his elaboration of this world by 
resorting to the so-called deontic system that is presented as follows: 
"P is prohibited 
P is allowed 
P is obligatory 
P is rewarded" (Ryan 1985, p. 729) 
The above deontic system contains a set of obligations understood as expectations of 
an interpersonal nature and a set of prohibitions/permissions that imply the existence of a 
power or authority. Forming an analytical scheme, I propose to split this world into two 
relatively autonomous worlds: the obligation world (the O-world) and the right world (the R-
world). In the O-world not fulfilling an obligation results in holding back of a reward; 
whereas, in the R-world violation of a prohibition results in punishment. This operation 
agrees with the model of cultural frames, which ensures consistency in analysis. Therefore, I 
use the following analytical scheme when analyzing the modal structure of the personal 
stories and editorials from the People's Daily: 
The character's domain: actual world 
Model worlds: 
Intention world (I-world) 
Moral-value World (M-world) 
Obligation World (O-world) 
Right World (R-world) 
Figure 2.6: Modality and Modal Domains 
It should be noted that the above conceptual scheme is a reduction and modification 
of Ryan's "general system" since his system includes the author's domains. Since in the 
personal stories to be analyzed the author is always syncretized with a character, Ryan's 
model is reduced by excluding the author's domains. The above scheme focuses on the 
character/author and the worlds she/he depicts from which her/his actions and action-
orientations are inferred in their own terms. 
Roberts (2002) proposes four types of modality in correspondence to his model of 
cultural frames. Except for obligation, permission, and requirement he includes ability as one 
modality. He believes that sufficient empirical evidence shows that people, in particular, 
Americans do rationalize their action in term of what they can do. As a result, he uses the 
four English modal auxiliary verbs, can, may, should and must, as semantic indices of the 
four modalities. He argues that these are the four and only four types of modality assuming 
all actions have only four consequences: to make something (valued) appear, to make 
something (unvalued) disappear, to prevent something (valued) from disappearing, and to 
prevent something (unvalued) from appearing. The first type of action corresponds to the 
"can" modality and his individualistic frame. This type of action is ultimately justified by the 
statement, "because I can." The second type of action rationalization corresponds to the 
"may" modality. Action is ultimately justified by the statement "because I may". In the 
reformist frame, what is brought into focus by this modality is in fact the opposite of 
permission, forbiddance. Oftentimes an action is carried out as an instance of forbidding or 
making unvalued things disappear. It can be seen that the above two actantial modalities 
concern the intention world and the right world. 
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The "should" modality modifies actions that link an actual world to an obligation 
world. This modality differs from the permission modality in that it presupposes 
interpersonal relations instead of a power (of a group). Finally, the "must" modality 
corresponds to a moral value world, the M-world. Actions are rationalized in terms of one's 
requirements of or responsibilities for the welfare of a community. Different from the 
permission modality, however, the individual determines whether to fulfill his/her 
responsibility to the community. In their consequences, significant violation of a permission 
or forbiddance leads to severe punishment, whereas failure to fulfill one's responsibility 
leads to excommunication. 
In should be noted that with the "right" modality "what is right" and "one's right" are 
fused. In other words, one's right is always "what is right." "what is right" is the ultimate 
justification of "one's rights." This is not to say that within other cultural frames people do 
not justify their actions in term of "what is right." Instead, within the other frames "what is 
right" can be further justified in terms of one's ability, obligations, and requirements. In the 
reformist frames, a further question of "why is it right" is inappropriate. Thus in my analysis 
the "right" modality is identified according to whether or not the ultimate justification of an 
action is its "righteousness." 
Table 2.2: Cultural Frames and Actantial Modalities 





Actual world: Epistemic modality 
Intention-world: "can" modality 
Moral-Value world: "must" modality 
Obligation-world: "should" modality 
Right-world: "may" modality 
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The correspondence between cultural frames and narrative modalities is tabulated in 
Table 2.2. To borrow a term from Greimas (1984[1966]), the four types of modalities of 
action are termed as actantial modality. In a sense, the distinction between epistemic and 
actantial modalities corresponds to the distinction between assumptions of objectivity and 
subjectivity and the distinction between explanation and understanding (interpretation). With 
epistemic modals, one assumes there is a reality "out there" and assesses the reality in terms 
of necessity, sufficiency, possibility, and impossibility. Actantial modalities exist in a 
subjective domain. Instead of evaluating truth-values of a reality, these modalities are 
employed to attribute meaning to one's actions, states, and emotions. Moreover, these 
modalities agree perfectly with the model of cultural frames (Roberts 2003). This is shown in 
the Table 2.2. 
In Greimas's actantial scheme, the tension or conflict of the story inheres in the 
relations among the actants. Therefore the tension is a "formal" tension, not a specific tension. 
In a sense, Greimas's model leaves open the question "what is the specific driving force of a 
story?" In Ryan's scheme, however, the driving force of a story can be derived from the 
conflict or tension between or among the actual and model worlds. According to Ryan (1985), 
conflicts are defined in terms of relations among the worlds at four levels. At the primary 
level, conflicts are results of the distance between the actual world and the model worlds in 
the forms of unachieved goal, unsatisfied moral values, unfulfilled obligations, and unmet 
justices. At the second level, conflicts come from the incompatibility between the character's 
model worlds. In other words, the satisfaction of one world requires the non-satisfaction of 
another. For instance, to achieve a personal goal requires that one ignore her/his obligation to 
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another person. At the third level, conflicts arise due to the internal inconsistency or unclear 
boundary of a model world or worlds. Ryan notes that many postmodernist stories and novels 
are about individuals who struggle for a coherent and consistent identity. Finally, at the 
fourth level, conflicts are found "whenever the realization of one of the worlds of a 
character's domain presupposes the non-satisfaction of the corresponding world in another 
character's domain. (1985, p.735)" Since conflicts of some type are inevitable in narratives, 
each possible type of conflict at the above four levels implies a driving force with which 
events can be organized into stories. 
Table 2.3 is a tabulation of all possible conflicts at all four levels. Of course, the 
combination of two or more conflicts leads to more complicated narrative plots and the 
number of possible combinations appears to be huge. Thus, I do not attempt to offer a 
discussion on narratives of multiple conflicts and complex narrative structures. Instead, I 
focus on the possibilities of single-conflict narratives. This is sufficient since all personal 
stories sampled contain much fewer events than most short stories; and, multiple-conflicts, 
though exist, are rare. 
Table 2.3: Possible Narrative Conflicts 
First Level A character's actual world vs. her/his model-worlds: 
4 possible types of conflicts 
Second Lev Between a character's model worlds: 
el 6 possible types of conflicts 
Third Level Within a character's model worlds: 
4 possible types of conflicts 
Fourth Level One Character's model worlds vs. another character's model worlds: 
16 possible types of conflicts 
In general, the analytic scheme established above allows for examination of types of 
conflict in the narratives. Specific to this research, this scheme enables me to explore, at least 
in part, the question, "In what ways has the Chinese communist regime posited traditional 
Chinese culture as its 'other'?" If the traditional Chinese primary cultural frame is recognized 
as essentialist, in which one's identities are mostly defined in terms of interpersonal relations 
such as those between family members, friends, and relatives, then one may expect that there 
exist narrative conflicts that oppose a "right" world to an "obligation" world. 
Action, Intention, and Modalities 
Actions occur in social relations. Weber was one of the earliest to propose a theory of 
social action. His four types of rationality are essentially four ways of assigning meanings to 
one's action. However, Weber's (1978 [1922]) focus was on the actor not the relations. 
Ricoeur (1991) distinguishes two types of understanding of action: causation and intention. 
He argues that "human order is in-between in which we constantly move, comparing our less 
rational and more rational motives, evaluating them relatively, submitting them to a scale of 
references, and finally using them as practical premises in practical reasoning" (1991, p. 134). 
It should be noted that for Ricoeur, the "constant move" is a switch from one discursive 
strategy to another in understanding actions. Ricoeur also suggests that a causal 
understanding of action excludes intentions and motives while intentional understanding of 
action locates the origin of action in a subject. Relevant to this research is the latter type of 
action understanding because it links action directly to a subject. In this research I define 
action-orientation as the discursive elements that justify actions in terms of intentions. 
Bruner (1990) argues that to understand man, "you must understand how his 
experiences and his acts are shaped by his intentional states" and the forms of these 
intentional states are "realized only through participation in the symbolic systems of the 
culture"(p.33). This argument has two layers. First, intentions, as the starting point and 
justification of action, are only meaningful in a cultural system. Thus the ultimate location of 
personal intentions is the cultural system not the individual. As Harré and Gillet (1994) argue, 
the traditional understanding of intentionality views human beings as machines driven by 
internal forces. This view cannot explain why individuals sometimes do things they prefer 
not to do and withdraw from actions they have already committed to. They further argue that 
intentionality is a reasoning mechanism that is regulated by the "prescriptive norms and 
discursive validations". People learn these normative rules to make sense of their engaging in 
and disengaging from actions. Through participating in a cultural system, one "learns" to 
have certain types of intention and subjectivity. 
Second, the cultural system provides the fundamental modes of intentions. Herman 
and Kempen (1993) relate personal psychological motives to basic "themes" at the collective 
level and discover through a series of study of personal narratives that people employ the 
existent cultural themes of motives to bring coherence to their account of their personal 
experiences. In a study of the motivation of Armenian terrorists, Tôtôlyan (1989) opposes the 
argument that the terrorists are irrational and psychotic individuals. He argues that the 
terrorists are human beings "socially produced, out of a specific cultural context" (p.99). In 
his research he focuses on the Armenian narratives that center on a lost empire, a lost 
glorious past and argues that these terrorists are "new heroes" produced for old stories. His 
research suggests that stories provide patterns of intentions and motivations for action. Only 
are the acts meaning in relation to the stories, they also constitute those actions as well. 
Moreover, in traditional social psychological discourse concepts such as intention, 
motivation, motive, and desire are differentiated. For instance, motive and motivation are 
understood as being stimulated by external factors while intention and desire are inner 
driving forces. Furthermore, motivation and intention are usually linked to materialized 
actions and used to refer to mental states that are more stable than motives and desires, which 
are fleeting and do not necessarily lead to action. However, for the constructionist these 
concepts all suggest various discursive strategies to be employed in "talking about" and 
"accounting for" materialized and possible actions. 
Although most of the theorists discussed above suggested the existence of cultural 
forms of intention or cultural themes as foundations of intentionality, no model of intention 
forms was proposed in their writings. However, the discussion on Ryan's (1985) model 
worlds and modalities suggested four types of intention: goals, moral values, obligations, and 
rights. Each form of intention bridges a gap between the actual world and a model world. 
Action, as the bridging act, is modalized in terms of the modality type of the model world. 
Roberts and Wang (2003) propose model of personhood based on the four cultural 
frames discussed in chapter 1. In individualistic frame a person is read as an agent and 
her/his actions are understood as sufficiently caused by the agent her/himself and social 
relations are viewed as resources of the actor. In the mutualist frames, a person is read as a 
collaborator whose actions are understood in relation to a community or other social systems. 
Instead of an autonomous actor, the collaborator's actions are not self-sufficient and are 
rationalized as communal requirements. In the essentialist frame a person is read as a persona 
that is presented through the person's performance. Actions are understood in this frame as 
expressions or representations of one's nature and the nature associated with each persona is 
understood in terms of the social relations in which the person is embedded, i.e. a set of 
obligations. The final type of personhood is the devotee whose actions are read as for the 
interests of the group to which she/he belongs. In this frame, those whose actions are 
perceived as against the group interests are read as opponents who belong to the "other" 
group. 
It can be observed that the above model is a synthesis of Roberts's cultural frames 
and Ryan's model worlds. In this research I expect to show that the Chinese communist 
ideology regulate its subject's intentionality primarily in terms of rights. In other words, 
actions are proposed because it is the right thing to do. 
Emotions and Actions 
The sociological study of emotion is currently divided into two camps. The 
essentialist position posits that emotions are psycho-physiological processes in response to 
interactions between a human organism and changes in its position within a social structure. 
For example, according to Kemper (1981) "different outcomes in power and status relations 
instigate different physiological processes, which are in turn related to different emotions, (p. 
339)" Accordingly, the essentialist perspective treats emotions as reactions to changes in 
social structure — reactions of a universal nature, given their grounding in the essential 
physical makeup of the human body. 
Unlike the essentialist, the constructionist transposes emotion into the domain of 
discourse and discursive practice. Hermans and Kempen (1993) indicate that emotion has a 
narrative structure in that an emotion is always an emotion in a situation. Emotions do not 
stand alone. Hochschild's study on emotion work (1979) suggests that "feeling rules" are 
constitutive of emotions in that they not only convey what emotion is appropriate in which 
situation, but also play a role in the instigation of emotions and emotion management. For 
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Harré and Gil let (1994), emotions are feelings and displays that are embodied expressions of 
judgment and, in many cases, comprise social acts that influence others. Wang and Roberts' 
study on the emotion Schadenfreude (2002) suggests that emotional patterns oftentimes rely 
on a narrative, a history that contains characters with which the individual can identify or 
disidentify. Therefore, emotions are rule-governed acts in reaction to certain situations that 
are oftentimes understood in relation to a narrative. 
Lyons (1980) notes that emotions are often used to justify certain behavior as either 
rational or natural. Certain behaviors are often perceived as accompanied by emotions. For 
instance, in Western societies the action of embracing one's lover is seen as a natural act that 
is attributed to the emotion of love. However, the connection of embracing one's lover and 
the emotion of love is at least not as "natural" and "closely causal" in some other cultures. 
Different cultures not only posit different behavior-emotion links but also ways of displaying 
emotions or emotional behaviors. 
Lyons also indicates that emotions are oftentimes seen as providing motives. He notes 
that emotions as motives are usually mediated by "desires". In other words, certain emotions 
are not directly linked to actions. They give rise to certain desires that serve as motives. What 
is of relevance to this research is the discursive transformations of emotions into actions that 
is provided in the Chinese communist ideological system. As Lyons cautions, I am not trying 
to establish a causal link between emotions and actions. Instead, I view emotion-action 
transformation as discursive strategies with which we account for our actions. One question 
remains to be answered, "What emotions are more likely to be discursively transformed into 
actions?" 
Kerby (1991) points out that our understanding of emotional states is governed by 
cultural rules. According to these rules, certain emotions are perceived as problems that need 
resolution. This concurs with Hochschiled's (1979) argument that we manage our emotions 
according to a set of cultural rules on appropriateness and inappropriateness. In light of 
Roberts's model of cultural frames, one can further argue that within different cultural frames 
emotions, especially emotions perceived as problems are managed differently. This argument 
is twofold. First, some emotions are more prominent in certain cultural frames than in others. 
For instance, frustration appears to be more prominent in individualistic frame than in 
mutualist frame. Hatred is primarily an emotion within reformist frame because its clear 
distinction between friends and enemies. Second, because emotions are differentially 
distributed within different cultural frames, resolutions of problematic emotions also vary. 
Take anger for example. Within individualistic frame, anger is more likely to be understood 
as residing in the individual and thus techniques are developed to manage this negative 
emotion, which is evidenced by the various anger management therapies in the U.S. In 
contrast, within reformist frame anger oftentimes calls for revenge. In this frame, anger is 
perceived as caused by external factors such as the enemy's violation of "our" right. Thus, 
resolution of this problematic emotion needs actions that avenge the injustice done to "us." 
Applying this argument to the study of emotion-action transformation in the Chinese 
communist ideology, I expect to identify a set of problematic or negative emotions that are 
transformable into actions or elements of actions. 
It should be noted that the discursive link between emotions and actions are not 
always explicit. In situations where emotions are not understood as transformable they 
usually either enhance or undermine actions. For instance, excitement may heighten the level 
of intensity of one's action; whereas, sadness may cripple one from acting. What is of 
interest is the discursive pattern in the Chinese communist ideology that organizes emotional 
displays and the degrees of one's commitment to actions. Degree of commitment to an action 
can be conceptualized as how strongly an action is modalized. For example, within reformist 
frame, the "right" modality can be graded in terms of "determination," "want," and "hope." 
Note that this gradation occurs within one modality. In other words, these are strategies of 
modalizing actions in degree not in kind. Thus we can expect that actions proposed in 
conjunction with emotional displays be more or less strongly modalized in accordance with a 
set of cultural rules.. 
Furthermore, because of the clear distinction between friend and enemy in reformist 
frame, the enemy is usually perceived as of no subjectivity or of morally lesser subjectivity. 
Thus we can expect that this contempt in perceiving one's enemy leads to less strong 
modalization if the proposed actions are one against one's enemies. 
In this chapter I have discussed the constructionist endeavor to relocate sociological 
and social-psychological studies from an ontologically realist domain to the domain of 
discourse. With this relocation, the importance and relevance of texts to this research are 
highlighted and narratives are brought into perspective as major cultural forms with which 
subjectivity and self-identity are formed. A theoretical model of grand narrative is 
established based on Aristotle's four modes of causality, Therbom's model of ideology types, 
Robert's model of cultural frames, and Labov's temporal analysis. Moreover, three narrative 
models — model of narrative modes, basic actantial model of narratives, and model of 
narrative modalities — are constructed to address the research questions on self-identity 
formation. Finally, I discussed relevant theoretical arguments on action-orientation and 
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emotion-action transformation. Before this chapter ends, I would like to stress that in this 
study of the Chinese communist grand narrative, I do not intend to appraise the truth-value of 
the ideas or to evaluate how it distorts reality. Instead, I focus on the ways meanings are 
structured in its discursive practice. In other words, my emphasis is on the structure of the 
ideology as an autonomous system. 
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CHAPTER 3 
RESEARCH DESIGN: NARRATIVE ANALYSIS 
AND SEMANTIC ANALYSIS 
In this chapter I discuss my research design with a focus on analytic procedures. The 
texts analyzed are sampled from People's Daily, the sole communist party official newspaper 
run by the Ministry of Propaganda. These texts are of three types: government 
pronouncements, personal stories, and editorials written by individuals in reaction to events. 
As mentioned in the previous chapters, the grand narrative of an ideological system provides 
an organization of time and historical events in conjunction with a single causal force that 
holds all events together. The autobiographies are productions by the subject in the process 
of identifying itself with the system. Action orientation and emotional patterns located in 
these texts are interpreted as results of this process of identifying and as responses to the call 
of the ideological system. Three analytic schemes are designed to handle each type of data. 
Temporal narrative analysis is a modification of Labov's (1997) approach to the analysis of 
orally-told stories. With modification, this approach can be employed to identify narrative 
constants and temporal shifts and to construct the causal chains on the semantic plane. 
Actantial narrative analysis (Greimas 1984) is integrated with narrative analysis of modality 
(Ryan 1985) and this synthesized approach is applied to the analysis of personal stories. 
Semantic analysis with a focus on modality is conducted to obtain a data matrix. This data 
matrix contains encoded semantic relations concerning emotions, modality of action, event 
type, and types of actant and object. This data set is analyzed in chapter 6 to test hypotheses 
concerning action orientation and emotional patterns. 
Temporal Narrative Analysis and Grand Narrative 
Data 
One feature of a totalitarian regime is its "eventful" history. This, as Arendt argues 
(1951), is due to its conception of history as movement. Events are required to sustain a sense 
of movement. The discursive construction of events by the official media, like People's Daily, 
provides a rich source of data that would shed light on the ways in which such a sense of 
movement is signified. Furthermore, the signification space created through the construction 
of events also contains identities with which the subjects of the system can identify or 
disidentify. Therefore, a first step towards understanding the Chinese communist ideological 
system is to reconstruct the structure of its grand narrative: its organization of time through 
the interpretation of events, and its positioning of social identities in a discursive history. 
To address the above research questions, I choose to analyze government 
pronouncements published in People's Daily in the form of editorials. It was a common 
practice that the Chinese central government published these pronouncements in pseudonyms 
and sometimes in the name of the People's Daily's board of editors. These pronouncements 
were usually framed as either a call to act or the government's stance in reaction to certain 
events. Since formal documents were usually distributed through channels within the 
communist party, these pronouncements were normally perceived as calls for action made to 
the whole population. In most cases the event(s) in question and the actions proposed were 
positioned within a large historical discourse. In this section of the study two events that 
occurred during the first 27 years of the Chinese communist regime were selected. These 
events are the anti-rightist movement and the initial stages of culture revolution, both of 
which had far-reaching impacts on the Chinese society. 
The anti-rightist movement was the first large-scale ideological movement in the first 
27 years of Mao's communist regime. It was an ideological movement not only because its 
targets were intellectuals (literally in Chinese, "men of knowledge") but also because its 
purpose was "thought reformation" throughout the whole society. At the time when the anti-
rightist movement was initiated (summer 1957), the communist regime had consolidated its 
power through a series of military and police actions. The previous movements (from 1950 to 
1956) such as extermination of counter-revolutionaries, movements against the three-vices 
and later the five-vices, started with clearly defined targets. During these movements, people 
were identified by their acts (e.g. military actions against the communist forces, officials' 
embezzlement and squandering of public properties, and illegal activities to sabotage the new 
economic order). The anti-rightist movement, however, was the first aimed at a group of 
people because of their speech (i.e. because of what they said and how they said it). 
Moreover, throughout the first seven years of this regime, a residue from the nationalist semi-
democratic system (1911-1949) was kept untouched, namely the democratic parties. As a 
promise from the communists during wartimes, members of these parties had taken 
governmental positions. Throughout this half-year long movement, the communist 
government published a series of pronouncements in People's Daily to define social 
categories and to provide classificatory methods for distinguishing "us" from "them." These 
pronouncements also provided directions in which the movement should be steered. It was 
through anti-rightist movement that the communist regime managed to get rid of those 
disobedient members of the democratic parties and put the rest under its full control. It was 
also in this movement that the discursive boundaries, logic, and strategies of the communist 
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ideological system were solidly established. However, it was the Cultural Revolution that 
pushed the discursive practice governed by the game rules to its perfection. 
It is almost a consensus among Chinese scholars that the Cultural Revolution (1966-
1976) is the historical event that had the most profound impact on the Chinese society. Not 
only did the tentacles of this movement reach almost every corner of the society, it was also a 
movement that aimed at subverting almost all traditional Chinese customs and values. When 
the Cultural Revolution was initiated, a whole new generation had been "mastered" (a term 
from People's Daily) by this ideology and Mao trusted the power of this ideology to such an 
extent that he only dropped a few hints at some crucial moments, his Red Guards would 
know what to do next. This was coined into a slogan during the Cultural Revolution: 
"Wherever Chairman points, we Red Guards will fight there." 
The causes of Cultural Revolution are complex. I will not attempt at offering any 
speculations. However, it is pertinent to mention that the social situation in 1966 was very 
different from that in 1957. The targets of Cultural Revolution included not only intellectuals 
but also government officials who were communist party members. Without violating its 
own logic, the ideological system played an important role in legitimating actions against 
people who were previously defined as "insiders." In a sense, the stability of the fundamental 
structure of such an ideological system dictated the instability of its categorization scheme. 
Although the ten-year movement had its twists and turns, the initial stages were the 
most violent, intensive, and charged with fanaticism and cruelty. The initial stages were 
marked by the Red Guards' smashing street signs and savaging stores that were perceived as 
the "four olds" (i.e. old ideas, old culture, old habits, old customs) in urban areas, and later 
by their invasion into rural China. In pronouncements published in 1966, the purpose of the 
Cultural Revolution was defined and targets of this movement were specified. Thus in this 
research I focus on the pronouncements published at the beginning of the Cultural 
Revolution (i.e. June 1966 to August 1966), when the Red Guards' legitimacy was officially 
acknowledged. 
The sample of texts analyzed to answer questions concerning grand narrative includes 
three pronouncements on each of the two above-mentioned events. The three 
pronouncements on each event were respectively selected at the beginning, the middle and 
the end stages of the events. Another criterion used to sample these pronouncements is that 
the texts should either define the nature of the movement, point out directions of the 
movement, or provide categorization schemes based on which members of society are 
regrouped. Three out of 20 government pronouncements were selected on the anti-rightist 
movement and 3 out of 22 were selected on the Cultural Revolution. In the following section 
I present a temporal narrative analysis that is devised to address grand narrative. 
Methods and Hypotheses 
The analytic scheme established for the analysis of grand narrative is based on 
Labov's (1997) analytic procedure for analyzing orally told stories. Although Labov does not 
address the idea of a grand narrative, his approach provides a framework within which grand 
narratives can be tackled. 
Labov explains his analytic approach by referring to an initial question "How did that 
happen?" He suggests that an event E0 makes sense as the narrator traces a series of previous 
events E„i, E.2,... E.n, until the question is rendered inappropriate. Of the series of events, each 
is an efficient cause of the next one. The approach taken in this research is to analyze the 
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discursive constructions and interpretations of "events." An event is defined as an 
interruption (sometimes disruption) of the "normal" unfolding of life. 
Labov's analytic scheme also provides ways of identifying semantic units of narrative. 
Of particular use is his definition of an abstract. "An abstract is an initial clause in a narrative 
that reports the entire sequence of events of the narrative" (1997, p. 17). In a sense, an 
abstract is a constant whose truth value holds unchanged throughout the whole narrative. A 
constant could be a past event that serves as background information for the fore-grounded 
events or a causal factor that plays into the materialization of the event(s) being signified. 
Thus identifying these abstracts or narrative constants (as is termed in this research) is one 
way to tease out elements of a grand narrative. The first step in the analysis of grand 
narrative is then to identify sentences that hold true as perceived by the author(s) no matter 
whether the "current" event being discussed occurs or not. Unlike Labov's approach, the 
second step is to exclude sentences that describe preceding events. The remaining textual 
elements are then expected to be narrative constants that hold events together. With this 
approach I intend to support the following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1: The causality of the Chinese communist ideology is of the material-
teleological mode and thus is organized in accordance with a reformist frame. 
Hypothesis 2: A scheme of historical phases exists in this ideology that is established 
based on the material-teleological cause. 
In each of the pronouncements, various social identities are discussed and relations 
among them posited. What is of interest for this analysis are the relations of those identities 
to narrative constants, particularly to the "purposeful" force and the historical phases defined 
in term of the force. Hence, the next step is to identify the social identities or categories in the 
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sampled texts and their semantic relations to the narrative constants. In doing so I intend to 
test the following hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 3: Social categories or identities are defined in terms of their relations to 
the purposeful causal force and the historical defined by it. 
According to Greimas's elementary structure of signification, four possible relations 
exist between a social actor and the causal force: the facilitator, the unfacilitator, the non-
facilitator, and the non-unfacilitator. For clarity and avoidance of awkwardness in 
terminology, I use the terms devotee and opponent to refer to the facilitator and the 
unfacilitator respectively, and ambiguous identities to refer to the non-devotee and the non-
opponent. It is argued in chapters 1 and 2 that a grand narrative in accordance with a 
reformist frame contains two semantically oppositional concept sets that are used to 
distinguish among members of the society. This leads to the next hypothesis. 
Hypothesize 4: The Chinese communist ideology contains two clearly defined 
oppositional sets of social identities: devotee and opponent. 
It should be noted that the social identities are identified semantically. However, 
syntactic features also provide cues for identification. For example, most "devotees" occur as 
subjects in sentences ad clauses; whereas, opponents are more likely to occur as objects. 
Furthermore, the category sets for devotees and opponents have a core of stable identities 
across events while the ambiguous category sets change from movement to movement. 
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Actantial Analysis, Autobiographies, and Identification 
Data 
To examine discursive strategies of self-identity formation in the Chinese communist 
ideology, I analyze a sample of personal stories published in People's Daily during the 
second half of 1974. This period is chosen because, first, personal stories were more 
prevalent then than in later years. Second, this is a time when the Cultural Revolution was 
approaching its end and the structures of this type of writings in People Daily had matured 
(or crystallized) into an almost ritualized form. In fact, a quick reading of some personal 
stories available in 1957 shows that the modes of narrative were still in formation at the time 
in that the stories dealt almost exclusively with a single type of content, namely suffering and 
salvation. By 1974 a new generation had grown up under the communists. Their voices and 
the ways in which their voices had been structured by the official ideology are of great 
importance and relevance to my analysis. Moreover, 1974 was a relatively uneventful year 
compared with preceding and ensuing periods. During such times more than a few topics 
were permitted in People's Daily, rendering the personal stories somewhat more diverse. 
The sample for this analysis consists of the corpus of texts comprising the population 
of personal stories published in the People's Daily during the period from July 1st to 
December 31st, 1974. The stories are identified based on the criterion that they all contain an 
account of at least one concrete event the author had experienced. Texts containing general 
autobiographical information do not qualify as personal stories and were thus excluded from 
this analysis. Twenty-six personal stories were identified and analyzed based on the models 
established in chapter 2. 
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Methods and Hypotheses 
The first analytical step is to identify the internal and external actantial roles in the 
story. Actantial models proposed by Greimas (1984[ 1966], 1977) provide analytical and 
generative schemes based on the semantic relations among narrative roles or actants. 
Identification of narrative modes is simplified by the fact that the authors are always subjects 
of the stories. Then the position of the subject is identified in accord with the functions 
she/he performs in the event. For instance, if the subject is portrayed as someone who 
overcomes obstacles in accomplishing a mission, she/he takes the hero's position and the 
story takes on a heroic mode. If the event leads to a troubled situation that the subject is 
unable to disentangle her/himself from, then the subject assumes the sought-for-person 
position and the story is takes on a synecdochical mode. Within this step the three action axes, 
if any exist, are also identified. 
The next step is to identify the genre of a story. This step is made easy by the 
identification of narrative mode and its correspondence to the cultural frames. Normally, if 
the story is in a heroic mode, it is then a melodrama. If the story is in a synecdochical mode it 
is then a synecdochical comedy. It should be noted that this entailment does not render the 
identification of narrative genre redundant because narrative genres are determined by the 
ways in which conflicts are resolved. The correspondence between narrative modes and 
genres only holds within a cultural frame. The predictability results from the theoretical 
model established above. 
The third step is to identify the tension of driving force in a story based on the 
modified model of narrative modalities. On the project axis, narrative tension can be 
identified in terms of characteristics of the obstacles. On the communication axis conflict can 
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be identified in terms of the information gap, i.e. what message is conveyed to and 
recognized by the subject. Furthermore, on the conflict axis the identities of the parties 
involved in the conflict provide cues for the identification of narrative tension. 
To analyze personal stories following the above steps I intend to test the following 
hypotheses that are derived from the theoretical models of narrative modes and genres. In the 
models established in chapter 2, it is shown that reformist frame only allows for three 
narrative modes: heroic, synecdochical, and ironic; and four narrative genres: melodrama, 
heroic tragedy, synecdochical comedy, and irony. It is also established that narrative mode 
reveal the author-perceived social relations, especially power relations. Moreover, the 
settlements of narrative conflict (i.e. choice of narrative genre) entail a syncretization of one 
internal actant with an external actant, which reflects cultural values and norms. 
Hypothesis 1: The personal stories are of three and only three narrative modes, i.e. 
heroic, synecdochical, and ironic. 
Hypothesis 2: In synecdochical comedies, most events occur on the communication 
axis because of syncretization of a powerful helper and the external actantial role of 
sender. 
I also expect to identify cases, in which traditional Chinese cultural values are 
opposed to the Chinese communist ideological system as narrative conflict between two 
modalities. 
Actantial Modality and Action Orientation 
Data 
As discussed in the previous chapter, an ideological system not only provides frames 
and means to organize one's experience, it also orients its subjects toward certain actions. To 
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examine the action orientation of the Chinese communist ideological system and the 
emotional patterns it produces, I choose to examine editorials written by individuals and 
groups of individuals that were published in People's Daily. An editorial is here defined as a 
text that expresses personal opinions about a current event and contains at least one sentence 
that is a proposal of an action or actions with respect to the event. Editorials are sampled 
from People's Daily on four events that cover a period of 19 years (from 1957 to 1976). 
These four events are chosen not only because all of them had profound impacts on the 
Chinese society but also because they are of four types according to the following scheme. In 
chapter 2, an event is defined as an interruption of the normal unfolding of life process. This 
interruption can be framed either as an interruption of a state or an ongoing process. One can 
further postulate that the state and the process can be either culturally valued or unvalued. 
Thus the four types of events are interruptions of an unvalued state, a valued state, an 
unvalued process, and a valued process. 
A similar event typology can be derived from Greimas' basic structure of 
signification. Assuming the Chinese communist ideology is in a reformist frame in which 




(violation of right) 
Figure 3.1: Event Typology within Reformist Frame 
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According to the above scheme, events in reformist frame can be perceived in four 
different ways: asserting our rights, violation of our right by an opponent, mistaking a non-
right for a right, and action as non-violation of a right. These four perceptions correspond to 
the four types of event mentioned above. The correspondence is shown in Table 3.1. 
The first event chosen is the anti-rightist movement discussed above. Suffice it to 
stress here that the intellectual and democratic party members' criticism of the communist 
system was initially permitted during the time period from late 1956 to early summer in 1957. 
Thus the anti-rightist movement was framed as an action to stop an unvalued process during 
which some members of the society mistook non-rights for their rights. 
Table3.1: Event Types 
Cultural revolution was framed differently from the anti-rightist movement. The 
Great-Leap in 1958 that led to three years of severe famine and at least 20 million deaths in 
rural China had forced Mao to retreat to the "secondary line" of the party, more or less a 
party token. The communist bureaucrats had been in the front of policy making until early 
1966. Early signs of Cultural Revolution included the criticism of literary works written by 
some official/writers. The criticism was soon extended to the whole ministry of culture. By 
early summer of 1966, similar criticism had penetrated into the ministry of education and 
Initial State or process Events (State or Process) 
Process unvalued 
(Mistaking non-right for right) 
State unvalued 
("Our" suppressed rights are reasserted) 
Process valued 
(Soviet's violation of our rights) 
State Valued 
(Great loss: non-agentic event) (Great achievements under the leadership of 
Mao) 
Anti-rightist movement 
(Rightist attack on the system) 
Red Guards' actions 
(Domination of the capitalist liners) 
Sino-Soviet war (1969) 
(Soviet's invasion) 
Mao's Death 
some major universities. Thus in the official pronouncements on the Cultural Revolution, the 
situation in China was described as a domination of the revisionist and bourgeois bureaucrats 
in many areas of social life, an unvalued state in which rights of revolutionary masses had 
been suppressed. 
By 1969, the Cultural Revolution entered its third year. The situation in China was 
framed as continuing!y deepening of the revolution in various areas of social life, i.e. a 
valued process. The conflicts along the Sino-Soviet borders then were perceived as an 
interruption of this valued process, an blatant violation of "our" sacred rights. 
The situation of China in 1976 was framed within People' Daily as a time when great 
achievements had been harvested thanks to the ten-year Cultural Revolution. Early in 1976 a 
poem by Mao was published that described the situation as "nightingales singing and 
swallows dancing." Mao's death came as an odd event to most Chinese since for 27 years the 
Mainland Chinese had been chanting, "Long live Chairman Mao" (literally meaning 
Chairman Mao will live for ten thousand years) and Mao's death seemed remote, if possible 
at all. Thus, Mao's death was framed a disruption of a valued state. However, Mao's death 
was caused by natural agent and thus fell in the category of non-anti-right since no social 
actor played any role in the event. 
With the above four events chosen, editorials were sampled. As a consequence the 
routine workings of the communist propaganda machine, People's Daily provides a 
convenient sampling frame: editorials on an event during the time period when they were 
permitted to be published. Usually, the policy of the communist regime and thus the policy of 
People's Daily only allowed editorials to be published during certain period of time. In a 
sense, an event would last as long as the People's Daily permitted it to be discussed. 
Normally, a government pronouncement would tell the population that something had 
happened, marking the start of the event. Two cues in the newspaper are used to determine 
the time period during which editorial are sampled. First, if a government pronouncement 
was published on a new event, then editorials on an "old" event would completely disappear. 
This is the case with the initial events of the Cultural Revolution and Mao's death. Editorials 
in response to the Red Guards' actions in cities stopped after a government pronouncement to 
redirect their action toward rural China. Editorials on Mao's death disappeared as soon as a 
government pronouncement declared the central government's decision to build Mao's 
Memorial on Tien'anmen Square, which was framed as a happy event. Mourning was 
immediately replaced by joyful cheers. Second, editorials in reaction to an event were 
replaced by analyses of the causes of the event. In these analyses no actions were proposed 
and thus they did qualify for editorials. This is the case with the Sino-Soviet war. Three 
weeks after the event was publicized, analyses completely replaced editorials. Using these 
two cues, a time period is first determined and all the editorials are the included in the 
sample. In fact, the sampled texts on the three events discussed above are the populations of 
all editorials in response to the events. 
A complicated case was the anti-rightist movement. During this half-year long 
movement, editorials appeared almost every day. In fact, 107 editorials were published 
during the first month (June 22, 1957 to July 21, 1957), which exceeds (by 20 editorials) the 
largest sub-sample of the three other events. Thus a sample was drawn. Tallying the numbers 
of editorials published every day during the first month, I discover that editorials were 
concentrated during the period from July 5th to July 14th, 1957. After this period no more than 
three editorials were published each day. This counting allows me to determine a time period 
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and to sample editorials whose number is very close to the size of the largest sample 
mentioned above. 
Sample size and sub-sample size are provided in the following table. 
Table 3.2: Sample and Sub-Sample of Editorials 
Events Anti-rightist Cultural Sino-Soviet Mao's Total 
Movement Revolution War Death 
Sub-sample 84 31 87 79 281 
After the editorials were sampled, the sentence closest to the end of each editorial that 
contains a proposed action is selected. A proposed action is here defined as a sentence or 
phrase that indicates an action to be taken by a certain member or members of a society. For 
instance, "We are determined to follow Chairman Mao's revolutionary line" is a proposed 
action in that it indicates an action to be taken by "us", namely in-group members. The 
modality of the action is then identified by reading the rest of the text and identifying the 
rationale provided in the text for the intended action. For instance, the most likely rationale 
for the above-proposed action is, "because history has proven that Chairman Mao's 
revolutionary line is the only right line." Furthermore, within the "right" modality, each 
action modalization is further categorized in terms of its strength. Strength of modalization is 
here defined as the degree to which the actor (i.e. the subject of the proposed action) is 
committed to the action. For instance, a determination is a stronger modalization than an 
intention. An intention is stronger than a hope. Then, each sentence selected in the first step 
is semantically analyzed into subject, action, and object or state, which are encoded to obtain 
a data matrix. 
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Similar steps are taken to collect data on emotions. A sentence closest to the 
beginning of an editorial that contains an expression of emotion(s) is selected. Then the 
whole text is read to locate a sentence that explicitly posits an emotion-action transformation. 
Then the emotion(s) and the action that the emotion is transformed into are encoded. 
Using categorical data analysis techniques to establish associations among actantial 
modalities, types of subject, types of object or state, types of event in question, types of 
emotions and emotion-action transformation, I intend to test the following hypotheses. 
Hypotheses 1 and 4 can be directly derived from the theoretical arguments discussed in 
chapter 2. Hypothesis 2 is proposed to test the existence of People's Daily's underlying 
author selection policy. The remaining hypotheses are based on the constructionist's 
argument that an action is always an action from a position (i.e. an identity) (Harré and Gillet 
1994, Hermans and Kempen 1993). One would expect that strong action modalization 
expresses the centrality of one's social identity. Links between emotions and actions are 
discursive features that social actors use to render a situation comprehensible and that 
provide directions for further actions (Gergen 1994). 
Hypothesis 1: Actions in Chinese communist ideology are primarily modalized in 
terms of rights. 
Hypothesis 2: Actions proposed during times of crisis (interruption of valued state or 
process) such as Mao's death and the Sino-soviet war are more strongly modalized 
than actions proposed during the other two events (Interruption of unvalued state or 
process). 
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Hypothesis 3: People of stable in-group identities such as workers, poor peasants, 
and People's Liberation Army soldiers are more likely to use stronger modalization 
than people of other identities. 
Hypothesis 4: Only negative emotions such as anger and hatred are discursively 
transformable into actions. 
Hypothesis 5: People of stable in-group identities are more likely to propose 
transformable emotions than people of other identities. 
Hypothesis 6: Actions associated with emotional transformation are more strongly 
modalized. 
Hypothesis 7: Actions directed to enemies and people of ambiguous identities are less 
strongly modalized than actions taken within the group. 
In this chapter I discussed analytical strategies used in the examination of grand 
narrative, personal stories, action-orientation, and emotions. Hypotheses associated with each 
section are provided. It should be noted that in the first two sections, qualitative analyses are 
to be conducted. Hypotheses are to be supported in terms of compatibility between data and 
the proposed analytical models. In the last section, qualitative data are analyzed 
quantitatively to test the proposed hypotheses. 
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CHAPTER 4 
STRUGGLES AND MOVEMENTS: THE GRAND NARRATIVE 
"The history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggle. " 
(The Communist Manifesto — Marx and Engels, 1978[1848]) 
"Time has Begun!" —Hu Feng, People's Daily, 1949 
The second quote is the title of a poem published in People's Daily on October 1st 
1949, the day after Mao pronounced the birth of People's Republic of China. Six years later, 
the poet found himself in prison after having been accused of being anti-communist-party 
and anti-Mao. After spending over 20 years in prison, the poet, like many "intellectuals" of 
his age, still denied the accusation. Nevertheless, the title of his poem has a ring of accuracy. 
Time had begun at that moment on that fateful day in 1949, not only in the sense that a new 
age had started but also in the sense that an alternative temporal was for the first time being 
imposed on Chinese society. 
In this chapter I examine the core of the Chinese communist ideological system, its 
grand narrative. Ricoeur (1984) describes narrative as a condition of temporal experience. 
Different from many linguists and literary analysts, Ricoeur here posits narrative as the 
ontology of time. In other words, time attains its being through a certain narrative mode. In 
this view, narrative is a necessary condition for time — for our experiences of and in time. 
It was argued in chapter 2 that grand narrative, defined as a (hi)story of a whole 
community, society, civilization, or even human kind that is unified by one single cause, is 
only possible in two of the four cultural frames: the mutualist and the reformist. In this 
chapter, a modified analytic procedure (Labov 1997) is applied to the texts of government 
pronouncements on two events. The purpose of this is to reconstruct the structure of the 
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Chinese communist grand narrative. This structure contains a concept of history as forward 
movement driven by an inner contradiction, a scheme of historical phases mapped to a 
specific society, and discursive strategies of categorizing social actors during struggles within 
these phases. The traditional Chinese cultural frame and its historical narrative style are then 
discussed to establish the Chinese communist ideology's cultural "other" or antithesis. 
Comparison and contrast between the two cultural systems show that the structure of the 
communist ideology differs fundamentally from the traditional cultural frame and its forms 
of historical narrative. Contrary to the commonly held argument that the emergence of 
modern totalitarianism in China was facilitated by its cultural heritage (Korchak 1994), this 
analysis shows that the communist ideological system is alien to traditional Chinese society 
at least in terms of its conception of social actors and historical discourse. 
Grand Narrative of the Chinese Communist Ideology 
Narrative Constants 
As discussed in chapter 3, narrative constants are those statements in a narrative that 
hold true throughout the story. In other words, constants are elements whose truth-values do 
not depend on the sequencing of events. In the pronouncements analyzed here most of the 
constants are statements that posit a fundamental cause to the events in question. This 
fundamental cause is consistently termed as "history". 
Quote 1: "History moves forward in struggle. People's thoughts move forward 
through debate. " 
(People's Daily. June 22nd, 1957) 
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Quote 2: History moves forward. 
(People's Daily, September 15th, 1957) 
According to Luhmann's (1999) systems theory, the primary distinction drawn within 
an ideology (i.e. its very first signifying operation), establishes its discursive domain. For the 
Chinese communist ideology, this first concept is history. Anything that is nonhistory is left 
on the other side of this distinction, rendering it meaningless. Discourse then proceeds on the 
asserted side of the distinction. With this discursive operation, the initial point of a field of 
meaning is established. 
The second discursive operation is to claim that "history moves," which is to say that 
an unmoving history is meaningless. This claim also conceives history as a force, an 
immanent force that is the defining characteristic of history. The third operation involves a 
claim that "history moves forward"—a concept that calls for at least two specific points (or 
events). Once time is understood as moving from an inferior point toward a superior one a 
semantic field is established for mapping conduct into a concrete pragmatic field. 
The fourth discursive operation gives history a form, namely as struggle. Thus, the 
forward moving quality of history has an immanent cause. Yet, like "forwardness", 
"struggle" opens possibilities of further signification. Struggle implies a contradiction, which 
is rendered meaningful after a thesis and antithesis are introduced into the discourse. 
Quote 3: What is counter-revolution? Revolution and counter-revolution are two 
tendencies in contradiction/struggle. Being counter-revolutionary is moving against 
the direction of historical development. History moves forward. Revolution is in 
accordance with the direction of historical development to determinedly break old 
systems and develop a new system. Going against the direction of historical 
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development, stubbornly defending the old system before the new system is 
established and doing damage to the new system after it is established and pulling 
society backwards, that is counter-revolution. 
(People's Daily, September 15th, 1957) 
In this paragraph, two concepts are introduced into the discourse to attribute specific 
meaning to the concept "struggle." These two concepts are revolution and counter­
revolution, which are defined by linking them into the forward-moving conception. These 
two sides of the struggle are defined respectively as moving with and moving against the 
direction of historical development. Here a tautology emerges, however. History moves 
forward because of the struggling parties and the parties struggle because history moves 
forward. Two strategies are usually taken to account for this circularity. One strategy is to 
philosophize the tautology, claiming that this is the inherent nature of movement as in 
Hegelian and Marxist dialectic philosophy. Another strategy is to acknowledge the tautology 
arguing that any semiotic (discursive) system contains such self-referentiality. From the 
above quotes one can see that the former strategy is adopted in the Chinese communist 
ideology since the second strategy distances a semiotic system from its claimed "reality." 
It should be emphasized that different ideological components are emphasized in 
different situations. For example, the forwardness of history is stressed during the anti-
rightist movement, whereas struggle was the focus during Cultural Revolution. 
Quote 4: All things exist in the midst of contradiction, struggle, and change. A 
cardinal point of Marxism, Leninism, and Mao-Zedong Thoughts is the will for 
criticism, struggle, and revolution. Struggle is life, if one does not struggle (against 
one's opponent), (one's opponent) will struggle against you. If one loses 
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revolutionary vigilance and does not struggle relentlessly against class enemies and 
class aliens, one is not a Marxist. 
(People's Daily. July 17th, 1966) 
Quote 5: The more victories we win in the various frontline s of socialism, the more 
our socialist cause is consolidated and developed, the more prominent are the 
contradictions and conflicts between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie. This is why 
Proletariat Cultural Revolution is on top of our agenda. This is (determined by) 
objective law. It is impossible to try to avoid such contradictions and conflicts. 
Proletariat, if they intend to win the final victory, has to be always ready to counter­
attack any challenge from the bourgeoisie in the ideological field. 
(People's Daily, July 17th, 1966) 
In the first quote, conflict is conceived as inevitable, independent from one's will or 
intention. This axiomatic type of statement can also be seen in the pronouncements issued 
during anti-rightist movement. This law-like form creates a sense of having-no-choice. Every 
act takes sides in the conflict. The second quote posits the way in which the conflict 
intensifies. On one hand, this is an answer to the question, "Why do we need Cultural 
Revolution if we have made great achievements?" On the other hand, it is a strategy to 
sustain the logical consistency of the discourse. Note that here Cultural Revolution is 
conceived as inevitable and determined by objective law. The "why-do-we-need" question 
mentioned above is essentially a question about necessity. 
At this point the constants within the Chinese communist ideological system have 
been established. "Play" within this discursive domain requires (at least tacit) agreement 
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regarding the semantics these constant entail. Questioning these semantics could only be 
done in accordance with a different discursive system, a new domain of meaning. 
Causality 
The domain established by the narrative constants that comprise "forward-moving 
history" can be mapped onto a concrete domain, the social. In the definition of revolution and 
counter-revolution, two new terms have been added: new and old (social) systems (see Quote 
3). First, with this distinction the forwardness of history acquires its reference since it can 
now be used to index two points along a temporal dimension suggested by "old" and "new" 
social systems. Second, through a metaphor of "pulling society backwards,"(Quote 3) a 
sense of history being a force and the old system being a constraint is created. Furthermore 
its opposition is also suggested, namely forward-moving history. Third, two actors are 
implied once old and new social systems are linked to the narrative constants: the facilitator 
and the impeder of historical movement. 
In The Origins of Totalitarianism Arendt (1951) indicated that totalitarian ideological 
discourses are characteristic of "lawfulness." For example, German Nazi ideology relied on 
an evolutionary theoretical frame and various "anthropological sciences" of races. Soviet 
communist ideology had a core of Marxian historical materialism that had achieved the status 
of universal truth. Both had a few simple assumptions and follow clear logical derivation of 
further propositions. Arendt also noted that both ideologies posit history as a form of motion. 
The Chinese communist ideology is no exception. However, for the Nazi's, actions obtain 
meaning in terms of struggle to restore a past glory; whereas an imagined future end or 
purpose, a communist Utopia has been the ultimate reference for the Soviet and Chinese 
communists. 
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Thus the causal force that holds events in the Chinese communist grand narrative has 
two aspects. One is suggested in the above discussion, namely the immanent struggle within 
the conception of history. The other aspect involves a claim that history will eventually 
achieves its highest form, namely, communism. The primary strategy to assert this highest 
historical form is to postulate a progressive trajectory of history marked by various phases. 
A review of the events that mark various historical phases is present in all 
government pronouncements issued at the initial stages of ideological and mass movements 
such as the anti-rightist movement and the Cultural Revolution. By positing phases using 
certain events as markers, the forward movement of history is made specific. More 
importantly, the ongoing situation and proposed actions can be framed in relation to a larger 
historical discourse. 
Quote 6: Therefore, in different historical periods, there are different specific criteria 
to distinguish revolution from counter-revolution. During the fall of feudalism and the 
rise of capitalism, bourgeoisie, who opposed feudalism and developed capitalism, 
was the progressive class. During the decline of capitalism and the rise of socialism, 
bourgeoisie, who defended capitalism and opposed socialism, became a counter­
revolutionary class. During the Chinese neo-democratic revolution (1911-1949, 
according to the Chinese communist definition) China needed to free herself from the 
old system of semi-feudalism and semi-colonialism. That was the objective 
requirement of history. ... Today, in a period of socialist revolution ...the direction of 
China's movement is to complete socialist revolution. 
(People's Daily. September 15th, 1957) 
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In the above quote, concepts such as feudalism, capitalism, and socialism are used 
without elaboration because the meanings of these terms had become mundane. According to 
Lyotard (1991 [1979]), a grand narrative contains an unquestionable ontological claim. Here 
the ontology of history takes effect, with its signifying operations such as positing historical 
phases and highlighting historical events. 
Another strategy is to suggest the communist Utopia by encouraging the in-group 
people to develop "communist thinking". 
Quote 7: We, all communist party members, revolutionary cadres, people who 
support socialist system and proletariat dictatorship, ought to... develop communist 
(way of) thinking, raise our communist self-consciousness, and establish communist 
aspiration. ... In so doing, we will be able to march invincibly during this new phase 
of socialist revolution (Cultural Revolution). 
(People's Daily, July 17th, 1966) 
It is worth mentioning that by 1966 the urban population, especially the younger 
generation, had been inculcated with the basics of Marx's historical materialism through 
weekly political study sessions and required courses such "politics" and "philosophy." Thus, 
such quote was understood not only as describing a scheme of historical phases but also 
suggesting the inevitability of a future communist society. The causality of the historical 
movement is not understood merely in terms of inherent struggle but also as a teleological 
progression. 
Social Categories and Instability of Identities 
By positing historical phases and defining revolution and counter-revolution as one's 
affiliation with historical forces, the basis of a categorization scheme is established. In the 
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discussion of narrative constants it was suggested that in the forward movement of history 
one only has two choices: going with or against this movement. The imposition of historical 
phases, especially the opposition of the new to the old social system, concretizes the sense of 
movement and also provides a basic mechanism with which social categories are officially 
established. In principle, anyone who is a facilitator of the historical movement is 
"progressive" and thus an ally, and anyone who is an impeder is by definition "regressive" 
and an enemy. In practice, categorization depends on the historical phases in which the 
categorizing operation is applied. For instance, traditionally an archetype of violence, cruelty, 
and trickery, the first emperor of China, Shi'huandi, was categorized by the Chinese 
communists as a progressive hero because he allegedly dismantled the slavery system and 
represented the then-progressive class, the landlords. In contrast, as the traditional 
embodiment of morality, intellectuality, and perseverance, Confucius was depicted as a 
regressive character. Despite his god-like status in traditional Chinese societies, he was 
portrayed as a clown who was ignorant enough to go against the tides of history, and a 
maniac who single-mindedly tried to restore slavery. 
Social categories are thus defined in terms of the posited historical phases, narrative 
constants identified above. Although the shifts of historical phases in this grand narrative are 
usually marked by ceremonial events such as Mao's declaration of the birth of People's 
Republic of China on the Gate of Heavenly Peace (Tien'anmen), the distinctive feature of a 
historical phase is a social form such as feudalism and capitalism. Another feature of the 
scheme of historical phases is its exhaustiveness. No period in history is left out. For 
instance, China, according to this historical scheme, similar to Western societies, had 
undergone slavery, feudalism, capitalism (though not fully fledged and short) and socialism. 
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Though historical events are used as markers for temporal shifts, each of the historical phases 
is signified by a term that describes a social system. With this maneuver, events become 
secondary in the sense that what holds the historical narrative is a totalizing concept of 
historical movement stages of which are delineated by social forms instead of historical 
events. Events are only comprehensible in reference to imposed discourse about the 
evolution of social forms. Moreover, defining historical phases in terms of social forms (i.e. 
relations) allows for positing social categories in accordance with the specific social forms. 
In the categorization schemes provided by the ideological system, social categories 
normally fall into two clearly incompatible sets. However, in schemes designed for mass 
movements there are always categories that are ambiguous. People of these ambiguous 
categories usually become the targets of the officially initiated movements. 
The following figure are obtained from the government pronouncements issued 
during the anti-rightist movement. 






Party central represented by 
Chairman Mao 
The party and the Government 
Masses of people 
worker's class, people of 
working classes, 
Revolutionary intellectuals 






Figure 4.1: Categorization Scheme of Anti-Rightist Movement 
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A and C are two incompatible category sets, each of which contains unambiguous 
categories such as communist party members, members of the youth league, and the worker's 
class in set A and bourgeois rightists in set C. Two categories appear to be ambiguous since 
the core concepts (i.e. the nouns) are contained in both set A and set C. The categories of 
intellectuals and members of democratic parties appear in both sets. However, a modifier is 
used to further define each term. The modifiers such as "revolutionary", "leftist", 
"bourgeois" function to practically place in either camp people who fall into the categories of 
intellectuals and democratic party members. Individuals of ambiguous identities (i.e. 
concepts in set B) such as intellectuals and democratic party members present a need for 
clarification because of the binary opposition in the faci)itator-impeder scheme. People of 
such ambiguous identities are thus posed as the target of mass movements. 
Moreover, each of the historical phases can be internally divided into further sub-
phases called periods. This subdivision creates a discursive space within which social 
categories specific to the historical periods can be posited. For example, the following bullets 
summarize five periods undergone during the Chinese socialist reform (as reported in the 
July 17th 1966 pronouncement from the People's Daily). 
• Early 1950s: Exposed the vices of capitalism 
• Mid-1950s: Socialist reformation of ownership 
• 1957: Crushed the bourgeois rightists' conspiracy to seize power 
• 1858-1963: Defeated the attempt of the rightist opportunists within the 
communist party to restore capitalist system 
• 1963-1966: Socialist education movement 
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The historical periods are either defined by the establishment of certain type of social 
form or a victory over an enemy. More importantly, such division opens a space where the 
current event, namely Cultural Revolution can be located: as a new phase of socialist 
revolution. 
Quote 8: However, (despite all the accomplishments and victories) the bourgeois 
world outlook is deeply rooted in old intellectuals. They are still closely interrelated 
with the foundations of the old system. Their accepting proletariat world outlook is a 
transformation of mind, an extremely painful process. It is not easily done. 
In the minds of the old intellectuals, when the proletariat world outlook has 
not conquered them, the pre-existing bourgeois world outlook, old bourgeois ideas, 
old habits continue to dominate and attempt to exert influence. They always attempt 
to reform the world in accordance with the world outlook of the landlords and 
capitalists. 
(People's Daily, July 17th, 1966) 
The new phase is always aimed at a new victory—a conquering of the enemy. 
However, the Cultural Revolution is a movement that tries to conquer minds. In the above 
quote, minds are categorized into two types: the old and the new. Minds are depicted 
metaphorically as a territory to be conquered. It is worth mentioning that a war metaphor is 
probably the most frequently used in most of the pronouncements. For instance, in each of 
the two movements, the whole society was depicted as composed of various frontlines. Other 
war-images include "troops of the working class," "attack and counter-attack," "allies," 
"victories," "surrender," "resistance," and "challenge." 
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More importantly, conceiving the Cultural Revolution as a new period of socialist 
revolution allows for a re-categorization of members of the society. The following figures 
obtained from the pronouncements on the Cultural Revolution shows that certain in-group 
identities in 1957 are now ambiguous. 












bourgeoisie in the 
party (of authority), 
Bourgeois rightists 
Intellectuals, 
Party members of 
authority 
Figure 4.2: Categorization Scheme in Cultural Revolution 
This figure differs from the previous one in that it places communist party members 
of certain authority in the ambiguous category set. Cultural Revolution is known to be a mass 
movement Mao used to purge the party. Thus not surprisingly party members, especially 
party members in various positions of authority, needed to realign their affiliation. It can also 
be observed that labels such as bourgeois rightists appear in the scheme too. In fact, any label 
used to categorize enemies in a previous movement would appear in a categorization scheme 
in later movement, consistently placed in the enemy category. 
In fact, similar re-categorization occurred in 1957 during the anti-rightist movement. 
The following quote shows that intellectuals and democratic party members were "allies" 
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before the communists took power in 1949. It was through positing a new historical period 
that these people were re-categorized. 
Quote 9: During China's neo-democratic revolution period, China needed to free 
itself from semi-feudalism and semi-colonialism and to establish a new democratic 
system. During this period, ...the nationalist bourgeoisie (a category that included 
bourgeois intellectuals and members of various democratic parties existing at the 
time of the nationalist government) was a class of a dual natures: it could be 
sympathetic with and even be a part of the revolution against imperialism, feudalism, 
and bureaucratic capitalism to a certain extent at a certain stage; that was its 
revolutionary side. (On the other hand) It was afraid of the basic elements of the 
revolution, namely, workers and peasants, it did not have the courage to oppose the 
enemies of the revolution; this was its compromising side. Today, during the socialist 
revolution period, what then is the criterion to distinguish revolution from counter­
revolution? China's direction of movement at this point is toward a thoroughly 
complete socialist revolution. Therefore, opposing the capitalist line (literally, road) 
and supporting the cause of socialist revolution and construction is pushing the 
society, and thus the revolution, forward. Adhering to the capitalist line, being hostile 
toward and doing damage to the causes of socialist revolution and construction is 
counter-revolution. Today, workers, poor peasants and revolutionary intellectuals 
are the main forces of revolution and those anti-socialist bourgeois rightists are the 
counter-revolutionaries. 
(People's Daily. September 15th, 1957) 
In this quote, modern Chinese history is divided into two periods: a neo-democratic 
revolution the purpose of which was to rid China of an old system, and a socialist revolution 
the goal of which was to construct a new one. Despite their "dual nature" described in the 
above quote, members of democratic parties and bourgeois intellectuals who were assigned 
governmental positions in the communist regime, had all been regarded as allies previously. 
In the above pronouncement, the instability of the criteria of classifying revolutionaries and 
counter-revolutionaries is linked to the changing historical period. Thus, the social categories 
in the communist ideological system are not stable. The instability is justified resorting to the 
movement of history. Bourgeois intellectuals, the basis of those democratic parties, who were 
allies during the neo-democratic revolution, became enemies in the anti-rightist movement, 
the very enemy the movement was meant to destroy. The instability of categories offered the 
most unexpected enemy for the Cultural Revolution: communist party members, particularly 
those in positions of authority, who were normally those "tested" party members who had 
struggled and sacrificed for the communist cause. 
In summary, the Chinese communist ideology is centered on a unified history that 
moves forward. The driving force of the movement is conceived as struggle. The forward 
movement is concretized by a sequence of exhaustive historical phases that are marked by 
certain social arrangements. Each of the historical phases can be further divided in terms of 
specific historical events. Specific to each historical phase or sub-phase, social categories are 
established and used to classify all members of the society into two opposing sets. Social 
movements and political campaigns usually start with an ambiguous set of categories that 
provides the target of action. 
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Traditional Chinese Culture and Communist Ideology 
In the following section, I first provide a somewhat sketchy picture of traditional 
Chinese society based on anthropological and sociological works by Chinese and American 
scholars. These works cover anthropological, social, psychological, and historical aspects of 
traditional Chinese society, which I believe, is sufficient as basis for comparative purposes. 
Then I compare the communist grand narrative with traditional Chinese cultural ways of 
viewing the world and themselves. The purpose of this comparison is to demonstrate how the 
Chinese communist ideology and the traditional Chinese world outlook are founded on two 
different cultural frames. The communist ideology is shown to be a subversion and disruption 
of traditional Chinese culture in that it redefines traditional social and cultural categories in 
an oppositional instead of a compatible manner. Moreover, it also destabilizes traditional 
social and cultural categories by positioning them in a forward moving history. Finally, I 
characterize traditional Chinese historical narratives to demonstrate that there did not exist a 
totalized and totalizing grand narrative in Chinese historical writings. The communist form 
of historical discourse is shown to be alien to traditional Chinese societies. 
In his well-known anthropological work From the Soil, a book banned by the 
communist government for over 30 years, Fei (1992 [1947]) characterizes traditional Chinese 
society according to a differential association model. Fei uses a spatial metaphor in 
describing his model. "In Chinese society, the most important relationships—kinship — are 
similar to the concentric circles formed when a stone is thrown into a lake." (1992, p. 63) 
According to Fei, the ego is at the center of this kinship network. A system of notation 
referring to the elements of such a network is commonly held. Each category in this system is 
used to identify a specific person by the centered self. In the inner most circle are the 
immediate family members and then the ripples extend via marital links to relatives, friends, 
neighbors, and colleagues. Each person in this order is differentiated from others in terms of 
closeness to or distance from the center. To the Chinese, the order of kinship is the 
fundamental order of man, termed Ren-Lun (or man-order). In fact, the etymological origin 
of the word Lun means, "the order existing in ripples of water." Therefore, for the Chinese a 
man of Ren (a benevolent man) is one who, first of all, exemplifies a good son, father, 
husband, and brother by conforming to Li (rituals) that govern the interactions between the 
self and other members of the immediate family. Once one satisfies this prerequisite, it is 
natural for one to "push" or extend this order to farther circles of one's network. Thus the 
Chinese person is located at the center of a social network the interaction within which are 
governed by the principle of closeness and distance. 
The manner of interaction depends on the intersection among one's identities of 
(entailed by one's relations to) the people regarding a specific situation. Because one's 
identities are differentiated, one's manner of interaction differs accordingly. Fei cites the 
Book of Rites in support of this observation. "Toward the intimate, there is only intimacy; 
toward the respected, there is only respect; toward superiors, only deference; between men 
and women, only differences; these are things people can not alter." Fei suggests that once 
they have established such a comfortable network, the Chinese would be extremely reluctant 
to move, since in situations where one's identities are not clearly defined one would be at a 
loss as how to interact with people. 
Therefore, traditional Chinese social categories or identities are defined based on such 
a network, a set of relations, and thus in complementary instead of oppositional terms. Sets of 
identities are viewed as permanent features constituting the natural order of men. In the 
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communist ideological frame, however, two sets of social categories are defined in 
oppositional terms and within each set the categories are basically discrete—allowing only 
relations of alliance or "friendship." Relations of oppositional categories are always ones of 
opponents or "enemies." 
Another anthropologist, Hsu (1981), supports Fei's observation about traditional 
Chinese society. Furthermore, Hsu's work provides new insights into the ways the Chinese 
deal with their own identities and identity-changes. Hsu writes that the Chinese man of 
accomplishment has to return to his hometown, his origin, to make his achievement 
complete, to "shine among, and share his success with those who are related to him." (1981, 
p. 168)" As Hsu points out, for the successful Chinese man, his relations with his folks do not 
change because of his success. However, it is only in his primary network that his success is 
appreciated. On the one hand, this suggests the constancy of one's network—the permanence 
of one's identity in kind among her/his original community. On the other hand, it also 
suggests that one's identity does change in degree. Only people who are familiar with the 
kind of one's identities would recognize changes in degree. In fact, because the entire 
primary social network is accredited with the ego's accomplishment (though differentially 
according to one's closeness to the hero) ranking of the whole primary network is raised 
relative to other networks. 
Thus, the Chinese person's identity is determined by one's relations to a primary 
group of people. His identity is constant in kind because the relations are understood as 
natural human order that is unalterable. Ranking occurs within an identity and identity-
change occurs in degree. 
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The communist ideology differs fundamentally from this conception of self-identity. 
In the communist ideological frame, not only do social identities change among historical 
phases, such change is always categorically (i.e. never in degree). With the discursively 
imposed shift of each historical phase, one's identity is brought into question. Moreover, if 
an identity changes, it changes categorically from one set to another, but not in degree. 
Oftentimes, especially at the initiation of a political campaign, some people's identities 
become ambiguous, which is rare in the traditional frame. In the traditional Chinese cultural 
frame, one's acts normally lead to assessment within an identity but very rarely to ambiguity 
regarding identity itself, and even more rarely to identity change. For instance, an emperor is 
always the emperor although he could be a good or bad one. 
Based on Roberts' (2003) model of cultural frames and the above discussion, 
traditional Chinese culture is primarily of an essentialist frame. In this frame, an individual is 
understood as an essence—an unalterable category or identity, manifested through a 
presented persona that "is ontologically linked to her/his social situation. (2003. p. 9)" 
However, the Chinese communist ideological frame is reformist, in that a person is perceived 
as either a devotee to a group or an "other." In Therbom's (1980) scheme, the form of 
ideology in the traditional Chinese culture is of the positional-existential type that locates an 
individual in a social hierarchy and the location acquires the sense of nature; whereas, the 
communist ideology is of the positional-historical type in which a person's position in the 
society depends on the history of a group or community. 
Another comparison is conducted in terms of organization of time. It is clear that the 
communist ideology offers a totalizing and totalized history for the entire nation of China. A 
single cause (i.e. class struggle) is used to characterize history. Eight major dynastic shifts 
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and tens of minor ones are all unified into one social form: a feudalist society. Major 
historical events were all interpreted in terms of progressiveness or regressiveness. Complex 
historical plots are all simplified into the struggle of two opposing parties. Such a totalized 
history did not exist in traditional Chinese societies. Before a discussion of the traditional 
Chinese historical narrative, one fact needs to be mentioned. The term China (Zhong-Guo) 
has a history of less than one hundred years. The Chinese nation, her identity as a political 
and multi-ethnic state in the modern sense was only defined after the last dynasty, Qing, 
collapsed in 1911. 
Traditionally, "China" as a whole was understood as an empire ruled by one person 
or family, where the ruler extended a family metaphor to all his subjects. That is, the family 
metaphor was the primary frame in which the relations between the emperor and his subjects 
were understood. With the cyclical shift of dynasties, "China," perceived as a territorial 
entity, was handed from one family to another. Terms, such as "rivers and mountains" and 
"(the area) under heaven" were used to denote the whole empire. Yet these terms conveyed a 
sense of territoriality, rather than the peoples living on this territory. This sense of 
territoriality was a political theme mentioned by early nationalists at the early stages of 
nationalist revolution. In mobilizing people to overthrow the Qing dynasty the nationalists 
urged them to "drive out the Manchurians and restore the Chinese nation." In this slogan, the 
Chinese nation was conceived as a territorial entity and the Manchurians were still perceived 
as alien ruling class. Disappearance of the slogan in later period of the revolution presumably 
shows that the nationalists realized that the Manchurians had become an integral part of the 
Chinese society after over 260 years of cultural assimilation. 
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The Chinese have been avid historians. Each dynasty had its own official history 
documented by court historians. Alternative versions of history were written by scholars not 
attached to the emperor's court, yielding different interpretations of the same historical 
period. Articles and less voluminous historical books were written with regard to specific 
historical situations. Historians were commonly inspired to rewrite episodes of history when 
similarities among historical situations were inferred. In a sense, Chinese history books 
provide chronologies of historical events and episodic narratives, characterized as having 
occurred in perceived similar situations. Considering the many dynasties that China had gone 
through and patterns among dynasty shifts, historians would not have much trouble 
recognizing "similarities" among historical periods. 
In his The Content of the Form White (1987) distinguishes three types of historical 
narrative: annals, chronicles, and narrative history proper. Annals are simply lists of events, 
they narrate but do not narrativize, as White puts it. In other words, annals do not impose any 
causal structure to the sequence of events they recount. Both chronicles and historical 
narrative proper are structured around a central subject. They recount events that happened to 
a person, a group, a community, or a society. However, a chronicle does not "conclude as 
simply terminate; typically it lacks, ... that summing up of the 'meaning' of the chain of 
events with which it deals that we normally expect from the well-made story" (1987, p. 16). 
Historical narrative proper or complete historical narrative, as it is sometimes called, is 
unified in the "meaning" that is the very structure of the events, an underlying cause. It 
should be noted that White does not see annals and chronicles as imperfect or primitive 
forms of history. For White, they are just particular products of cultural conceptions of 
history. 
112 
With White's scheme it can be observed that the traditional Chinese historical 
narratives are of the first two types. Although some historians and literary analysts argue that 
traditional Chinese historical writings reflect a belief in dynamic cycles—an ancient belief 
shown in Chinese classics such as I'Ching (Chang 1990), —this theory of dynamic cycle is 
in fact of a mysterious nature and was not understood as the ultimate cause of historical 
events. Historical writings tend to focus on empirical evidence and particular situations in 
which events occurred to render sequence of events coherent in a specific period of time. The 
mysterious force behind events is attributed to "nature," "Tao," "heaven," "fate." The force 
behind occurrences is essentially fluid, unpredictable, and amorphous, and was oftentimes 
"manipulated" by historical characters to make things happen. In a sense this natural force 
could be provoked and appeased. Natural phenomena such as earthquakes, droughts, flood, 
and eclipse were consistently used as signs of dynasty shifts. Most importantly, this force 
was understood as responsive to human acts, especially the emperor's behavior, instead of 
the other way around. Thus the duration of a dynasty is normally explained by the numbers 
of benevolent emperors and their lifestyles. Furthermore, this natural force normally serves 
as a value system one can appeal to rather than the ultimate agency of human events. 
Communist ideology reverses this logic. History is naturalized as relentless and 
ineluctable laws that govern a forward movement. For the first time a single cause is imposed 
on the Chinese history. More importantly, according to communist ideology history has an 
end and follows a linear trajectory; whereas, the traditional Chinese view conceives history 
as an endless alteration of normal and abnormal states. Consequently these two views differ 
in ways in which historical periods are established. In the traditional view, a normal period 
occurred when a new dynasty was established and consolidated and the "natural" order was 
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restored. This "normal" period was interrupted as the empire deteriorated and was ready for 
replacement. Despite the dynastic alteration, the fundamental social relations, i.e. kinship, did 
not change. However, communist ideology conceives historical periods or phases as marked 
by social forms such as feudalism and capitalism. Nothing is normal or abnormal and 
everything is dictated by historical laws. Social relations thus conceived change from one 
historical phase to another. 
Despite voluminous historical studies, no grand narrative exists in traditional Chinese 
historical writing. Traditional Chinese narrative is episodic. In records of three thousand or 
more years of Chinese recorded history, historical events enter into discourse as localized 
episodes whose intelligibility is ensured by social relations and cultural norms and values. 
Thus the invocation of a historical episode comes into the process of communication by 
virtue of its similarity to a current event in question in terms of the social relations among the 
characters (actors) and the moral lesson(s) to be drawn from the historical event. In other 
words, the Chinese traditional historical discourse is characteristic of situated events. This 
type of discourse does not claim any transcendental truth or law. Thus, the operation of 
storying or emplotting historical events is one of identification or recognition. 
In contrast, the communist ideology provides a unified history. Unification or 
totalization is achieved through a pre-established scheme of historical development. Events 
come into discourse by virtue of their consistency with the scheme, and they obtain their 
truth-value through the scheme. The operation of emplotting historical events is one of 
indication or "marking" rather than recognition. 
In a comment on Simmel and his contribution to the study of culture, Bauman (1999) 
points out that Simmel's assessment of aristocracy and its ideals is that the two (i.e. social 
positions and culture) are mutually self-sustaining. That is, the existence of an aristocracy 
depends on its perpetual reproduction of an aristocratic-type of stratum and aristocratic-type 
of cultural principles. Likewise, the Chinese communist regime is established through its 
creation of a social structure that adheres to a logic that is in turn confirmed by the behaviors 
of which the structure is comprised. In a phrase, the logic of communist ideology is 
constitutive. The Chinese communist regime's dependence on this logic "forces" the regime 
to select policies from among a set of alternatives that perpetuates its structure. The 
sustenance of this structure further requires that the system perpetually produce and 
reproduce actions and discourse that are intelligible in accordance with the system. 
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CHAPTER 5 
STRUGGLE WITHIN THE SELF: PERSONAL STORIES 
In this chapter I shall explore the structures of personal (i.e. autobiographical) stories 
sampled from People's Daily published from July to December, 1974. Using models of 
narrative modes, narrative genre, and narrative modalities I intend to examine the ways in 
which subjects are constituted in the communist ideological system. The analysis shows that 
10 of the 26 sampled stories are of the genre of synecdochical comedy. This type of stories is 
centered on a "sought-for-person" whose identity is initially ambiguous. 8 stories are 
identified as melodrama, the subject of which is a "hero" who overcomes obstacles to 
accomplish a mission. Another 8 stories are identified as of mixed genres, which put "the 
new society" in contrast to "the old society." This type of story makes claims of an in-group 
identity. In the following section I use three stories to illustrate the three types. The stories 
are not represented in translation. Instead, I provide outlines of the events in the stories 
without my interpretation. 
The First Story: Synecdochical Comedy and Return to the Center 
This story is chosen because it almost epitomizes the genre of synecdochical comedy 
and representative of more than one third of the sampled stories. This genre normally has a 
flawed subject, a non-hero or a sought-for person who takes the contrary position in the 
model of narrative modes. Because of his/her flaw, he/she is unable to mount a fight against 
the opponent. It is the helper, a complement to the hero, who is in direct opposition to the 
opponent. Note that in this case the focal point of the story is the sought-for person or object. 
116 
The hero is in contrariety to the sought-for-object. The helper (not necessarily a person) 
usually plays a crucial role in the eventual restoration of harmony. The opponent is not as 
villainous as he/she is in a melodrama and less powerful than in a tragedy. In many cases, the 
opponent is simply the flaw of the hero, for instance, his arrogance, stupidity, or ignorance. 
The first story is outlined as follows: 
Jiang, female, a high school graduate considered as one of the knowledged 
(educated) youth was recommended by poor-and-lower-middle peasants to work as a 
teacher at the village elementary school. Born and raised in a poor-and-lower-middle 
peasant family, Jiang thought that she had a "straight root" (meaning she was 
originally from a poor peasant family), and had grown into a "red seedling. " She 
firmly believed that she would be good teacher. Before she started her career as a 
teacher, a session was held for her appointment when the peasant representative at 
the school administration had a conversation with her, exhorting her to be a good 
teacher who served the poor and lower middle peasants. 
She was assigned to teach a "chaotic" class, and her trouble came 
immediately. One of the students was disobedient and habitually skipped classes. 
Jiang had him stand in front of the whole class and scolded him and had other 
students criticize him. The parents of the pupil were very unhappy with the way she 
treated their son, and accused her of bullying their child and brought up the issue to 
the school administration. The peasant representative at the school had a talk to 
Jiang and pointed out to her that good intentions are not sufficient for a good teacher. 
Her way of handling the pupil was not a problem of method but a problem of "line". 
He further pointed out that Jiang was educated when the revisionist line had control 
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over education and her way of treating her pupils was no different from ways in 
which she was treated under the revisionist education system. 
Jiang then realized that her assumption was wrong about herself being of 
"red root and straightly grown, " and having an inborn immunity to the revisionist 
influences. She then changed her attitude and methods to find that she and the pupil 
got closer. She then repeated her mistake in a similar situation. Only this time a 
different pupil made trouble during classes. When the peasant representative talked 
to her she exculpated her by attributing the mistake as caused by her quick-temper. 
The representative was less polite this time. He pointed out that it was not a problem 
of temper but a problem of emotional closeness (to the peasants). He then asked 
whether she had made up her mind on whether she wants to serve the poor peasants. 
Jiang then had a chance to talk to the mother of the pupil who recalled the 
miserable life in the "old society" (before 1949) when her family members could not 
afford to go to school. The mother then entrusted her child to Jiang and hope that she 
would educate him well. 
Jiang then was ashamed of herself And realized she hadn't always followed 
Mao's revolutionary line and had let the poor peasants down. She then studied Mao's 
teachings and realized the influences from the revisionist educational line would not 
fade away automatically. One has to fight them, sometimes painstakingly. 
(People's Daily. July 17th, 1974) 
This story has three events recounted, two of which were centered on some trouble-
making students in Jiang's class. The first event is a ritual of entrusting or what Propp (1968 
[1928]) refers to as making contract. In this event, only two external actants appear: the 
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sender and the receiver, and the event takes place on the communication axis. The sender, the 
peasant representative, entrusts a mission to the receiver, Jiang. Although tension is 
suggested in the exhortation session, it does not manifest as conflict. The sender was not 
without doubt about the receiver's "competence" to accomplish the mission. This tension 
allows the sender to be syncretized with the helper to appear in the later events. 
The second event recounts a series of instances including the deeds of the trouble-
making student and the parents' accusation. With the three syncretized as the opponent, the 
function of the opponent is only to expose the flaw of the subject. Moreover, Jiang does not 
even know what her problem is. What is sought for is not clear for her. It was until the 
reappearance of the peasant representative and the message he brings, she realized that the 
resolution of the conflict between her and the opponents depends on what is sought for, 
namely, a new self free of the evil influence of the old system. 
The third event is similar to the second. However, it differs from the second in that 
the only opponent is the student, and the student's mother appears in the event as a 
sender/helper. The peasant representative again appears as a syncretized sender/helper. Only 
this time he is more solemn in his manner. The tension is finally resolved when our hero 
realized the root of the problem and carries on her mission in a more determined manner. 
Based on this analysis, the actantial role are identified as follows: 
• Subject (sought-for person): Jiang under the influence of the revisionist 
education 
• Opponent: naughty pupils and the parents of the first pupil 
• Hero: Jiang's willing 
• Helper: Peasant representative 
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The actantial structure of this story is represented in Figure 5.1. Characteristic of the 
synecdochical comedic stories from People's Daily is the split of one character into two 
actantial roles: the hero and the sought-for-person. Note in this model, the actantial roles of 
"hero" and "sought-for-person" are one character, Jiang. The above-mentioned split creates 
two oppositional positions signified respectively by Jiang's willingness to change and her 
flaw. These two positions allow for self-identification to occur. 
In a synecdochical narrative mode the hero's power is usually almost equal to her 
opponent. She/he is not able to resolve the conflict between her/him and the opponent(s). In 
this mode, the helper is usually the wisest or most powerful. Thus our hero in this story is 
entangled in a set of relations where she is not in a position to settle the dispute. This less 
advantageous position is obviously due to her estrangement from the group. The parents of 
both students, though one student's parents appear as opponent and the other 's mother 






(Jiang's will to change) 
Opponent (-W) 
(Naughty student and his 
parents) 
Figure 5.1 Actantial Model of the First Story 
This actantial analysis reveals the structure of social relations in which the subject of 
the story is positioned. The poor and lower peasants occupy the center of the social system 
and thus appear as either helpers or opponents. At the center one can never be wrong. For 
120 
instance, our narrator never judges whether the accusation from the parents of the first 
student is right or wrong. Instead, the problem is always identified as residing in the subject, 
who has alienated herself from the center because of her education. The interactions between 
the subject and the peasant representative take the form of communication initiated by the 
syncretized sender/helper. The resolution of the conflict between the hero and her opponents 
depends on the hero's awareness of what is sought for, the object. It is only through her 
embrace of the object that the conflict is resolved and harmony within the group is restored. 
All events unfold along the axis of communication. It can be seen that the two crucial 
moments in this story are moments of marking (see chapter 2). The one who marks or 
indicates is the peasant representative who is from the center. Jiang's difficult situations are 
never read as a problem of operation or method and are always interpreted as caused by her 
estrangement from the poor peasants. The only conflictual event (i.e. when Jiang refuses to 
recognize what she is accused of) takes the form of communication. Accusation is a form of 
marking or indicating. In this case Jiang's refusal to recognize terminates the communication. 
Instead of devising a way to make further communication possible, the peasant representative 
makes another "marking." Since this time the message is from a more powerful person, an 
authority, Jiang recognizes her "lack" of affective closeness to the poor peasants. The tension 
is thus settled through this complete communicative act. 
From the narrator's perspective this story relates a process of identification. This 
seems to be a distinctive feature of the reformist synecdochical comedy: the distance between 
the hero and the sought-for-object creates a tension within a single subjectivity. As Ricoeur 
(1992) suggests, identification is always identification with an "other." The space between 
the self and the "other" allows for the process of identification, a discursive action. In this 
121 
story, Jiang embodies the "bad" effect of the old system and a will to purify her self of the 
evil influence. This turns out to be the "project" of this story since the eventual resolution of 
the tensions between Jiang and the poor peasants is determined by Jiang's "realization" of 
her "lack." As Greimas (1984[1966]) suggests that the project axis entails a "will" or 
"desire." Jiang's "will" bridges the old subject and the one she struggles to identify with. 
This narrative strategy splits a person into two opposing identities, the contradiction between 
which requires complete disappearance of one to establish harmony. As a subject of the 
ideological system, Jiang had to deny part of herself (namely, her 12-year education in the 
old system) in order to be fully accepted by the group, namely the poor-and-lower-middle 
peasants. 
The distance between the "old" and "new" self is not recognized by Jiang herself. 
Instead, she first "mistakes" her way of treating the child for a problem of method and insists 
that she did what she did out of good intentions. In the relational knowledge frame, however, 
interactants adhere to a semantic domain and a "grammar" in which the situation and new 
phenomenon are rendered comprehensible. In this domain, the resolution of the conflictual 
situation does not depend on a procedure but on an understanding that is determined by a pre­
existing sign system. 
The narrative tension in this type of story is usually between an "actual world" that is 
polluted by traces of the old system, such as education and a "right world" that is imposed by 
the ideological system. In Ryan's (1984) terms, the conflict in this type of story is between 
one character's actual world and another character's right world. The story usually proceeds 
from the actual world to the recognition of the right world and to the eventual abandonment 
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of the actual world. The "right world" always triumphs over the actual one and the story ends 
with a complete rejection of the actual world by the narrator. 
Accordingly, it is within a discursive domain that an individual with a marginalized 
identity experiences a process of identification. The initiator is usually an authority figure 
from the center of the group whose identity is clear and stable. Through "marking" she/he 
exposes a "lack" in the individual who normally recognizes it. Thus the identification process 
is of the type of marking-recognition. It is worth noting that during the identification process 
a sign system is held constant. The function of the sign system is to "suture" (Hall 1996) a 
subjectivity with elements of a sign system. 
The Second Story: Melodrama and Enhancing the Spirit of Struggle 
The first story is centered on an individual whose identity as an insider was put into 
question. Through a series of events the individual comes to the realization that the root 
cause of her alienation from the group, the poor and middle lower peasants, is within her. It is 
this realization or awakening that brings her back to the center of the group. The second 
story, however, is told by an individual whose identity is never questionable. It is his tenacity 
in adhering to his identity that is strengthened through the narrated experiences. The outline 
of the story is outlined as follows: 
Jiang was the (communist) party secretary of his production brigade (usually 
a village) who was entrusted this position during Cultural Revolution. In his work, he 
demonstrated a strong determination to struggle against everything that was wrong, 
and thereby offended some people. As he started to have doubts about what he was 
doing, he was faced with another challenge. 
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Since the party branch decided to organize the craftsmen in the brigade to 
serve the community, Jiang needed to persuade some of them to join the project. His 
second brother, a carpenter, refused. After an intense argument with his brother, 
Jiang gave up and the project was aborted. Since this event, Jiang tried to avoid 
confrontations with other people. 
Then the movement of Criticizing Lin Biao and Confucius' started. Jiang was 
criticized by other members of the party branch and by some poor peasants. He then 
repeatedly studied Chairman Mao's teaching that "The philosophy of the communist 
is one of struggle" and came to the realization that struggle was a lifetime process. 
With strengthened spirit, he made a self-criticism to other members of the party 
branch and volunteered to finish the aborted project. 
Trying to persuade his brother to join the project, Jiang had three 
conversations with him and organized a session of "remembering bitterness and 
appreciating sweetness "2. These sessions brought his brother to tears. In a study 
session for all craftsmen in the village, his brother was the first to stand up to 
criticize Lin Biao and Confucius. With his brother as a role model, the craftsmen 
were soon organized. 
(People's Daily. July 2nd, 1974) 
1 This movement started in 1973, almost two years after Lin Biao, who used to be the second most 
powerful figure in the communist regime, fled China and died in a plane crash on his way to Soviet 
Union. Since Lin Biao was allegedly a lover of Confucian classics, this movement was named after 
him and Confucius. This movement was less violent compared with preceding periods of Cultural 
Revolution. One theme of this movement was to "criticize" Confucius's doctrine of the golden mean 
that advocated a middle course of personal behavior, avoidance of confrontation, and moderation. 
2 This was a form of study session invented by the communists during the Land Reform in late 1940's 
and early 1950's as a strategy to mobilize peasants. "Bitterness" refers to the miserable life of the old 
society and "sweetness" refers to the happy life in the socialist society. 
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This story starts with Jiang's self-introduction. The fact that he was assigned to the 
position of party secretary seven years after the beginning of the Cultural Revolution gave 
him an unquestionable identity as an "insider." He was at the very center of the group of poor 
peasants—always an unambiguous identity in the categorization schemes discussed in 
chapter 4. Moreover, Jiang depicted himself as the initiator of actions, a requirement of 
someone of his identity. Thus in our analytic scheme, Jiang was the hero, though not without 
his moments of weakness. Other members of the party branch were presented in the story as 
helpers who appeared at crucial points to provide assistance. In one specific event narrated 
here, his brother assumed the role of opponent. As a carpenter, his brother's identity was a 
marginalized one. Like property and knowledge/education, skills also alienate one from the 
center. This alienation was implied in the story through the craftsmen's reluctance to be part 
of Jiang's project. Furthermore, the "object" of the story was the project of organizing the 
craftsmen to serve the community. Therefore, the actantial roles are identified as follows and 
the model of narrative mode is presented in Figure 5.2. 
• Hero: Jiang 
• Project: Organization of craftsmen 
• Opponent: Brother 
• Helper: other members of the village party branch 
Opponent 
Brother 





Members of party branch 
Figure 5.2: Actantial Model of the Second Story 
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This is a story about a hero who overcomes obstacles to accomplish a mission or task 
with the help of his allies. The only chance his opponent has is the temporary weakness of 
the hero. With the helper syncretized with the sender (i.e. other members of the party branch), 
the tenacity of our hero is enhanced after the messages (i.e. criticism from other branch 
members and the themes of the movement) are received, and his opponent has to give in. The 
narrative mode appears to be heroic. The social relation reflected in this mode is primarily 
the power differential between the hero and his opponent. Although the opponent is not 
depicted as a villain, he not only confronts the hero directly but also exposes the weakness of 
the hero. Again, similar to the first story, the events unfold mostly along the communication 
axis. Even the confrontation between the hero and his opponent takes a communicative form, 
namely argument. Argument is one possible outcome of a particular form of the inquiry-
answer type of communicative act (see chapter 2). In this form of communication, the inquiry 
is a request. If the request is refused, then the proposed "contract" does not materialize. 
It is noteworthy that our hero gave up his effort after the argument. Here a Chinese 
traditional cultural rule is invoked. Jiang, though the secretary of the party branch in the 
village, was still seen as a member of the Jiang family. His personal identity is closely 
intertwined with his brother's and other family members'. In this discourse, he was at a 
disadvantage since his opponent is his older brother, someone whose authority he ought to 
defer. The situation in which the conversation occurred was between brothers. In other words, 
his "conversation" with his brother took place in a family setting, rendering our hero 
powerless. For other villagers, especially the reluctant craftsmen, his brother's refusal gave 
them enough leverage not to be part of the project. The narrative tension is between two 
model worlds (Ryan 1985): the obligation-world of the traditional Chinese family values and 
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the right-world that is advocated by the communist ideological system. Moreover, the "hero" 
is in a weak position at the interface of two cultures. 
Then the movement of Criticizing Lin Biao and Confucius provided a more powerful 
authority in accordance with which the standstill between Jiang and his brother could be 
broken. Note that this movement was one that directly confronted some traditional cultural 
rules, especially those governing interpersonal interactions, with a discourse on struggle 
emanating from the center of the communist ideological system. Armed with this new 
discourse and with the help of other members of the party branch, the hero was able to 
confront his brother again. This time our hero constructed formal and serious situations and 
brought his brother into study sessions where traditional values were rebuked. Thus the 
eventual victory of our hero is the victory of the movement, the victory of the ideological 
system over traditional values. 
In this story the identity of the hero is not influenced. Instead, the efficacy of his fixed 
identity is strengthened. Different from the first story, the identity of the hero in this story is 
never problematic. It is his "will" to struggle that is enhanced through provision of a new 
discourse from the ideological system. The narrator utilizes the grand narrative of struggle to 
organize his experiences by opposing two discursive systems head to head. "Struggle" in this 
story (like in many such stories) is not a physical conflict but a clash between two cultural 
systems. The purpose of the struggle is reformation of others' subjectivities. The success of 
this struggle is shown by the brother's complete willingness to be a role model for other 
craftsmen. Recall that in the first story, it was the "hero's" subjectivity that was reformed, not 
others'. 
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The Third Story: Suffering and Salvation 
During the first 30 years of the Chinese communist regime, "remembering bitterness 
and appreciating sweetness" served as a protocol of narrative that was used to highlight the 
differences between the "old society" and the "new society." Typical of this type of narrative, 
the narrator (subject) takes the actantial role of the "sought-for-object." Thus, the narrative 
mode of this type of story is similar to the first case: synecdochical comedy. However, the 
events in this type of story unfold mainly along the project axis instead of the communication 
axis (see chapter 2), which does not narrate a process of reforming one's identity but implies 
a claim of one's identity as a member of the central groups. Moreover, this type of story 
usually contains a "tragedy" that is briefly narrated in contrast to the comedy the narrator 
experienced in the "new society". This "tragedy," however, does not show features of 
Greimasian tragic narrative mode. Instead, the events are narrated in an ironic mode in which 
the hero is defeated and thus certain cultural values are brought into question. As discussed in 
chapter 3, this narrative mode conveys a sense of meaninglessness. In the reformist frame 
this narrative is only enacted to depict the irrationality of the "other." The following is an 
outline of such a story. 
Zhang was struck by a strange disease in the winter of 1973 and lost his ability to 
walk and talk. A barefoot doctor3 of his commune started to pay regular visit to him 
no matter how severe the weather was. He also encouraged him to struggle against 
the illness. Nine month in a row the doctor never missed his visits and took care of the 
3 
"Barefoot doctors" was a medical system installed during the Cultural Revolution as an effort to reform the 
old medical system that had been "dominated by the revisionists and bourgeoisie". Young people of "good 
elements" were selected and briefly trained as doctors. This system soon disappeared after Mao's death because 
of its ineffectiveness and many disasters it had caused. 
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patient as if he were his son. Finally his illness was cured and he proclaimed this a 
victory of Chairman Mao's proletariat medical line. 
When Zhang was child, his father was very ill. The eleven-year-old Zhang was asked 
to go 20 miles to invite a doctor. Without money to hire a horse-drawn wagon, the 
doctor refused to come. The father died without "a grain of medicine. " 
Thinking about the suffering in the old society and the sweetness of the new, Zhang is 
determined to whole-heartedly support the new system. 
(People's Daily July 28th, 1974) 
This simple story has two parts, a comedy and an irony. The following actantial roles 
identified and the models narrative modes are shown in Figures 3.5a and 3.5b. 
Part 1: 
Part 2: 
• Hero: Barefoot doctor 
• Sought-for-person: Zhang the patient 
• Opponent: illness 
• Helper: Absent 
• Hero: Absent 
• Sought-for-person : Zhang's father 
• Opponent: illness and the doctor 






Zhang, the Patient 
Absence of Helper 
Hero 
Barefoot Doctor 
Representing a system 
Figure 5.3a: First Actantial Model of the Third Story 
Irony 
Object 




Disease and Doctor 
Representing a system 
Absence of Hero 
Figure 5.3b: Second Actantial Model of the Third Story 
Both stories are narrated by Zhang who is the "object-sought-for" in one story and the 
"helper" in the other. As subjects of both stories, two different actantial roles establish two 
different narrative modes: comedic and ironic. One highlighted contrast in these two models 
is the presence of a "hero" in one and the absence of a "hero" in the other. The salvation of 
the object depends totally on the presence of a hero. One external actantial role is invoked in 
the first story, the sender, by depicting the barefoot doctor as sent by the new system. This 
fusion of the sender and the sent occurs in most such stories. This narrative strategy regulates 
the reading of the "sent person." In particular, the "sent person" is thus read as a sign—a 
representative of a system. His benevolence is attributed to the system instead of being 
understood as an individual quality. 
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Another contrasting point is the actantial role of opponent. In both stories the illnesses 
are opponents. However, in the second story, the doctor's refusal places him in direct 
contradiction to the helper and thus syncretizes him with the illness as the opponent. The 
fusion of the father's illness and the anonymous doctor as the opponent highlights an irony of 
the "old society." This fused actantial role is again depicted as representing a system, the old 
society. Consequently the irrationality and absurdity of the old system is exposed. 
It should be noted that on the surface, this type of story does not narrate a process of 
one's struggle with one's identity as the first two stories do. In fact, this type of story 
contains a claim of an identity as a central member of the system because whoever suffered 
in the old system falls into the "revolutionary" categories by default. However, this logic 
works the other way around. Whoever is a member of the "revolutionary" categories must 
have suffered in the old society. This is why in mass movement the identities of those with 
knowledge, skill, and property are more ambiguous than those without them. The logic here 
is that with such resources at their disposal, such people probably suffered less leaving them 
more attached to the old system. 
It is also noteworthy that the subjects in this type of story are powerless and they are 
never heroes in the actantial model. Their eventual salvation is determined by the arrival of 
the hero, a representative of the communist system. This type of narrative provides a this-
worldly soteriology according to which salvation is attained. 
Therefore, narrating one's suffering in the old system and happy life in the new one is 
a format used to assert one's in-group identity. However, such narrating is mostly a privilege 
restricted to people with an unambiguous in-group identity. The credibility of one's narration 
depends to a large extent on the clarity of one's identity. Thus oftentimes the narrators find 
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themselves negotiating the tension between their presumed identities and the credibility that 
ascribed to their narration. At later stages of Cultural Revolution, the term "old system" 
sometimes referred to the first seventeen years of the communist regime, which was depicted 
as dominated by the revisionist-capitalist liners. This type of narrative was sometimes used to 
tell stories about one's suffering in the revisionist system. However, relating such stories was 
a dangerous game because the temporal boundaries distinguishing old from new were never 
clear and always open to revision. In the sampled stories, there are a few such stories written 
by people whose identities were beyond question and their stories focused on certain sub­
systems such as medical service and education. None targeted the communist system as a 
whole. 
Discussion 
Of all the twenty-six personal stories, 10 were identified as of the first type: 
characteristic of a synecdochical narrative mode and narrating experiences of one's struggle 
with an estranged identity. The narrators in these stories are of two types: intellectuals, such 
as schoolteachers and scholars, and party officials, who had been in positions of authority in 
the "revisionist system." The first group of people had to struggle with their identities 
through the first twenty-seven years of the communist regime. The identities of the people in 
the second group become problematic during the Cultural Revolution. In the stories written 
by members of both groups, their struggle with their obscured identities is uniformly assisted 
with help from people of central groups, such as poor peasants and workers and sometimes 
"the party." Their actions are read and interpreted by other people who belong to the central 
groups. In each case, the author ends the story re-centered (i.e. in conformity with the 
communist ideological system). 
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Eight stories were identified as of the second type, namely melodrama. Heroes in 
these stories are invariably of the central categories such workers, poor peasants, People's 
Liberation Army (PLA) soldiers, and red guards. Different from the first type, not the heroes 
but their opponents vary from adherents of traditional values to people attached to old 
systems. However, an external sender-helper is not always necessary. Oftentimes, heroes 
come to realize on their own that they need to be stronger-willed and to exert more effort. In 
these stories it is by virtue of the hero's identity that she/he is able to take a position at the 
front of the "struggle." 
The remaining eight stories were identified as the third type, and thus as having two 
stories—one in comedic mode and the other in ironic mode. The contrast between the 
experiences of the narrator in two different "worlds" renders one "meaningless" and the other 
meaningful. In fact, it is in this contrast that the "meaninglessness" of the old world is 
established, and that the meaningfulness of the new world is attained. Thus, in this sign 
system two categorically different worlds are distinguished so that each obtains meaning by 
virtue of its opposition to the other. The subjects in these stories are never agents in the sense 
of having the capacity to initiate actions. The stories' heroes are never specific individuals. 
As in the third story analyzed above, in which an individual hero is mentioned, she/he is just 
a nameless barefoot doctor that signifies the communist system. In a sense, this type of story 
is a direct translation from the grand narrative. And, the grand narrative acquires its specific 
referent through this type of narration. 
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CHAPTER 6 
DETERMINATION AND TRANSFORMATION: 
ACTION AND EMOTION 
In this chapter I examine how the ideological system constitutes the behavioral and 
emotional patterns of the masses. As discussed in chapter 1, neither action-orientations nor 
emotional patterns are understood as individual traits. Instead they both can be viewed as 
components of a model of personhood that was instituted by the ideological system through a 
structured discursive practice. In chapters 4 and 5 the fundamental semantic structure and the 
discursive strategies of identification are reconstructed from the textual data of narratives. In 
this chapter a sample of editorials is examined to test the hypotheses derived from an analytic 
theoretical model established based on Roberts' (2003) model of cultural frames, Ryan's 
model of modalities, and constructionist theoretical arguments discussed in chapter 2 and 3. 
Variables and Descriptive Statistics 
As discussed in Chapter 3, textual data are obtained from 281 editorials on four 
events. Components of sentences are coded into a categorical data matrix that contains the 
following variables. 
1. Event type: variable with four values referring to the four events. 
2. Modality of action: variable with four primary values referring to four types of 
modality corresponding to four cultural frames: "can," "should," "may," and "must." Note 
that the "may" modality is sub-categorized according to how strongly the action is 
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modalized. For instance, a "determination" is a stronger modalization than an "intention" or 
"want." An "intention" is stronger than a "hope." 
3. Author type: a two-valued variable to characterize whether the author has a clear 
in-group or ambiguous identity. In-group identities include workers, soldiers, poor peasants, 
communist party members, red guards, and so on, while ambiguous identities include 
intellectuals, school teachers, actors, and democratic party members. 
4. Actor type: a three-valued variable that captures the identity of the actor that is the 
subject of the modalized action. The three values of the variable stand for "we", "they", and 
actors of ambiguous identities. 
5. Object type: a four-valued variable that captures aspects of the object of the 
modalized action. The four values respectively stand for material or immaterial aspects of 
"us" or "them". For instance, if the action proposed is "to strengthen our will," then "our 
will" is coded as an immaterial aspect of "us." 
6. Action types: a many-valued variable that characterizes types of action. Coding of 
this variable depends on the verb that describes the action. 
7. Emotions: a many-valued variable that captures the types of emotions displayed 
in the texts. 
8. Emotion transformation: a variable that characterizes the types of action or 
aspects of action discursively transformed from emotions exhibited in the texts. 
9. State of being: some "actions" proposed in the sampled sentences are in fact ways 
of "being" instead of "doing". Thus a variable is created to capture whether the modalized 
"being" will lead to a better or worse state and hence this is a two-valued variable. 
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With the above variables established, all the hypotheses proposed in chapter 3 can be 
tested. However, descriptive statistics calculated from some of the above variables inform the 
research too. Here I provide a brief discussion of these variables. 
First, of the three actor types, 238 cases are of the "we" or "in-group" type. Only 24 
cases propose actions to be taken by out-group actors and 19 by people of ambiguous 
identities. This evidence strongly suggests that subjectivity of the "enemy" is weakly 
perceived if perceived at all. The proposed actions with enemy or people of ambiguous 
identities as subjects are modalized as warnings and advice of "noting acting in certain way" 
or "stopping" certain action. 
Second, a frequency table of author types shows that of the 281 editorials 204 were 
written by people of clear in-group identities and 68 were written by people of ambiguous 
identities (9 cases are unidentified). This evidence suggests that People's Daily's editorial 
policy is one that publishes editorials based on authors' identities. 
Third, 76 actions proposed in the editorials deal with between-group relations, i.e. the 
relations between "us" and "them." These actions include "destroy," "crush," "combat," 
"fight," "criticize," "struggle against", and so on. 166 cases propose within-group actions, 
which include "strengthen," "construct," "raise," support," "follow," "accomplish," 
"reform," and the like. 19 cases are actions imposed on people of ambiguous identities. 
These actions include "self-criticize," "wake up," "recognize," "acknowledge," and 
"choose." The rest of the cases are either modalized states of "being" or actions to be taken 
by the enemy. These action types fall into three distinct semantic domains: actions against 
enemy, actions among "us," and actions dealing with people of ambiguous identities. It 
should be noted that the first two sets can be understood as "rights" of "us". The third set 
usually presents two choices for people of ambiguous identities: either becoming one of us or 
becoming one of them. 
Fourth, seven emotions are identified from the texts: anger, hatred, grief, disgust, 
happiness, excitement, and pride. In 104 cases no emotions are displayed. Of the seven 
emotions, anger with 62 cases, hatred with 18 cases, and grief with 79 cases are the most 
prominent emotions. The large number of grief displays is concentrated in the event of 
"Mao's death. It can be observed that the prominent emotions are all ones that have external 
causes. This is not to argue that Chinese people under the communist regime did not have 
self-directed emotions such as shame, regret, and guiltiness. Instead, it should be noted that 
the communist ideology is a public discourse. On one hand, the presence of certain emotions 
serves to draw the boundary for this discourse. On the other hand, these emotions can be 
understood as part of the personhood the ideological system constitutes. 
Finally, another feature of the ideological system concerns the objects of actions in 
these texts. 255 cases propose actions centered on transitive verbs. Of the 255 cases, 197 
actions are directed towards non-material entities such as "capitalist road," "revolutionary 
cause," "Chairman Mao's revolutionary line." This feature suggests that individuals 
participating in the ideological practice tend not to propose concrete actions—actions that 
have specific targets. It is safe to play the game within the sign system unless the object of an 
action is clearly defined (e.g. individuals clearly defined as enemies). In the following section 
I test the hypotheses proposed in Chapter 3. 
Hypothesis Testing and Findings 
In this section I present the results of hypotheses testing and discuss the implications 
of findings. Seven variables are needed to test all the hypotheses proposed in chapter 3. 
Hypothesis 1: Actions in the Chinese communist ideology are primarily modalized in 
terms of rights. 
Suppose that the four possible modalities are equally distributed in the population of 
texts, one would expect that the sample contains approximately equal proportions of the four 
types of modalization, i.e. VA for each modality. Thus to test hypothesis 1 is to test whether or 
not the proportion of the actions modalized in terms of right is significantly larger than VA. TO 
do the testing, "modality of action" is recoded into a binary variable that has two values: the 
"right" modality and "ability, obligation, and requirement" modalities. The proportion of 
"right modality" and its confidence interval are calculated. 
Proportion of "right" modality: 95% (24 out of 281) 
Confidence interval: [92.5%, 97.5%] 
This confidence interval suggests that in the population of such texts, 92.5 to 97.5 
percent of proposed actions are modalized in terms of rights. Since the lower limit of this 
confidence interval is much larger than 0.25, the hypothesis is supported. 
Hypothesis 2: Actions proposed during times of crisis (interruption of valued state or 
process) such as Mao's death and the Sino-soviet war are more strongly modalized than 
actions proposed during the other two events (Interruption of unvalued state or process). 
This hypothesis is tested within the "right" modality and thus the sample size is 
reduced to 245. The modality variable is recoded into "strong modalization" that includes 
only "determinations," and "less strong modalization" that contains the categories of "want," 
"hope," and "advise." Furthermore, event type is recoded into a binary variable. The two 
values are "interruption of a valued state or process" and "interruption of unvalued state or 
process" with the former understood as "crisis." In this case, the null hypothesis is that there 
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is no association between the two variables. This independence is tested using a Chi-squared 
statistics. 







Crisis Count 121 33 154 
Expected Count 103.1 50.9 
Non-crisis Count 43 48 94 
Expected Count 60.9 30.1 
Total Count 164 81 245 
*Pearson Chi-Square: 25.352; df=l; p < 0.0005 
The value of chi-square and its significance level provide strong evidence to reject the 
independence hypothesis. The expected counts suggest that in times of crisis actions are more 
strongly modalized than in times of non-crisis. Thus hypothesis 3 is supported. 
Hypothesis 3: People of stable in-group identities such as workers, poor peasants, 
and People's Liberation Army soldiers are more likely to use stronger modalization than 
people of other identities. 
To test this hypothesis, "author type" and the recoded "modality type" are used. Since 
in 8 cases, the authors' identities cannot be identified, these 8 cases are excluded from the 
analysis. Similar to the test of hypothesis 3, the null hypothesis is a hypothesis of 
independence, i.e. there is not association between author's identity and modality strength. A 
similar test is conducted and the results are shown below. 
An examination of the test statistics in Table 3.2, its significance level, and the 
expected counts shows that people of clear in-group identities are more likely to use strong 
modalization of actions such as "determination" while people of ambiguous or marginal 
identities tend to modalize actions less strongly. 
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Table 6.2: Crosstabulation of Author Types and Modality Strength* 
"Right" Modality 
Strong Less Strong Total 
modalization Modalization 
In-group Identity 
Count 134 49 
Expected Count 124.3 58.7 
Ambiguous Identity 
Count 27 27 
Expected Count 36.7 17.3 
Total Count 161 76 237 
*Pearson Chi-Square: 10.324; df=l; p=0.001 
183 
54 
Hypothesis 4: Only negative emotions such as anger and hatred are discursively 
transformable into actions. 
No statistical test is needed to support this hypothesis since all transformable 
emotions are negative emotions. The three transformable emotions identified are anger, 
hatred, and grief. Of the 177 emotion displays in the texts, 71 cases propose emotion 
transformation: 51 cases of grief, 12 cases of hatred, and 8 cases of anger. However, only in 
two cases emotions are directly transformed into actions and in the other 175 cases emotions 
are transformed into "strength." 
Hypothesis 5: People of stable in-group identities are more likely to propose 
transformable emotions than people of other identities. 
This hypothesis is tested using a similar approach and results are presented in Table 
6.3. Again, the test statistics and expected counts suggest that people of clear in-group 
identities are more likely to display transformable emotions than people of other identities. 
140 
Table 6.3: Crosstabulation of Author Type and Emotion Transformation* 
Author Type Emotion Transformation 
Transformable Non-transformable Total 
Emotion Emotion 
Clear In-Group Identities 
Count 58 125 183 
Expected Count 48.6 134.4 183 
Ambiguous Identities 
Count 5 49 54 
Expected Count 14.4 39.6 54 
Total Count 63 174 237 
*Pearson Chi-Square: 10.753; df=l; p=0.001 
Hypothesis 6: Actions associated with transformable emotions are more strongly 
modalized. 
This hypothesis is tested using two binary variables. The first is "emotion 
transformation" that has two values: transformable emotion and non-transformable emotion. 
The second is "strength of modalization." 
Table 6.4: Crosstabulation of Emotion Transformation and Modality Strength* 
"Right" Modality 
Strong Less Strong Total 
Modalization Modalization 
Transformable Emotion 
Count 57 6 63 
Expected Count 42.2 20.8 63 
Non-transformable 
Emotion 
Count 107 75 182 
Expected Count 121.8 60.2 182 
Total Count 164 81 245 
*Pearson Chi-Square: 21.230; df =1; p < 0.0005 
Similar to the interpretation of hypotheses 3 and 4, the test statistics and expected 
counts in Table 6.4 show that authors who display transformable emotions are more likely to 
modalize actions strongly. Hypothesis 6 is supported. 
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Hypothesis 7: Within-group actions are more strongly modalized than actions 
directed to enemies and people of ambiguous identities. 
To test this hypothesis, "action type" is recoded into a binary variable. The two values 
are respectively within-group actions and between-group actions. 
Table 6.5: Crosstabulation of Action Type and Modality Strength* 
"Right" Modality 
Strong Less Strong Total 
modalization Modalization 
Action directed 
to non-group members 
Count 45 50 95 
Expected Count 64.5 30.5 95 
Action within the group 
Count 116 26 142 
Expected Count 95.5 45.5 142 
Total Count 161 76 237 
*Pearson Chi Square: 30.779; df =1; p < 0.0005 
Again, the test statistics and expected counts show that in-group actions are more 
strongly modalized than actions directed toward enemies and people of ambiguous identities. 
Hypothesis 7 is supported. 
Discussion 
Two sets of findings emerge from the analyses in the preceding section. The first set 
concerns how actions in response to an event are modalized and the second set has to do with 
regulated emotional displays and discursive transformation of certain emotions. 
The findings about action modalization strongly suggest that the predominant 
modality in the ideological system is the "right" modality. That is to say, proposed actions 
are justified in terms of what is "right." Within this modality, however, actions are 
differentially modalized in degree. In the above analysis, four factors are linked to this 
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variation. First, event type influences the strength of modalization. In times of crisis—when 
the in-group is attacked or threatened—actions proposed are more likely to be strongly 
modalized, i.e. modalized in terms of determination. 
A second factor that affects strength of modalization is author type or author's 
identity. The above findings suggest that authors of clearly defined in-group identities tend to 
modalize actions strongly. On one hand, this strong modalization is an assertion of one's 
identity; and on the other, it is the centrality of one's identity that places her/him in a 
discursive position from which she/he has the "right" to make such calls. 
The strength of modalization is also affected by a third factor: action types. The 
above findings show that in-group actions are more strongly modalized than action directed 
toward enemies and people of ambiguous identities. Because of the clear distinction between 
"us" and "them" in reformist frame, emphasizing the power of "them" is perceived as 
undermining the power of "us." In a sense, such ideological discourse promotes contempt of 
one's enemy, especially in times of crisis. The emphasis is then on in-group actions since the 
defeat of the enemy is presumed and what is crucial is in-group solidarity. Highlighting 
group boundaries and reassuring group members' compliance is of primary importance in 
situations of group conflicts. 
This argument is also supported by "explanations" provided in the government 
pronouncements published in People' Daily on events like the Sino-Soviet war and anti-
rightist movement. In these pronouncements the Soviets were depicted as desperate and 
irrational. Their "invasion" into Chinese territory was presented as an attempt to redirect their 
internal failure externally. Thus, "our" unity and success proved that "Chairman Mao's 
revolutionary line" is right. Further strengthening our unity and continuing the right line 
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would guarantee our victory. In the pronouncements on the anti-rightist movement, the 
bourgeois rightists were depicted as a minute minority of the population. They were doomed 
to being defeated. Our victory is assured by our ability to recognize their disguised attack and 
strategies of deception. In both cases, the emphasis was on in-group actions. 
Still another factor that affects the strength of modalization is emotion. Emotional 
display is usually a sign of the extent to which one's self is involved in a situation and one's 
commitment to an action. Merely cognizing an event creates distance from the situation. The 
emotional displays in the ideological practice can thus be understood as the subjects' 
response to the call of the ideological system, acts of self-identification, and displays of the 
depth of one's involvement. 
Furthermore, the association between emotion-transformation and intensity of action-
modalization can also be understood as a feature of the ideological discourse. In most cases 
the transformable emotions such as anger, hatred, and grief are not directly transformed into 
actions. Instead, they are transformed into "strength" that further energizes action. 
As discussed in chapter 2, Lyons proposes a discursive logic that transforms negative 
emotions into motive/intention and then action. In the editorials analyzed the discursive logic 
is to transform emotions into strength that further modalizes actions. In the light of the model 
of cultural frames, it can be argued that these two transformational logics are enacted by rules 
inherent in two cultural frames, namely individualistic and reformist frames. For the 
individualist a negative emotion is perceived as a problem to be dealt with and thus actions 
are needed to target the emotion itself. In the reformist frame, however, negative emotions 
are caused by external factors and thus actions are called for to deal with the external 
"causes." Furthermore, the essentialist perceives (positive or negative) emotional displays as 
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either appropriate or inappropriate. The appropriateness or inappropriateness is evaluated 
according to the identity of the individual who displays such emotions in a specific situation. 
Thus understanding emotional displays is of primary importance instead of taking action. 
The mutualist displays negative emotion to stop an ongoing action or non-action that causes 
discomfort to members of a community. Thus the discursive logic for emotion transformation 
is from one's emotion to other's awareness of the problem and then to other's action or stop 
of an action. 
It can be further argued that within reformist frame negative emotions are 
predominantly other-directed such as anger and hatred. That is why these are the most 
prominent emotions identified in the editorials. The self-directed negative emotions such as 
frustration, guiltiness, and embarrassment are not identified in the texts. 
In this chapter I examined action modalization and emotion patterns in the Chinese 
communist ideology. The features of action modalization are shown to be conditioned by the 
fundamental semantic structures associated with the grand narrative, especially, perception of 
events and social categorization strategies. Emotion display and transformation are shown to 
be governed by the cultural frame within which this ideology is founded. These social 
psychological elements are thus examined as textual production regulated by a dominant 




In this research I have established an epistemological position from which ideologies 
can be studied without assuming a separation between ideas and reality. The notion of 
discursive practice suggests that reality is always conceived through a certain discourse. 
Instead of viewing ideas as reflections of reality, I view ideas as constitutive of reality. This 
position allows me to examine the ways in which ideological systems are sustained through 
producing their subjects and realities that are meaningful to the subjects. 
Methodologically, I incorporated Greimas's (1977, 1966 [1984]) narrative theory and 
analytical models, and Ryan's (1985) model of narrative modality into sociological analysis 
of personal stories. In conjunction with Roberts's (2003) model of cultural frames, this 
deductive analytical procedure provides an alternative to conventional qualitative analysis 
that starts with data and infers theoretical arguments. This analytical procedure allows me to 
reconstruct the author-perceived world in terms of its social relations, cultural ways of 
settling conflicts, communication patterns, and sources of social conflicts. Moreover, since 
this procedure is established based on theories that address fundamental cultural forms, it 
should have great potential for analyzing stories written or told by members of other 
societies. 
As a case study based on the epistemological position and theoretical and analytical 
models established I examined the Chinese communist ideological system as a culture. My 
new position allows totalitarianism to obtain its meaningfulness as a discursive domain that 
is produced within one of four possible fundamental cultural forms, i.e. reformist frame. 
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However, this is by no means to argue that reformist frame is equivalent to totalitarianism or 
that reformist frame produces totalitarianism. In fact, a cultural frame is a set of rules that 
regulate the production of meaning. It does not produce meanings on its own. Specific 
meanings are produced by concrete discursive practice. A culture is the totality of discursive 
practice that is regulated by one or more cultural frames in the same way in which 
mathematics is governed by logic. An ideological system is totalitarian in its claim of being 
the Truth for a people and in its demand for people to organize and understand their lives 
only in its terms. 
In the Chinese communist ideological system, such a truth claim is made through 
establishing a grand narrative that imposes a single cause for historical events and generates 
strategies and schemes for social categorization. Unlike existing literature on grand narrative, 
in which the notion of grand narrative is used as a heuristic tool to hint at the underlying 
assumptions of social discourses covering a long historical period, I define grand narrative in 
terms of its mode of causality. This definition allows for establishing an analytical procedure 
to tackle textual data and reconstruct grand narratives. 
The findings in chapters 4 and 5 support Tucker's (1973) argument that modern 
totalitarian societies are results of cultural transformations. However, this research 
contributes to this argument in that it provides the specific forms in which cultural 
transformation takes place. On one hand, the communist grand narrative replaces traditional 
Chinese historical discourse through state ideological apparatuses (Althusser 1984[1967]) 
such as media. On the other hand, the social categorization scheme required by the 
communist ideological system coexisted with traditional interpersonal relations and 
interactional norms. Members of the Chinese society oftentimes had to negotiate a position in 
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between two cultural domains. For instance, the personal stories often oppose an obligation-
world to a right-world, suggesting the tension between the traditional and the ideological 
discursive domains. 
This research also contributes to the study of modern totalitarian ideology in that it 
emphasizes the ways in which subjects to a totalitarian system are produced. Ideology is 
understood as a living and lived discourse instead of a static set of ideas. Personal stories are 
examined as self-identification processes, through which members of a society organize their 
life experiences in accordance with the narrative modes, genres, and narrative conflict 
provided by the ideological system. 
Common to all three types story, the fundamental semantic structure established 
through the grand narrative is used to interpret one's life experiences and to achieve a sense 
of self. The narrative modes are dictated by the social categories established in the grand 
narrative. These narrative modes require that subjects recognize such grand narrative, while 
positioning themselves in the progressive social category. The grand narrative is then 
sustained through its "marking" or "indicating" and its subjects' recognition. 
In chapter 6 I have shown that the Chinese communist ideological system orients its 
subjects toward actions predominantly in terms of right. This action-orientation is 
fundamentally different from that in traditional Chinese culture, which orients its subjects 
toward actions in terms of interpersonal obligations. Moreover, negative emotions in the 
Chinese communist ideological system such as anger and hatred are other-directed, which are 
oftentimes transformed into actions mediated by strength, whereas in traditional Chinese 
culture emotions are evaluated as appropriate or inappropriate according to one's social 
identity in a specific situation. 
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In conclusion, the communist system typically opposes traditional Chinese culture as 
the "other." This finding is fundamentally inconsistent with the argument that modern 
totalitarian system emerges in societies such as China because their traditional cultures 
contain elements that are compatible to totalitarianism. Surely it would be far-fetched to 
argue that nonetheless by being used as the communist ideological system's antithesis, 
traditional Chinese culture somehow contains elements "compatible" with the Chinese 
communist ideology. These findings also offer no support for arguments reviewed in chapter 
1, according to which traditional cultures "perverts" either the emancipation or the 
modernization process and transforms them into totalitarianism. 
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